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ABSTRACT
The growth of persistent unemployment in Europe led to the introduction of activation 
requirements in GMI schemes as a means of improving their employment effectiveness. 
This move prompted two debates that deal with issues of fairness and effectiveness, and 
the balance between them. The first debate concerns the terms in which one can justify the 
provision of a right to a minimum income. In particular, questions are made as to the 
fairness of activation requirements and to the conditions under which individuals are asked 
to fulfil their obligations. The second debate concerns the balance between fairness and 
effectiveness in the activation of GMI recipients. More specifically, it is necessary to 
determine to what degree the guarantee of fairness can hamper, or further, the employment 
effectiveness of the schemes.
This thesis argues that the right to a minimum income can only be adequately justified with 
reference to the individuals’ Right to Personal Development. Recognising that the right to 
a minimum income should be made conditional on the fulfilment of the individuals’ 
obligation to exploit their talents, the Right to Personal Development nonetheless holds 
that this should be enforced in a context where they have effective opportunities to exploit 
their talents and that recognises the different activities that make a contribution to society.
Assuming that the right to a minimum income should be justified with reference to the 
individuals’ Right to Personal Development, the thesis goes on to demonstrate that, with 
the exception of the freedom to choose other activities instead of paid employment, it is 
possible to combine a higher respect for the Right to Personal Development with higher 
levels of employment effectiveness.
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C hapter I -  Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades in the European Union have been marked by the growth o f  structural 
unemployment. Although there is significant disagreement as to its causes, it seems to be 
the product o f  the interaction between the growth o f international trade competition, the 
impact o f technological change and the decline in the demand for certain skills (Ferrera 
and Rhodes 2000, p. 261). As Graph 1 illustrates, one o f  the most importance 
consequences o f this process, was the increase o f the number o f  persons depending on 
minimum income benefits, especially between 1980 and 1990.
Graph 1 - Recipiency rates of lone-parent and social assistance benefits, as a 







— # — Austria — 0— Belgium — 0 —  Denmark — X—  France — A — Germany
— A— Ireland -  *  — Netherlands — • —  Spain — 9 —  Sweden - - ♦  • - United Kingdom
Source: OECD 2003, p. 225.
1 For the sake o f comparison, the OECD combined information on general social assistance and lone parent 
benefits in the same category (2003, p. 182).
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2Given the impossibility of pursuing expansionary policies to combat unemployment , 
policy makers sought to improve the employment effectiveness of income support 
schemes. In this context, the OECD’s Jobs Study initiative, published in 1992, advocated 
the introduction of time-limits to unemployment insurance entitlement and the reduction of 
after-tax replacement rates. In addition, long-term assistance benefits should be made 
conditional on the participation in active labour market programmes (OECD 1994, p. 38- 
39).
This debate was also pursued within the European Union. In 1992 the European Council 
suggested that, in order to improve the reintegration capacity of minimum income 
schemes, the right to a minimum income should be made conditional on a work 
requirement for able-bodied persons. At the same time, member states were encouraged to 
offer training courses to help recipients return to the labour market (European Council 
1992, p. 3). In 1993, the European Commission’s ‘White Paper for Growth, 
Competitiveness and Employment’ recommended that the new model for European society 
should be based on active, rather than passive solidarity. In particular, the White Paper 
emphasised the need to invest in active employment programmes (1993, p. 15-16). This 
trend was further reinforced with the approval of the European Employment Strategy in 
1997 (Bosco and Chassard 1999, p.43-4 and Jonckers 2001, p. 9-10).
In this context, EU member countries introduced a set of reforms aimed at activating 
minimum income recipients3. In 1995 the UK government introduced the Jobseekers Act, 
which made the receipt of benefit dependent on searching, and accepting, available jobs4. 
Later, the government introduced the New Deal programmes that provided work and 
training opportunities for unemployed persons (Trickey and Walker 2000, p. 186-92). In 
Sweden, the new Social Service Act of 1998 established that the right to social assistance 
for individuals between 20 and 24, was conditional on their participation in local labour
2
As Ferrera and Rhodes show (2000, p. 258-60), the governments’ ability to tackle unemployment by 
pursuing expansionary policies was constrained by the increase in trade competition, which in turns puts 
pressure on governments to reduce the tax burden on business; by the integration o f  financial markets, which 
forces governments to focus on the stability o f monetary policy variables (i.e. inflation and interest rates); 
and by the growing weight o f  healthcare and pensions systems in social expenditure.
3 For a more detailed review o f  the changes introduced in unemployment benefits see Pelizzari (2004).
4 In 1987, the United Kingdom government had already introduced the Restart programme by which long­
term unemployed were summoned to compulsory interviews and job-search training, and it introduced 
benefit penalties for non-compliance (Dolton and O’Neil 1997, p. 1).
2
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market programmes or local activity programmes5 (see Salonen and Johansson 1999, p. 
11-2).
In Denmark, the law that regulated the provision of social assistance was amended in 1991 
in order to compel municipalities to provide unemployed recipients under 25 with advice 
and activation offers, such as subsidised job training, employment projects or education 
courses. This law was amended in 1993 in order to extend the activation offer to 
individuals above 25 (Torfing 1999, p. 16). In 1998, the Act on Active Social Policy 
introduced a right and duty to activation. This meant the obligation to accept a ‘suitable 
work offer’, as defined by local authorities, or to participate in activation programmes 
(Rosdahl and Weise 2001, p. 167).
Finally, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy introduced Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI) 
schemes where the right to a minimum income was made conditional on the individuals’ 
willingness to engage in an insertion process, which could encompass active job-search, 
participation in education/training courses, participation in community programmes, etc. 
(Matsaganis et al. 2003, p. 646; Capucha 1998, p. 30, 36-42; Arriba and Moreno 2002, p. 
16-18; Enjolras et al. 2000, p. 50-2).
However, as the following sections will show, these reforms raise important questions as to 
the nature of the right to a minimum income and the balance between fairness and 
effectiveness in the activation of GMI recipients. This thesis aims at providing a valuable 
and innovative contribution to these debates. This introductory chapter will provide the 
necessary background for this enterprise. Hence, the chapter starts by presenting the main 
institutional characteristics of GMI schemes and the different forms of minimum income 
provision. The second part of the chapter will clarify what is meant by activation and 
analyse the instruments and strategies used to activate GMl recipients. The last section will 
specify the research questions that will guide this study and provide an outline of the 
thesis.
5 The Social Services A ct o f 1982, gave individuals the right to social assistance in case they had exhausted 
their means to guarantee for self-sufficiency. Yet, this right was left very much unregulated, leaving space for 
municipalities and for judiciary organs to define particular aspects o f  policy implementation, such as benefit 
payment or the imposition o f  work requirements (Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 355 and Salonen and Johansson 
1999, p. 11).
3
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1.1. GMI SCHEMES AND THE PROVISION OF A SAFETY-NET
Social protection systems are based on two main pillars. The first is social security, which 
provides insurance-based protection against (work-related) social risks, such as 
unemployment, old age or illness. The right to social security is established on a reciprocal 
basis between the individual and society. Social assistance, on the other hand, provides 
non-contributory protection against social risks that are not covered by social security 
benefits. Thus, social assistance is unilateral and dependency based. This affects the status 
of the recipients, who are at risk of stigma and prejudice (Lodemel and Schulte 1992, p. 8-
9).
Although it can include a variety of targeted and in-kind means-tested benefits6, 
Guaranteed Minimum Income schemes, as they constitute non-contributory, 
(quasi)universal benefits, targeted at individuals whose income is bellow a minimum 
standard; are a fundamental pillar of social assistance7. According to Lodemel and Shulte 
(1992, p. 10-11), European GMI schemes share the following institutional characteristics:
• They are subsidiary programmes within social protection systems and aimed at 
providing benefits to those in proven need;
• They are right-based;
• They are essentially universal, although certain targeted and categorical 
mechanisms do exist;
• They cover standard needs, although provisions for specific needs can be 
guaranteed by combining GMI with other benefits;
• Benefits are available for unlimited periods, but only if entitlement conditions 
still hold;
• There is a work-test condition for the able-bodied;
• They involve reintegration services/activities, which in some cases are 
mandatory;
• They are supplemented by private charity or third-sector support.
6 According to Eardley et al. one can differentiate between general assistance, which provides cash benefits 
for almost all people below a specified minimum income standard; categorical assistance, which provides 
cash benefits for specific groups, such as the unemployed, disabled, old-aged, etc; tied assistance, which 
provides access to specific goods or services in kind or in cash (ex. housing benefits, heating benefits, etc.) 
(1996a, p. 28).
7 Lodemel and Trickey for instance, use social assistance to refer to last-resort income support schemes 
(2000, p. 9).
4
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In the context of the European Union member countries one can identify the following 
GMI schemes:
Table 1 -  GMI schemes in European Union member countries
Country GM I scheme
Austria Sozialhilfe.
Belgium Minim ex
Denmark Social Bistand (Social Assistance)
Finland Toimeentulotuki (Social Assistance)
France Revenu Minimun d’Insertion
Germany Bundessocialhilfegesetz
Italy Reddito Minimo d’Inserimento
Ireland Supplementary Welfare Allowance
Luxembourg Revenu Minimun Guaranti
Netherlands Algemene Bijstand
Portugal Rendimento Minimo Garantido
Sweden Socialbidrag
Spain Rentas Minimas (Regional Benefits)
United Kingdom JSA (non-contributory), Incom e Support
1.1.1. MAPPING THE PROVISION OF A SAFETY-NET
The earliest attempt at mapping GMI schemes in Europe was conducted by Lodemel and 
Schulte in the late 1980’s 8. Based on Titmuss’s typology of welfare regimes, the authors 
identified four poverty regimes:
• the institutionalised poverty-regime, associated with the UK, was characterised by 
the limited role of social insurance in tackling poverty. Beyond social insurance, 
the destitute could only count on the market to provide for their needs;
• the differentiated poverty-regime, typical of corporatist welfare states such as 
France and Germany, was based on a clear differentiation of the role of social 
insurance and social assistance in combating poverty. The role of social assistance 
was less relevant, but still with extensive coverage and clear entitlement rules;
8 In 1989, Serge Milano analysed GMI schemes in (Western) Germany, UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
France. However, the author’s study is more focused on the description o f  the schemes, rather than on a 
comparison between them.
5
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• the residual poverty-regime, which incorporated Nordic countries, was marked by 
the limited importance of social assistance in the fight against poverty. Social 
assistance schemes combine both income benefits and services to recipients;
• the incomplete differentiated regimes type, included Southern Europe countries that 
combined a highly differentiated structure of social protection systems with 
significant gaps in the provision of a minimum income (1992, p. 12-13, 18-19).
Eardley et al. (1996a) propose a more comprehensive typology that covers a number of 
aspects such as the extent, cost and coverage of social assistance; the relative generosity of 
benefits; the structure of implementation; the implementation of the means-test; and the 
level of discretion given to officials (1996a, p. 165). As Table 2 shows, there are 
significant differences in the provision of a minimum income guarantee in European 
countries. In the Nordic states, full-employment and the strength of social security has 
made social assistance a marginal form of welfare provision. Despite being based on 
national legislation, there is a significant level of discretion, as implementation is the 
responsibility of local municipalities.
Table 2 -  Eardley et al. typology of social assistance schemes in OECD countries
Cluster Countries
Welfare states with integrated safety-nets 
Dual social assistance 
Citizenship-based but residual assistance 
Rudimentary assistance 
Decentralised discretionary regime 
Public assistance state 
Selective welfare systems 
Centralised discretionary regime
UK, Ireland, Germany and Canada 
France, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey 
Norway, Austria and Switzerland
USA
Australia, N ew  Zealand 
Japan
Based on Eardley et al. (1996a, p. 168-71)
In other countries, such as the UK, Ireland and Germany, the right to a minimum income is 
provided through a more-or-less integrated safety-net that covers a significant percentage 
of the population9. This contrasts with France, Belgium and Luxembourg, which 
introduced more inclusive schemes to complement the plethora of categorical means-tested 
benefits. In southern European countries, social assistance is targeted at particular groups,
9 There are nonetheless significant differences between them. For instance, whilst in Germany social 
assistance is implemented by the local authorities; in Britain, Income Support is delivered by the central 
government. In Ireland there is a significant number o f  categorical means-tested schemes, which cover a 
considerable proportion o f the population (Eardley et al. 1996a, p. 169).
6
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namely the elderly or the disabled. In addition there are discretionary programmes run by 
municipalities or charities. Social assistance in Norway, Austria and Switzerland, also 
depends of a highly localised and discretionary structure of implementation. However, the 
level of benefits is significantly higher than in Southern European countries (Eardley et a l 
1996a, p.168-71)10.
Despite their analytical value, none of the typologies provides any information on the role 
of GMI schemes in the broader framework of welfare provision. In light of this, it might be 
helpful to look at the literature on welfare-regimes11. Unfortunately, Esping-Andersen’s 
welfare-regime typology ignores the role of social assistance schemes in welfare provision 
(Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 54). Instead, Esping-Andersen uses the level of expenditure on 
general social assistance schemes as an indicator of the role of the welfare state as a system 
of stratification. In particular, the author points to the salience of means-tested benefits and 
the relative weight of private provision of pensions12 and health-care13 as evidence of the 
centrality of the market as a principle of stratification in the liberal-regime cluster (Esping- 
Andersen 1990, p. 61-65, 69-76).
Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes provide a more interesting alternative. Based on the 
literature generated since Esping-Andersen’s initial study, the authors identify four 
welfare-state types: the Scandinavian model, the Anglo-Saxon model, the Continental 
model and the South European model14. The Scandinavian model, provides quasi-universal 
risk coverage and very generous social benefits. There is also a strong emphasis on active
10 Ian Gough tried to confirm the validity o f this typology by applying cluster analysis to the original data.
His study focuses on the level o f generosity, inclusiveness and extensiveness o f  social assistance schemes. 
The use o f  cluster analysis confirms that there is significant diversity in how countries provide a security net 
for those in need. Nonetheless, in what Europe is concerned, this study only confirms two o f the original 
regimes: the citizenship-based but residual regime and the decentralised discretionary regime. The results 
also show that there is a significant consistency in the cluster o f  central Continental countries. In contrast, the 
cluster analysis shows that there are significant differences within the Latin regime. Whilst there are 
significant similarities between Portugal and Greece, Spain and Italy are closer to the Continental model 
(Gough 2001, p. 168-9).
11 Serge Milano (1989) made a first attempt o f integrating GMI within the broader policy-mix. The author 
traces the role and structure o f GMI schemes to the principles that define the ascription o f  social rights and 
also the modes o f  social regulation. However, Milano’s study fails to analyse the policy linkages between 
GMI, unemployment and social pension benefits.
12 Here measured as the relative share o f private-pension expenditures to total pension expenditure (Esping- 
Andersen 1990, p. 78).
13 Here measured as the relative share o f private health expenditures to total health expenditure (Esping- 
Andersen 1990, p. 78).
14 In contrast to other studies, the authors first identified the welfare models, and only then looked at their 
internal characteristics. Their analysis focussed on risk coverage and eligibility, the structure o f  benefits, the 
financing mechanisms and the organisational arrangements in place (Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes 2000, 
p. 15-19).
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labour market policies (ALMP) and public social services (namely, childcare), with the 
purpose of increasing participation in the labour market. Given this basic structure and the 
richness of services available, means-tested mechanisms have occupied, until recent years, 
a residual but inclusive role (Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes 2000, p. 15-19)
The Anglo-Saxon model refers to the British case15. With the exception of healthcare, there 
is no universal coverage of social risks. Inactive persons and those earning bellow a given 
threshold are not entitled to National Insurance benefits. Social security benefits are also 
much lower than in Scandinavian countries. In light of this, GMI and means-tested 
schemes are much more extensive than in Scandinavian countries (Ferrera, Hemericjck and 
Rhodes 2000, p.21-26).
The Continental model includes Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and Austria. The funding and delivery of social protection is linked to the work status of 
individuals16. Given its occupational basis, the social protection system provides an 
inclusive, but fragmented, coverage. This is complemented with a network of fairly 
generous GMI benefits (Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes 2000, p. 26-31).
The Southern Europe model comprises Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. The tendency 
here was to articulate universal health-care with insurance-based income protection. As 
families still play a significant role in the provision of welfare, family benefits and family 
services are rather undeveloped. However, during the 1990’s, Spain, Portugal and Italy 
introduced guaranteed minimum income schemes17 (Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes 
2000, p. 31-37).
15 Curiously, the authors do not include Ireland in this model. Although they accept that it shares a number o f  
characteristics with the British model, the authors argue that Ireland, with its focus on negotiated adjustment, 
has gradually dissociated it (see Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes 2000, p. 21). However, the authors fail to 
relocate the Irish in any other cluster.
16 The exception is the Netherlands, where some universal basic pensions schemes have been introduced 
(Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes 2000, p. 26-30).
17 There are nonetheless differences in the implementation o f  minimum income schemes in Southern 
European countries. For instance, in Italy, despite a national regulatory framework, local and regional 
authorities enjoyed great discretion. Hence, local minimum income schemes were the product o f  municipal 
initiative. In 1998, the Italian government introduced the ‘Reddito minimo di inserimento’, which was 
supposed to create the basis for a more integrated safety-net. In Spain, the federal legislation as ascribed 
regional authorities with the power to create and regulate the functioning o f  regional GMI schemes.
Portugal, on the other hand, introduced a GMI scheme (Rendimento Minimo Guarantido) in 1996 which is 
very much inspired in the French RMI (see Matsaganis et al., 2003).
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Reflecting on the previous paragraphs, one can observe that these typologies only capture 
partial aspects of the role of GMI schemes in the provision of a safety-net in European 
countries. In order to overcome this obstacle one can compare the welfare typology 
developed by Ferrera, Hemericjck and Rhodes and the social assistance typology created 
by Eardley et al. As can be seen from Table 3, in the Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon and 
Southern European regimes the GMI schemes in place seem to be consistent with the 
overall model of welfare provision. In contrast, there are significant differences in the 
provision of a minimum income guarantee in Continental countries. In Germany, the social 
assistance scheme provides an integrated safety-net for those who trickle down the social 
security benefit structure. In France, Belgium and Luxembourg the safety-net is composed 
of (quasi)universal and targeted non-contributory schemes. In the Netherlands and Austria, 
social assistance plays a residual role in the protection of people in need. However, whilst 
in the former the rights of social assistance recipients are well established, in the latter they 
are subject to significant discretion by local authorities.
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1.2. THE ACTIVATION OF GMI RECIPIENTS
As Geldof demonstrates (Geldof 1999, p. 16), the principle of activation has been used in 
various areas with different meanings. For instance, in income support policies, this meant 
the introduction of contractual elements in the entitlement to income protection and of 
employment measures for long-term unemployed. In the employment area, it involved a 
more personalised treatment of jobseekers and the introduction of in-work benefits. In 
sociocultural work, activation measures and methodologies are aimed at empowering 
recipients. This implies reducing personal feelings of inferiority and insecurity, helping 
recipients to establish their own objectives and assume their personal and social 
responsibilities. The purpose of this section is to examine the main aspects of the 
introduction of the principle of activation in GMI schemes. The section starts by clarifying 
what is meant by activation. The remaining sections analyse the instruments and the 
different strategies used to activate GMI recipients.
1.2.1. DEFINING ACTIVATION
According to Hvinden (1999, p. 28), one can differentiate between a narrow and a wider 
approach to activation. The first refers to a set of policies that seek to promote participation 
in the primary labour-market through increased job-search assistance, training and 
education, or job creation programmes. The second is focused on the personal development 
of individuals and involves the participation in a wider set of activities such as protected 
labour markets, voluntary or community activities. Hvinden’s distinction is quite helpful, 
as it highlights the different strategies underlying the introduction of activation elements in 
GMI schemes. However, the author fails to mention the role of activation requirements as a 
means of inducing recipients back to the labour market18.
Hanesh and Baltzer provide a more interesting perspective. According to them, activation 
refers to “ ... a set of policies/measures/instruments aimed at integrating unemployed social 
assistance recipients into the labour market and improving their economic and social 
inclusion” (2001, p. 3). Activation can include interventions on the supply and demand
18 In fact, according to the author, there is a significant overlap between his narrow sense o f  activation and 
the notion o f  ALMP (1999, p.29).
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side of the labour market, and involve a number of policy instruments such as legislation, 
financial incentives and social or labour market services. In contrast to Hvinden, Hanesh 
and Baltzer focus on the instruments, rather than on the strategies, used to activate GMI 
recipients. However, although they recognise that activation involves both negative and 
positive incentives, the authors fail to highlight the political significance of the 
introduction of activation requirements in GMI schemes.
Given the limitations of the previous definitions of activation, an alternative definition is 
needed. Hence, one can define activation as the combination of negative and positive 
incentives aimed at engaging GMI recipients into processes that lead them to (re)gain self- 
sufficiency, preferably through paid employment19. This definition bears a number of 
advantages20. First, it assumes that the differentiating character of activation lies in the 
combination of negative and positive incentives to recipients. Consequently, it recognises 
the political debate underlying the introduction of activation requirements in GMI 
schemes. In addition, although it recognises that the ultimate purpose of activation is self- 
sufficiency, preferably through paid employment, this definition is flexible enough to 
accommodate different activation strategies.
One can further circumscribe this notion of activation by differentiating it from two 
neighbouring concepts: ALMP and workfare21. Although active labour market programmes 
are part of the policy-mix used to activate GMI recipients, there are nonetheless, two 
significant differences. First, their main purpose is the macro-economic management of the 
structural imbalances in the labour-market. Besides combating unemployment, they have 
also been used to deal with other structural problems such as the labour-market 
participation of women, the equality of opportunities for disabled people, or the economic 
recovery of specific regions and industries (Hvinden 1999, p. 28-29; Kildal 2000, p. 5).
The concept of workfare emerged in the early 1970’s, with the introduction of work 
requirements into social assistance schemes in the United States (Hvinden 1999, p. 28-29).
19 This focus on positive and negative incentives follows Guibentif and Bouget’s analysis o f  activation o f  
GMI recipients (see Guibentif and Bouget 1997: 14-6).
20 Although it does not directly relate with the purpose o f  this study, this definition, as it focuses on the 
processes that lead to self-sufficiency, opens the way to an analysis o f the organisational processes that 
structure individual trajectories.
21 According to Kildal, welfare-to-work is a mere variant o f workfare. They both focus on the application o f  
compulsory elements in benefits for the workless poor. However, welfare-to-work seems to provide more 
education and training opportunities, and better working conditions than workfare (2000, p. 5).
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According to Lodemel and Trickey, workfare refers to “programmes or schemes that 
require people to work in return for social assistance benefits” (2000, p. 6). This definition 
comprises three main elements. First, workfare is compulsory: if work requirements are not 
fulfilled the benefit can be reduced or even withdrawn. Second, workfare is primarily 
about work. The purpose is that individuals become self-sufficient through (unsubsidised) 
paid employment or, if that is not possible, that they participate in public work schemes in 
exchange for the benefit. Thirdly, workfare is a part of social assistance and implies a 
reconfiguration of the right to minimum income protection (Lodemel and Trickey 2000, p. 
7-11).
In the same way as the notion of activation advanced earlier, Lodemel and Trickey put 
great emphasis on the significance of the introduction of work requirements in the 
redefinition of the entitlement to minimum income protection. However, the centrality 
given to paid employment limits the ability to analyse the schemes that pursue alternative 
activation strategies. Furthermore, the focus on the conditional character of the entitlement 
to social assistance ignores the variety of activation opportunities available to recipients.
1.2.2. POLICY INSTRUMENTS
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of this section is to identify the various instruments used 
by policy-makers to activate GMI recipients. As mentioned earlier, activation involves 
both positive and negative incentives. Furthermore, as Hanesh and Baltzer point out (2001, 
p. 4), these incentives can be targeted at the demand or supply-side of the labour market. In 
light of this, one can classify the various activation incentives according to the following 
typology:
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Table 4 -  Positive and negative incentives used in the activation of GMI recipients








growth o f  cash benefits
Positive
Incentives
Job-search assistance programmes 
(counselling, job-search support and
training)
State obligation to provide activation offers 
Incentives or subsidies for employers
Training Job creation schemes (traditional job creation, 
intermediate labour market initiatives)
Incentives or subsidies to individuals Job Sharing/Job Rotation
As mentioned earlier, the distinctive feature of activation consists in the introduction of 
activation requirements as an entitlement condition for minimum income protection. 
According to Guibentif and Bouget (1997, p. 15-6), this activation requirement is 
expressed in two distinct formulas. In the first, which is the most common, the main 
purpose of activation is to find a job. The activation requirement is expressed as an 
obligation of active job-search, or mandatory enrolment in the public employment
99services . Despite its universal character, certain countries do consider some exceptions 
for individuals with child-care responsibilities23, or with dependent adults in the family24. 
Furthermore, some countries limit this requirement in such a way that it does not force 
individuals into jobs that do not match their qualifications25, their previous occupation26, or 
that are not adjusted to their characteristics or situation27.
22 In Finland, there is no explicit obligation for social assistance recipients to find work. In fact, an appeal 
court ruled that claimants did not have an automatic obligation to take paid work. However, there are 
sanctions for individuals who fail to search for jobs or to take part in activation measures (Eardley et al. 
1996b, p. 128-9; OECD 1998, p. 15; Guibentif and Bouget 1997, Finnish Questionnaire.).
23 Namely, Portugal, Denmark and Finland (see Eardley et a l  1996b, p. 114, 129).
24 This is the case o f  Germany (see Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 164).
25 Namely, the Netherlands (see Oorschot and Engelfriet 2000, p. 15).
26 This is the case o f  Germany or the UK (see Vogues, Jacobs and Trickey 2001, p. 78; Ditch and Roberts
2000, p. 22).
27 This is the case o f  France and Denmark (see Rosdahl and W eise 2001, p. 167; Enjolras et al. 2000, p. 50- 
! ) •
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In the second model, the social insertion model, the main objective is to engage recipients 
in a multi-level strategy that is intended to reverse their situation. In this sense, the search 
for a job has the same priority as recovering from health problems, finding suitable 
accommodation, etc. The entitlement to minimum income support requires the signature of 
an insertion contract. This contract consists of an agreement that identifies the objectives 
and stages of the insertion process, and the resources made available to recipients 
(Guibentif and Bouget 1997, p. 16-17).
The enforcement of activation requirements is undertaken with the help of sanctions. These 
can range from the termination of benefit entitlement28, to partial cuts, or the temporary 
suspension of benefit29. Some countries have a fixed-penalty regime, whilst others use 
progressive sanctions30. In the US, some states introduced time-limits on entitlement to 
social assistance (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001, p. 37-8). In Europe this has not yet 
been introduced. Only the refusal to fulfil the activation requirement, or changes in 
individual/family incomes can terminate entitlement (Guibentiif and Bouget 1997, p. 31-2 
and Eardley et al. 1996a, p. 143-5).
Besides the introduction of sanctions and time-limits, policy-makers have demonstrated 
concern about the potential disincentives to job-search produced by GMI benefits, also 
known as unemployment traps31. As Pellizzari points out, the reduction of the level of 
benefits has been a central part of the reform of unemployed insurance benefits in Europe 
(2004, p. 7). This is not necessarily the case with GMI schemes. Nonetheless, some 
countries did introduced mechanisms to curb the growth of benefit levels32.
Besides negative incentives, the activation of GMI recipients also involves positive 
incentives, both at the demand and supply-side level. Supply-side interventions are aimed 
at improving the recipients’ employability, or improving the incentives for recipients to 
take on paid employment. In the first group one can include job-search assistance 
programmes such as in-depth counselling, job-search training, job-broking services, job-
28 As in the case o f Portugal and France (see Lefevre and Zoyem 1999, p. 2 and Capucha 1998, p. 40).
29 As in the case o f Ireland or the UK (see Earldey et al. 1996a, p. 150; Trickey and Walker 2000, p. 201-2).
30 This is the case o f the UK (see Trickey and Walker 2000, p. 201-2).
31 For a more detailed discussion o f unemployment traps see Carone et al. (2004, p. 7-9).
32 For instance, in the Netherlands the link between wages and social assistance benefits was frozen for 3 
years. Sweden was the only case where the base amount o f  benefit was reduced (Cantillon et al. 2004, p. 
528-35)
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clubs, etc., and a variety of training programmes33. In the second group, one can include in­
work benefits34, back-to-work grants35, support for job-search costs, or start-up incentives36 
(Meager and Evans 1998, p. 9-10 and Martin 1998, p. 18).
Demand-side interventions, on the other hand, are intended to create additional work 
opportunities for GMI recipients. In most cases, this is not seen as State obligation. The 
exceptions are Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark, municipalities are required to provide 
unemployed recipients under 25 with advice, counselling, and a range of activation 
programmes. In 1993, this obligation was extended to individuals above 25 (Torfing 1999, 
p. 16). In Sweden, municipalities are obliged to offer an activity to young unemployed 
individuals who have not received any job or ALMP offer in the first 90 days of their 
unemployment period (Salonen and Johansson 1999, p. 14)
One can identify two main types of demand-side intervention: direct job-creation schemes 
and incentives to employers. In the first group, one can differentiate between traditional 
job-creation programmes37, which consist of large-scale initiatives that allow the creation 
of jobs in the public and non-profit sector; and intermediate labour market initiatives, such 
as insertion enterprises38, which consists of small-scale, local initiatives aimed at the 
creation of employment for those hard to employ. In the second group, one can include 
exemptions of social security contributions, wage-subsidies (or a combination of the two), 
as well as job-sharing/job-rotation programmes39 (Meager and Evans 1997, p. 8-9).
33 For a more detailed description o f the training programmes available to GMI recipients see Tables 5 and 6 
in Annex II.
34 In Ireland, individuals who have been unemployed for over 12 months and gain employment are entitled to 
an additional tax credit (Revenue Job Assist) for a period o f  three years (European Employment Observatory 
2003a, p. 72). In the UK, individuals belonging to couples where any o f  the partners work 16 or more hours 
per week, or that lead lone-parent households are entitled to the Working Families Tax Credit (Kaplan and 
Leicester 2002, p. 8-9).
35 In Germany, recipients can receive an Integration Allowance when they engage in a regular working 
contract or become self-employed (Breuer and Engels 1999, p. 10-11).
36 For a more detailed description o f the start-up incentives available to GMI recipients see Table 3 in Annex 
II.
37 For a more detailed description o f the direct job creation schemes available to GMI recipients see Table 1 
in Annex II.
38 Insertion Enterprises were introduced in France in 1992. They allow collective bodies to hire hard to 
employ individuals on a fixed-term contract that can last for a maximum 24 months. In order to help in the 
funding o f  these working posts, these enterprises will receive a direct funding from the central state (Cealis 
2000, p.7). This type o f  instrument is also available in Portugal (European Employment Observatory 2002b: 
132).
39 For a more detailed description o f the employment incentives available to GMI recipients see Tables 2 and 
4 in Annex II.
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1.2.3. POLICY STRATEGIES
Having reviewed the variety of activation instruments, this section will focus on the 
strategies pursued to return GMI recipients back to the labour market. The US-based 
literature tends to differentiate between ‘human capital development’ and ‘labour-market 
attachment’ approaches40. In the latter approach, the objective is to get recipients back to 
work as soon as possible. Hence, the focus is on intensive job-search assistance 
programmes such as job clubs, intensive client counselling and self-esteem building. Some 
education and training is provided, but only to the hard-to-employ.
Human capital development-oriented schemes have more broad and long-term objectives. 
Their purpose is not to reinsert recipients as soon as possible, but to find more stable jobs, 
that provide better wages and have a potential for personal development. Hence, the focus 
is on basic education, professional training, job placement assistance, and work-related 
support services (child-care, healthcare or transportation). Furthermore, as the focus is on 
sustainable transitions to work, recipients are allowed some lenience in the choice of jobs 
they will accept. For instance, in Portland (Oregon, US) recipients were encouraged to 
select programmes that provide better wages and some possibilities of personal 
development (Theodore and Peck 2000, p. 85-89).
In the European literature, one cannot but highlight the relevance of Trickey’s comparative 
analysis of workfare programmes in Europe and US4142. The author suggests that there is a 
relation between the schemes’ ideological underpinning and their structure of
40 However, as Theodore and Peck admit, it is difficult to find ideal-type cases (2000, p. 84). In their review 
o f US-based evidence, Bloom and Michalopoulos identify four different approaches:
•  Job-search-first approach
• Education first
•  Employment-focused with mixed initial activities
•  Education-focused with mixed initial activities (2001: 10-11).
41 This is not to ignore the existence o f other relevant studies in this domain. This is the case o f  Kildal’s study 
o f workfare schemes in Scandinavian countries (2000). The same applies to Handler’s (2004) study o f  
workfare programmes in Europe and the US. Although it covers a large range o f  countries, this study fails to 
provide a systematic view  o f  the introduction o f activation in different policy context. Furthermore, one 
needs to take in consideration some o f the literature, such as Kvist (2000), Torfing (1999), or Barbier and 
Ludwig-Mayerhofer (2004), which view activation (or workfare) as an overall reform o f  the relation between 
social and employment policies.
42 The author compares schemes in terms o f their ideological underpinning (integrative vs. preventive), the 
target group, the activation strategy (human resource development vs. labour market attachment), the degree 
o f centralisation, and the level o f discretion in the enforcement o f  sanctions (see Trickey 2000, p. 249-81).
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implementation (Trickey 2000, p. 279). More specifically, centralised43 schemes tend to be 
more integrative44 and to put a higher focus on human resource development. This is 
illustrated in what the author calls the ‘European Centralised Programmes’ cluster, which 
comprises the Danish Activation Act, the Jobseeker’s Employment Act for Young People 
in the Netherlands, and the New Deal for Young People in the UK. On the other hand, as 
the Norwegian Workfare programme would illustrate, decentralised schemes tend to be 
preventive and to put a greater emphasis on quick labour market attachment (Trickey 2000, 
p. 279-80).
There are, nonetheless, limits to this idea. For instance, the US Workfare programmes, 
which are implemented through a moderately centralised administrative framework, are 
eminently preventive and focus on labour market attachment. On the other hand, the 
French RMI and Help Towards Work programmes in Germany, combine a decentralised 
administrative framework, with a strong integrative focus (2000, p. 275-276, 280).
1.3. PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
As the previous sections suggest, the activation of GMI recipients implied significant 
changes in the character and role of GMI schemes. More than just providing income 
security for those in need, GMI schemes are expected to provide a range of services that 
are intended to help individuals to regain self-subsistence, preferably through paid 
employment. As well as the changes in the implementation and delivery of minimum 
income schemes, this process prompted two important, and complementary debates.
The first concerns the terms in which one can justify the right to a minimum income. The 
introduction of activation requirements bears the crux of the problem. One needs to 
question if the activation requirement does not undermine the dignity of the individuals 
that the right to a minimum income is supposed to protect? At the same time, it is
43 The author measures the level o f centralisation o f the structure o f  implementation in terms o f  the degree o f  
central control over funding and main components o f  delivery, the level o f  discretion held by 
administrators/social workers, and the level o f distinction between insurance-based and assistance-based 
benefits (see Trickey 2000, p. 266).
44 Integrative programmes emphasise the structural basis o f  social exclusion processes, and put a focus on 
individual rights and on demand-side interventions. Preventive programmes are aimed at reducing individual 
dependency on benefits, and focus on individual responsibilities and supply-side measures (see Lodemel and 
Trickey 2000, p. 250-5).
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necessary to ask if individuals should not be expected to contribute to the society that 
produces the resources that guarantee their survival? Even if one accepts the latter premise, 
it is still necessary to determine what are the conditions under which the individuals should 
be asked to fulfil their obligations, and to what degree this requirement is fair if they have 
no effective opportunities to do so. One also needs to question which activities can be seen 
as making a contribution to society.
The second debate concerns the balance between fairness and effectiveness in the 
activation of GMI recipients. While they functioned as a safety-net, the importance of this 
balance in the implementation of GMI schemes was marginal. However, as the debate 
around the existence of unemployment traps in income benefits illustrates, as GMI 
schemes took on the responsibility of assisting GMI recipients back into the labour market, 
this issue gains a central role. Hence, as well as determining what is an adequate 
justification for the right to a minimum income, it is also necessary to determine to what 
degree this can hamper, or further, the schemes’ employment effectiveness.
This thesis will engage in the debates prompted by the activation of GMI beneficaires. The 
first part of this thesis (chapters 2 and 3) will try to respond to the following question: How 
can one justify the right to a minimum income? Chapter 2 will evaluate to what degree the 
existing literature provides an adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. The 
chapter will first review the various standpoints in political theory on the right to a 
minimum income. It will then be argued that the arguments posed by Van Parijs and 
Lawrence Mead, which typify the fundamental standpoints in the literature, fail to provide 
an adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. Reflecting on the difficulties 
faced by Mead and Van Parijs, it will be argued that a more satisfactory alternative is 
possible. This alternative should be set in the context an ontological framework that puts a 
focus on the promotion of the individuals’ personal development, but recognises its social 
basis, and the obligations that this imposes; and encompasses a more critical view of the 
role of the market as a mechanism of social regulation.
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With this in mind, Chapter 3 will develop a normative framework that can provide an 
adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. Using the ontological frameworks 
proposed by Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill as terms of comparison, the first part of this 
chapter demonstrates that Durkheim’s theory of social justice provides a theorisation of 
society, market and individual from which an adequate justification of the right to a 
minimum income can be derived.
The subsequent sections will argue that, in line with Durkheim’s theory of social justice, 
every individual has a Right to Personal Development, i.e., a right to exploit its talents, 
which can be exercised whilst performing a social function in society, such as paid 
employment, performing unpaid work in social economy organisations or providing care to 
dependent family members; or improving their human capital through education or 
training. In order to secure this right, social actors and institutions must:
• meet the individual’s basic consumption needs
• eliminate direct and indirect constraints to the individual’s choices on the best way 
to exploit its talents
• provide the individual with opportunities to exploit its talents
• enforce, through the use of restitutive sanctions, the individual’s obligation to 
exploit its talents as to enable the personal development of others.
The last section will show that the Right to Personal Development, as it recognises that the 
right to a minimum income should be made conditional on the fulfilment of a contribution 
requirement, but demands that this requirement is enforced in a context where individuals 
have the opportunity to fulfil their obligations and that recognises the variety of activities 
that make a contribution to society, can provide an adequate justification of the right to a 
minimum income.
Assuming that the Right to Personal Development can provide an adequate justification for 
the right to a minimum income, this can then be used as the normative standpoint to 
analyse the balance between fairness and effectiveness in the activation of GMI recipients. 
The second part of this thesis (chapters 4 to 6) will test the hypothesis that GMI schemes 
that show more respect for the Right to Personal Development, once labour market 
conditions are accounted for, are more effective at returning recipients to the labour 
market.
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Chapter 4 will provide the methodological framework for this comparative study. Based on 
a review of the empirical literature on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes, it 
will be argued that the relationship between the schemes employment effectiveness and 
their respect for the Right to Personal Development, can be best analysed by combining 
Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis with correlational measures and cluster analysis. 
The remaining sections will show how to measure the schemes’ respect for the Right to 
Personal Development and their employment effectiveness.
Chapter 5, will measure the schemes’ respect for the Right to Personal Development. In 
line with the methodological framework defined earlier, this chapter will measure to what 
degree the schemes satisfy the recipients’ income needs; what is the recipients’ freedom to 
choose other activities instead of paid employment or the job they wish to perform; what is 
the level of discretion in the implementation of the schemes; how much opportunities to 
work or to participate in education/training courses they have; and the character of the 
sanction regime they are subjected to.
Chapter 6 will then analyse the relation between the schemes’ employment effectiveness 
and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. The first part will be focused on 
the measurement of the schemes’ employment effectiveness. The first step in this venture 
consists in the measurement of the percentage of recipients who, a year after being on 
GMI, made a transition to unsubsidised work. This will then be adjusted to the labour 
markets’ ability to create jobs for unemployed persons - Unemployment Reintegration 
Performance. The remaining sections will use correlational measures, Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis and cluster analysis to explore the relation between the schemes’ 
employment effectiveness and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. These 
will show that, with the exception of the recipients’ freedom to choose other activities 
besides paid employment, schemes can successfully combine the respect for the recipients’ 
Right to Personal Development with higher levels of employment effectiveness.
Having provided an answer to the questions posed by the activation of GMI recipients, 
Chapter 7 will review the main contributions made by the thesis and discuss how these 
could be further elaborated in further research.
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2. THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM INCOME: BETWEEN 
MEAD AND VAN PARIJS
As seen in the previous chapter, the introduction of activation requirements has generated 
an intense debate over the conditional nature of the right to a minimum income45. This 
chapter will argue that Mead and Van Parijs, which typify the fundamental standpoints in 
the literature, fail to provide an adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. 
The first two sections will identify the main topics and the various standpoints in the 
debate on the right to a minimum income. The following sections will examine if the 
arguments presented by Mead and Van Parijs provide an adequate justification for the 
right. Reflecting on difficulties faced by the authors, the last section will argue that an 
alternative argument is possible.
2.1. SURVEY OF THE MAIN ARGUMENTS WITHIN POLITICAL 
THEORY
The purpose of this section is to identify and describe the main arguments in the debate 
over the right to a minimum income. In order to simplify this exercise, this section will 
focus on three domains within political theory: theories of justice, which discuss the 
principles that should regulate the functioning of political communities; social justice 
theories, which try to determine the fair distribution of resources in society; and welfare 
theories, which are focussed on the nature of social rights of citizenship.
45 One cannot ignore that the debate right to a minimum income also includes other relevant dimensions, 
namely the universal or subsidiary character o f the right to a minimum income (see Atkinson 1996). 
However, in the context o f the debate over the introduction o f activation policies, the focus here w ill be on 
the conditional nature o f the right to a minimum income.
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2.1.1. THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM INCOME IN THEORIES OF JUSTICE
John Ralws’ conception of justice as fairness tries to determine the principles that 
individuals would choose to govern the functioning of social institutions and the 
distribution of ‘primary social goods’46, i.e., all the means needed to pursue a given 
conception of a good life 47 (Rawls 2001, p. 35). The first principle, the ‘liberty principle’, 
argues that each individual is entitled to exercise all equal basic liberties, such as freedom 
of conscience, freedom of expression, private property and due process of law (2001, p. 
68). The second principle is intended to regulate the distribution of social and economic 
inequalities. Here, the distribution of social and economic inequalities must take place in a 
context where all positions in society are open to all citizens under fair equality of 
opportunity (the ‘liberal equality principle’) and in such a way that it privileges the least 
advantaged in a given community (the ‘difference principle’) (Rawls 2001, p. 239)48.
One can argue that the application of the difference principle to the distribution of income 
in society would legitimise the introduction of the right to a minimum income49. In the 
same way, one can argue that Rawls’ theory of social justice can be used to legitimate the 
conditional nature of the right to a minimum income. This is because, as well as the 
principles that are supposed to regulate the functioning of social institutions, the original 
social contract also defines the principles that determine the behaviour of individuals. One 
of these principles is the ‘principle of fairness’, which requires obedience to the rules of a 
(just) institution whenever an individual has voluntarily benefited from the rewards and 
opportunities produced by that institution. The underlying logic is that individuals should 
not take unfair advantage from the efforts made by others, without giving the fair share that 
is expected from them (Rawls 2001, p. 267-8).
Unlike Rawls, Gutmann and Thompson provide an explicit argument as to the conditional 
nature of the right to a minimum income. Their ‘theory of deliberative democracy’ argues
46 According to Rawls (2001, p. 90), this category includes rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth and 
the bases o f  self-respect.
47 Rawls’ theory o f  justice requires that individuals choose the principles o f  justice under a ‘veil o f  
ignorance’, i.e., they are ignorant of their social status, their position in the distribution o f talents in society, 
their own conceptions o f good or personal psychological characteristics (Rawls 2001, p. 33-4).
48 Rawls also establishes a rule to resolve conflicts between these principles. Thus the liberty principle takes 
precedence over the liberal equality principle, and the later has precedence over the principle o f  difference 
(Rawls 2001, p. 239).
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that conflicts over fundamental values should be resolved by reference to the principles of 
reciprocity, publicity and accountability. However, contrary to traditional deliberative 
theories, this is not a purely procedural framework. The authors identify three substantive 
principles that are supposed to regulate the deliberation process. These would be:
• the principle of basic liberty, which secures individuals from violations of their 
physical and mental integrity;
• the principle of basic opportunity, which guarantees citizens access to the basic 
goods that secure a good life (such as healthcare, education, work, and income);
• the principle of fair opportunity, which requires a merit-based distribution of 
certain goods in society (Muhlberger 2000, p. 7).
On the one hand, these substantive principles act as conditions to the deliberative process, 
in the sense that they limit the possibility of reaching resolutions that might violate the 
ideas of basic liberty, or basic opportunity; on the other hand, they constitute the 
prerequisites of the whole deliberative process, as they guarantee the possibility of equal 
standing for all participants.
The authors’ discussion of the right to a minimum income comes about in the discussion of 
the fulfilment of the basic opportunity principle. The guarantee of a minimum income, as a 
basic opportunity, should respect the principle of reciprocity50 - which entails the idea of 
mutual dependence. The authors argue that given the fact that the resources that secure a 
minimum income guarantee are produced by those engaged in productive economic 
activity, then those who make a claim on those resources must be available to participate in 
the productive process that generates it, i.e., they need to be available to work. But the 
principle of reciprocity also involves social responsibilities to society: “The obligations of 
welfare should be mutual: citizens who need income support are obliged to work, but only 
if their fellow citizens fulfil their obligation to enact public policies that provide adequate 
employment and child support” (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, p. 276).
49 This is confirmed by Van Parijs’s attempts to justify his proposal for a Basic Income in terms o f  its 
coherence with Rawls’s theory o f justice (see Van Parijs 1997, p. 95).
50 There are two fundamental dimensions to this concept o f  reciprocity. The first is that o f  mutual respect. 
This requires individuals to appeal to reasons that could be shared by other individuals, or in the case that the 
resolution o f  conflicts is impossible, to maintain mutual respect. The second is that o f  mutual dependence. 
The principle o f reciprocity is supposed to guarantee the fair terms o f social cooperation (Muhlberger 2000,
p. 8).
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However, the relevance of the previous arguments should not give the impression that the 
existence of right to a minimum income is consensual in the various theories of justice. 
Nozick’s ‘Entitlement Theory’, for instance proposes a contrary argument. In contrast with 
‘patterned’ or ‘end state’ theories, where social justice is evaluated in terms of its 
distributive consequences, Nozick departs from the assumption that individuals hold a 
number of inviolable rights (entitlements), and that a situation is deemed just when it 
derives from the exercise of those rights, and unjust when it involves their violation.
This has particular implications for the evaluation of social inequalities, and for the use of 
redistributive polices to combat them. From this point of view, any inequalities that do not 
derive from the violation of the individuals’ rights are just, even those in the in more 
advantageous positions do not merit. Consequently, any attempt to reduce just inequalities, 
such as the establishment of a right to a minimum income, would be unjust as it would 
violate the individuals’ rights (Fitzpatrick 2001, p. 45-6).
2.1.2. THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM INCOME IN THEORIES OF SOCIAL 
JUSTICE
The debate on the right to a minimum income has gained particular relevance in the 
context of debate over the notion of social justice. This is in great part due to the 
contribution of Van Parijs. The author argues that a just society must maximize what he 
calls ‘real freedom’, that is, the freedom to do whatever one might want to do (1997, p. 
23). The main institutional implication of achieving a just society would be the 
introduction of an unconditional ‘basic income’ (BI), regardless of the individuals’ income, 
place of residence, household situation, and most importantly their willingness to work 
(Van Parijs 1997, p. 30-33).
Van Parij’s work provoked a number of counter-arguments which argue that the 
distribution of resources in society should respect the notion of reciprocity. This is the case 
of Stuart White’s ‘civic minimum’ (2003). The civic minimum consists of a series of 
policies and institutions that would satisfy the demands of ‘(non-ideal) fair reciprocity’. 
This requires:
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• That no person suffers poverty of income due to forces beyond her control 
(non-immiseration);
• Adequate protection against market vulnerability and associated risks of 
exploitation and abuse (market security);
• Adequate opportunity for self-realisation in work (work as a challenge);
• Minimisation of class inequality, i.e., the reduction of inequalities in initial 
endowments of wealth and educational opportunity to a reasonable minimum 
(White 2003, p. 19).
When a society fulfils these requirements, an individual who claims a generous share of 
the social product has an obligation to make an adequate productive contribution to the 
community -  the ‘basic work expectation’ (2003, p. 96). This consists in the performance 
of a number of hours of ‘civic labour’, i.e., all forms of labour that provide a significant 
service for, or on behalf of, the wider community. This notion of civic labour includes paid 
employment (both market and non-market based), parental care, care of the infirm and a 
limited quantity of household work. (White 2003, p. 98-112).
Besides these more specific arguments, the right to a minimum income can be analysed 
with regards to other theories on the just distribution of resources in society. This is, for 
example, the case with Sen’s ‘capability approach’ (1999). The author argues that 
inequality should be examined in terms of the ability of individuals to achieve valuable 
functionings. By ‘functionings’ the author means the things a person might value doing or 
being. A person’s ‘capability’ refers to the combination of functionings that are possible 
for a person to achieve, i.e., the freedom to achieve different lifestyles (1999, p. 75).
Despite its comprehensiveness, Sen’s capability approach does not discuss the right to a 
minimum income per se. Nonetheless, one can infer the author’s stance on the issue from 
his analysis of the relation between poverty and capabilities, and between capabilities and 
rights. The author argues that poverty should be viewed not in terms of lack of income, but 
in terms of the deprivation of ‘basic capabilities’51, i.e. inability to satisfy fundamental 
functionings of individuals (Sen 1993, p. 41; Sen 1999, p. 87-90). Rather than writing-off 
the role of income in the analysis of poverty, the author’s main purpose is to emphasise its
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instrumental character with regards to capabilities. Sen goes on to suggest that as long 
as minimal capabilities can be achieved by enhancing the income level (...) it will be 
possible (...) to identify the minimally adequate income for reaching the minimally 
acceptable capability levels” (1993, p. 42).
Bearing in mind the fact that, according to Sen (1982, p. 16), it is possible to derive a 
theory of rights from his capability approach (the ‘capability rights system’), one can argue 
that the right to a minimum income can be justified in order to secure a minimum level of 
capability to individuals. This right does not entail any reciprocity requirements. Contrary 
to other authors who legitimise the provision of rights by reference to a more fundamental 
obligation to assist others in need52, capability rights are based on what Kant defines as 
‘imperfect obligations’ (1999, p. 230). In this case, the claims for assistance are not 
addressed to a particular person or agency, but to all in a position to help .
Doyal and Gough’s ‘theory of human needs’ provides a valuable alternative Sen’s theory 
of capabilities. The authors argue that physical survival and autonomy are the basic 
preconditions for the avoidance of serious harm, here seen as a dramatically impaired 
participation in a form of life (1991, p. 55). Although the mode of satisfaction of basic 
needs varies from culture to culture, the authors argue that one can identify a number of 
common characteristics in the goods or services necessary for the enhancement of the 
health and autonomy of individuals. These properties, which the authors define as 
intermediate needs, can be seen as second-order goals necessary for the fiill-satisfaction of 
the needs of individuals. The list of intermediate needs includes: nutritional food and clean 
water; protective housing; a non-hazardous work environment; a non-hazardous physical 
environment; appropriate health care; security in childhood; physical security; appropriate 
education; safe birth control and child-bearing; and economic security (1991, p. 157-8).
It seems quite plausible to argue that the need for economic security can justify a right to a 
minimum income. However, the authors are unclear with regards to the conditional 
character of the right to a minimum income. On the one hand, they accept that all persons
51 As for instance, the ability to be well nourished and sheltered, the ability to avoid escapable morbidity or 
premature mortality (1993, p 31).
52 Such as Doyal and Gough (see 1991, p. 104-8).
53 The obvious consequence, which the author him self admits, is that this can lead to situations where the 
right to a minimum income is not fulfilled at all (Sen 1999, p. 230).
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have an obligation to participate in cooperative process that guarantees the satisfaction of 
basic needs54. In addition, the authors argue that the relation between rights and duties is 
culturally bounded. Hence, one can admit that in a society that values a strong work ethic, 
the provision of the right to a minimum income can be made conditional on some kind of 
work requirement. On the other hand, the authors admit that the obligations on individuals 
are limited by their need for economic security. In the same way, the introduction of work 
requirements can be seen as limiting the freedom of choice of individuals, and 
consequently their autonomy (Doyal and Gough 1991, p. 93, 104-8).
2.1.3. THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM INCOME IN WELFARE THEORY
Having analysed the debate over the right to a minimum income in the context of social 
justice theories, one can now move to the realm of welfare theory and citizenship rights. 
According to Marshall, social rights can go from "... the right to a modicum of economic 
welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life 
of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society” (Marshall and 
Bottomore 1992, p. 8). However, the debate within welfare theory has focused not on the 
right to a minimum income per se, but on the conditional nature of social rights. Marshall 
himself recognises that social rights are conditional on fulfilment of the duties of 
citizenship (Marshall and Bottomore 1992, p. 26). These include both precise obligations, 
such as the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions, to become educated or to 
perform military service; and a general obligation “... to live the life of a good citizen, 
giving such service as one can to promote the welfare of the community” (Marshall and 
Bottomore 1992, p. 26).
However, Marshall is ambiguous about the possibility of making social rights conditional 
on the exercise of a duty to work. On the one hand, Marshall recognises that the exercise of 
this right could be made conditional on the fulfilment of the duty to work, if the economic 
situation requires it. On the other hand, bearing in mind the author’s argument that the 
purpose of social rights is to reduce the level of market-induced inequalities, the 
introduction of work requirements would undermine the whole purpose of citizenship. In
54 Therefore, there is strict duty to submit to taxation that secures the functioning o f  the agencies, such as the 
welfare state, that satisfy the needs o f individuals (Doyal and Gough 1991, p. 104-8).
27
Chapter 2 - The R ight to  a  M inim um  Incom e: B etw een  M e a d  A n d  Van P a rijs
addition, the constitution of large national communities (where responsibilities become 
more diffuse), and the availability of jobs guaranteed by full-employment policies, have 
actually weakened the obligation to work. As the author would argue .. the essential duty 
is not to have a job and hold it, since that is relatively simple in conditions of full 
employment, but to put one’s heart into one’s job and work hard (Marshall and Bottomore 
1992, 45-46).
In contrast to Marshall, Titmuss puts forward a more explicit refusal of the idea of making 
the right to a minimum income conditional on the exercise of the duty to work. This is 
clear from Titmuss’s criticism of the Victorian Poor Laws, in comparison with 
universalistic social services. According to the author, the Poor Laws made the 
redistribution of resources conditional on a number of moral judgments on people in need 
and their behaviour, hence harming their sense of self-respect and self-determination. 
“Within the established pattern of commonly held values, the system could only be 
redistributive by being discriminatory and socially divisive.” (Titmuss 2002, p. 104-5). 
Universalistic welfare services, on the other hand, eliminate these mechanisms of formal 
discrimination between individuals (Deacon 2002, p. 17).
Dahrendorf provides an additional argument against the introduction of work requirements. 
For him, citizenship rights are based on a social contract valid for all members in society 
(Dahrendorf 1996, p. 32-3). Work, on the other hand, is a private contract. When rights are 
made dependent on people entering into private employment relations, this destroys the 
voluntary character of the employment relation. This amounts to forced work.
This idea of the unconditional nature of social rights has been contested by a number of 
authors, in particular those identified with the communitarian school of thought. 
Underlying this standpoint is a defence of the moral merit of individuals55, or desert, as a 
both a moral and distributive principle. As moral principle, the notion of desert stresses the
55 A s Sen points out, merit as a principle, and meritocracy as a distributive system that rewards merit, is very 
under-defined. In particular, there seems to be some confusion as to if  merit refers to persons or to their 
actions (see Sen 2000, p. 12-5). Bearing in mind this distinction, one can differentiate between two types o f  
meritocratic argument: desert-based arguments, epitomised in the works o f  Mead (1986) or Selbourne 
(1997); and talent-based arguments, illustrated in Durkheim’s theory o f  social justice. This has implications 
as to the criteria used to identify (and reward) the merit o f individuals. In the first case, individuals are 
rewarded when they act in such a way that promotes a given conception o f  good society. In the second case, 
individuals are rewarded by reference to their internal abilities and their effort when using them, which is 
seen as having valuable social outcome.
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interdependency between the different parts of society. As a distributive principle, it 
requires an equivalence between contribution and retribution - or reciprocity56 (Fitzpatrick 
2001, p. 8 and White 2003, p. 13-4). In this context, the right to a minimum income should 
be made conditional to some kind of work requirement as a form of securing the 
functioning of society and of avoiding individuals to free-ride on the effort of others.
A good example of this is David Selbourne’s “The Principle of Duty” (1997). The 
‘principle of duty’ guarantees the functioning of the ‘civic order’, a metaphor for a morally 
integrated community/society. According to the author (Selboume 1997, p. 141, 143-5), 
the state-based, universalistic, provision of welfare services (which were previously 
provisioned on the basis of personal obligation) has undermined the principle of duty. The 
restoration of the civic order will require the strengthening and enforcement of the 
principle of duty. In particular, the author argues that the abuse or misuse of welfare 
benefits (and other forms of public provision) should be sanctioned. For instance, 
individuals who refuse training or work offers should be sanctioned with the loss or 
curtailment of their unemployment benefits (Selboume 1997, p. 292-3).
This is also the case of Mead, who argues that traditional welfare programmes have failed 
to develop the ability of individuals to function in society (Mead 1986, p. 61-7). In light of 
this, he argues that government programmes should enforce the obligations of individuals. 
In particular, Mead argues that the right to a minimum income should be made conditional 
on the obligation to perform/search for work (Mead 1986, p. 167-8).
In the same way as Mead or Selboume, Amitai Etzioni calls for a rebalance between rights 
and responsibilities as part of a broader agenda concerned with the moral revival of 
modem communities57. According to the author (Etzioni 1994, p. 263-4), the provision of 
welfare services should be shaped by the principle of reciprocity. Individuals are expected 
to provide for themselves and their families through paid employment. On the other hand, 
the community is responsible for the provision of the basic needs of those who truly cannot 
provide for themselves. Despite his emphasis on the responsibilities of individuals, Etzioni
56 A good example o f  this can be found in Stuart White’s conception o f  the ‘basic work expectation’ (see 
section 2.1.2, p. 24).
57 In addition, the author argues that it is necessary to curb the provision o f  new rights, the recognition that 
some responsibilities do not entail rights and the adjustment o f  rights to changing circumstances (1994, p. 4- 
11).
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does stress the centrality of a minimum income guarantee (or ‘social basics’) as the 
foundation of a good society. Furthermore, in contrast with Lawrence Mead, Etzioni 
argues that public funds should be used to create community jobs that will allow 
individuals to fulfil their responsibility to support themselves (1997, p. 82-3).
The idea of conditioning the exercise of social rights has also been advocated by authors 
outside the communitarian school. Pierre Rosanvallon (and Jean-Paul Fitoussi) argue that 
the growth of new forms of social exclusion and the financing problems of the welfare- 
state require a rearrangement of the relation between rights and responsibilities. The 
authors propose a framework of citizenship-rights based on Tiberty-rights’, which combine 
Marshall’s civil and political rights; ‘credit-rights’, which comprise traditional passive 
social rights; and, ‘integration-rights’. These represent a new set of social rights, which 
entail a reciprocal relation between the individual and society (Rossanvallon 1995, p. 138- 
40). According to the author, the insertion policies introduced in France in the early 1990’s 
- as they establish links between moral obligations and welfare provision, and explore new 
forms of public employment creation - reflect this new conception of social protection 
(Rossanvallon 1997, p. 166).
Giddens provides a more wide-ranging argument on the need to make some social rights 
dependent on the fulfilment of individual responsibilities. According to the author (1999, 
p. 4, 7), the rise of risk society undermines the insurance logic that underlies the welfare 
state that emerged from the post World War II. Whereas unconditional rights are adequate 
to deal with ‘external risks’, i.e., risks that are regular enough and can easily be protected 
through public insurance, they are inadequate to deal with ‘manufactured risks’, i.e., risks 
that are produced by the progress of science and technology, that are difficult to predict 
and to insure. This opens the way for a redefinition of individual and social 
responsibilities, where individuals are called to a more active management of their material 
and social conditions. Therefore, the author argues, it is necessary to connect rights with 
responsibilities.
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2.2. MAPPING THE DEBATE ON THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM 
INCOME
As the previous section shows, the debate over the right to a minimum income intersects 
various domains within political theory. This is not to say that these arguments are 
independent from each other. For instance, as the work of Guttman and Thompson, White 
or Etzioni shows, the notion of reciprocity is used within different domains of political 
theory. Also, Van Parijs’s proposal for a BI has gone outside the realm of social justice 
theory, and gained great relevance in the debate over the nature of the social rights of 
citizenship (see Plant 2004). In light of this one can argue that is possible to identify a 
number of core issues that structure the debate over the right to a minimum. These, in turn, 
can be used as the criteria to evaluate the adequacy of the various standpoints in this 
debate.
The central issue, clearly, concerns the conditional nature of the right to a minimum 
income. For some, such as Van Parijs, Sen or Titmuss, the right to a minimum income 
cannot be made conditional on any kind of work or activation requirement. From this 
standpoint, the right to a minimum income, as other social rights, is suppose to offset the 
inequalities generated by the market, and to allow individuals to choose freely how to lead 
their lives. However, a large number of authors (from Guttman and Thomson, to White or 
Mead) would argue that the right to a minimum income, as well as other social rights, 
presupposes the production of resources on a cooperative basis, which in turns requires 
individuals to make some kind of contribution in return for their benefit. For some, in 
particular Mead, Etzioni or Selboume, the right to a minimum income is seen as subsidiary 
form of protection to that that is provided by paid employment, which reinforces its 
conditional character.
The conditional character of the right to a minimum income entails two further issues. 
First, it is necessary to determine what are the conditions for the exercise of one’s 
responsibilities. Some authors, such as Mead or Selboume, prefer to stress the mandatory 
character of individual responsibilities. Others recognise that there is a clash between the 
notion of reciprocity and the equality of opportunities available to individuals. Stuart 
White’s notion of ‘fair reciprocity’ embodies the idea that the enforcement of reciprocity 
as a distributive principle should acknowledge that it is unfair to force individuals to make
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a contribution to the community without regards to their background conditions58. This 
idea is also present in Guttman and Thomson’s notion of ‘fair workfare’. The authors 
suggest that the obligation to look for a job needs to be balanced with the investment in 
child-care services that relive lone mothers from their parental obligations. Etzioni, on the 
other hand, suggests that the enforcement of work requirements needs to be accompanied 
by the creation of community jobs that create real work opportunities for income support 
recipients.
Besides the issue of what are the conditions for the exercise of personal responsibilities, it 
is also necessary to establish what can be considered as an appropriate form of contribution 
to society. As the previous section shows, some authors, such as Mead or Guttman and 
Thompson, identify work as the main form of contribution to society. Stuart White’s 
notion of civic labour, embodies a criticism of the view that only the market provides the 
services that can be seen as such a contribution. According to the author, the criterion 
should be “ ... what kind of work is sufficiently valuable to other citizens to count in 
reciprocation for the goods and services they have supplied” (White 2003, p. 99) The most 
obvious mechanism to determine the value citizens assign to a given good or service is the 
market. In light of this, the author argues, the notion of civic labour points, in the first 
instance, to market-generated paid employment. However, there are other valuable 
activities that are not produced through the market. This is the case of public and merit 
goods59 produced by the state. This is also the case of care work performed within 
households (White 2003, p. 101-12).
58 Stuart White’s ‘basic work expectation’ raises a further dimension o f  the clash between reciprocity and 
equality o f  opportunity. This relates to what one can define as the metrics o f  retribution, i.e., the number o f  
hours o f  civil labour that a person is expected to perform. This would consist in a “ ... minimum number o f  
hours o f  paid employment per week or year” (White 2003, p. 114). This requirement is qualified with regards 
to a number o f  issues related to equality o f opportunity. Thus, the work expectation should vary in inverse 
proportion to talent. In the same way, the basic work expectation should be reduced in the case that a society 
does not fully comply with the requirements o f fair reciprocity (in its non-ideal form) (White 2003, p. 114- 
lb).
59 Public goods are those kind o f  goods that are available for the (indiscriminate) use o f all individuals and in 
which individual consumption does not diminish their availability to other individuals. Merit goods are those 
that respond to claims o f distributive justice or to other moral reasons (White 2003, p. 101-6).
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2.3. MEAD, VAN PARIJS AND THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM 
INCOME
As the previous sections show, the debate on the right to a minimum income comprises a 
variety of authors. Given the practical unfeasibility of making a full-fledged evaluation of 
the various points of view, it was decided to restrict this exercise to two typical, indeed 
dominant, arguments in this debate60: Van Parijs’ argument for an unconditional Basic 
Income and Mead’s argument for the introduction of work requirements. Hence, the 
purpose of this section is to evaluate if the arguments provided by the two authors provide 
an adequate justification of the right to a minimum income.
2.3.1. MEAD AND THE ARGUMENT FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF WORK 
REQUIREMENTS
Mead provides a twofold argument for the introduction of a work requirement as an 
entitlement condition for income support. According to the author, “compliance usually 
serves self-interest, but is mandatory in any event” (1986, p. 246). Mead views the role of 
social policy as an extension of the Hobbesian conception of the State: the maintenance of 
public order. Rather than just law and peacefulness, order here includes all the socially 
produced conditions necessary for people to have a satisfactory life (Mead 1986, p. 5). 
According to the author, social order cannot be achieved by passive compliance alone, but 
by the fulfilment of the expectations other individuals have in relation to the public role an 
individual performs as a worker, a parent or a neighbour. The ability of individuals to 
function in society is related with their capacity to respond to these expectations (Mead 
1986, p. 6 and Deacon 2002, p. 51).
This conception of social order is well reflected in Mead’s theory of citizenship. According 
to the author, this involves both rights and duties. Hence, traditional social rights, which 
protect people against need, unemployment, and other social risks, need to be matched 
with social obligations. Mead identifies five core ‘common obligations’ to all individuals: 
work in available jobs, unless aged or disabled; supporting (as much as possible) one’s
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family; fluency and literacy (in English); learning in order to become employable; and, law 
abidingness (Mead 1986, p. 242).
According to the author, “work for the employable is the clearest social obligation” (Mead 
1986, p. 243). This can be traced to the significance of the work-ethic as a founding value 
of American society. In fact, the author argues, its importance has grown, as work and the 
workplace seem to be replacing other forms of communitarian existence such as ethnicity, 
religion or the family. This has specific implications for Mead’s view of the conditional 
nature of the right to income support. According to him, “while individuals make claims 
for sustenance through politics and their own labours, they must also contribute to a 
reservoir of resources, both economic and moral, shared by all citizens” (Mead 1986, p. 
246).
However, as mentioned earlier, the author argues that although the obligation to work is 
mandatory, this also serves the self-interest of individuals. This argument comes about in 
Mead’s analysis of the ability of social assistance programmes to return recipients back to 
the labour market. According to the author, the traditional response was to assume that, 
given the opportunity, individuals would fulfil their responsibilities - the ‘competence 
assumption’ (Mead 1997, p. 13). However, based on his analysis of the WIN (Work 
Incentive) programmes, Mead argues that the enforcement of work obligation was the most 
significant aspect in explaining the employment effectiveness of income support 
programmes. The more effective WIN offices were those which had broader notions of 
employability, were more effective at transmitting to recipients that they were required to 
work, and more willing to impose sanctions if necessary (1986, p. 156-68)61. In his words: 
“Society must give up at the least some of its fear of ‘blaming the victims’ if it is to help 
them more effectively” (Mead 1986, p. 247).
60 See Fitzpatrick 1999, van der Veen and Grook 2000, Deacon 2002, Standing 2002, Lodemel and Trickey 
2001 .
61 Nonetheless, the author does admit that the informal enforcement o f  work obligations was more successful 
than the use o f  sanctions (1986, p. 160).
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2.3.2. VAN PARIJS AND THE RIGHT TO A BASIC INCOME
Van Parijs argues that a free society is one that realises real-freedom for all (1997, p. 27). 
His notion of real-freedom stands on three fundamental principles: that there is some well- 
enforced structure of rights (security); that this structure is such that each person owns 
herself (self-ownership); and, that each person has the greatest possible opportunity to do 
whatever she might want to do (leximin opportunity) (1997, p. 25).
The main institutional implication of achieving a just society would be the introduction of 
an unconditional BI, provided regardless of the individual’s income, place of residence, 
household situation, or willingness to work (1997, p. 30)62. The significance of the BI is 
not related with the possibility of equating everybody’s wealth, or purchasing power; but 
with the possibility that people are be able to choose between different goods or even 
different life-styles (Van Parijs 1997, p. 33 and Gough 2000, p. 205).
Whilst building his argument for an unconditional BI, Van Parijs tries to rebut two 
challenges that share the same underlying idea: that the introduction of a BI would unfairly 
favour those who are voluntarily unemployed. The first criticism is that an unconditional 
BI would favour those with a preference for leisure against those who are keen to work 
more in order to achieve a higher income -  the ‘Crazy-Lazy dilemma’ (1997, p. 93). The 
author argues that, in order to carry out its productive activities, Crazy uses more external 
resources than Lazy. Hence, giving Lazy a BI that is funded by the taxation of the proceeds 
made by Crazy, does not discriminate the later. In fact, this resets the equal distribution of 
external resources and, consequently, leximins opportunity between Crazy and Lazy (Van 
Parijs 1997, p. 92-102 and Gough 2000, p. 208).
Van Parijs extends this line of though, when he argues that BI should be funded through 
the taxation of employment rents63. The author starts his argument by recalling that due to 
a combination of the effect of minimum wages, efficiency-wages and high turn-over costs,
62 Van Parijs does accept that part o f the BI should be provided in-king, namely as structures that secure the 
enforcement o f  self-ownership rights, and goods, such as education or public infrastructures, that can have 
positive externalities on the opportunities o f  individuals; or goods, such as clean air, the cleansing o f  roads or 
the maintenance o f  public spaces, that one would expect that individuals would normally be interested in 
buying (see Van Parijs 1997, p. 41-5).
63 These employment rents are given by the difference o f  the income (and other advantages) a person gets 
from her job, and what she would get in a situation o f  a perfect labour market (Van Parijs 1997, p. 108).
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a great many individuals are excluded from participation in the labour market. In light of 
this, jobs can be seen as external assets, the same as inherited wealth and skills. Hence, 
rather than introducing a further bias in favour of those who do not want to work, a BI that 
is funded through the taxation of employment rents64 would reduce inequality in the 
distribution of work-related assets (Van Parijs 1997, p. 106-9).
Besides the charge that a BI would unfairly favour the voluntarily unemployed, Van Parijs 
is also forced to consider the challenge that the introduction of a BI would generate 
exploitative situations, i.e. it would allow certain individuals to take an unfair advantage of 
someone else’s work. In order to deal with this challenge, the author considers different 
interpretations of exploitation. Underlying the various interpretations are different 
distributive principles65:
- the ‘lockean’ principle, which implies that a person is entitled to the total product
of her labour;
- the iutheran’ principle, which implies that a person is entitled to a share of the total
product that is proportional to the value of her individual labour contribution;
- the ‘strong effort’ principle, which implies that a person’s income is strictly
proportional66 to her work effort (Van Parijs 1997, p. 145-69, White 1997, p. 323);
Van Parijs accepts that the introduction of a BI would generate exploitative situations as 
judged by reference to any of these principles67. However, he argues, these three principles
64 These employment rents are given by the difference o f  the income (and other advantages) a person gets 
from her job, and what she would get in a situation o f  a perfect labour market (Van Parijs 1997, p. 108).
65 In fact, Van Parijs also examines Rohmer’s conception o f ‘capitalist exploitation’ (see 1997, p 169-78). 
However, as this refers to asset distribution rather than the relation between work and personal return, it will 
not be included in this analysis.
66 The difference between the ‘Iutheran’ and the ‘strong effort’ (and consequently the ‘weak effort’) 
distributive principle lies in the metrics used to compare the individuals’ contributions and benefits. The first 
uses the notion ‘labour value’ that is characteristic o f  marxist political economy. Here, Van Parijs assumes 
that “ ... the labour value o f  one unit o f  a product is the amount o f  unskilled labour that enters on average, 
given the existing equipment and technology, whether directly or indirectly, in the production o f  that units” 
(1997, p. 154). However, as Van Parijs demonstrates, there are significant problems to this. In alternative, 
Van Parijs suggests that a persons’ contribution should be measured in terms o f  the work effort (i.e. hours o f  
work), whilst its benefits should be simply measured in terms o f  received income. In this sense, the ‘strong 
effort’ principle is not more than the ‘Iutheran’ principle applied through a more precise metric.
67 When the ‘lockean’ principle is considered, a BI becomes exploitative because it requires some kind o f  
redistribution, which would deny producers the full return o f  their labour. When the ‘Iutheran’ principle is 
considered, a BI becomes exploitative because it would upset the proportionality between the value o f the 
contribution and the benefits received by individuals. When the ‘Iutheran’ principle is considered, a BI 
becomes exploitative because it would upset the proportionality between the income and work effort (Van 
Parijs 1997, p. 145-69, White 1997, p. 323).
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might also generate brute luck inequalities in income68, which renders them inconsistent 
with the principle of leximin opportunity. As an alternative, Van Parijs suggests that the 
relation between one’ work and the ensuing proceeds might be governed by a ‘weak effort’ 
principle. This stipulates that there should be a positive correlation between one’s work 
and the return it generates. In this case, the introduction of a BI would not distress the 
positive correlation between contribution and return whilst improving the individuals’ 
ability to choose the life-style they prefer (Van Parijs 1997, p. 133-159 and White 1997, p. 
323-325).
2.3.3. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF VAN PARIJS AND MEAD
Having described the fundamental arguments presented by Mead and Van Parijs, the next 
step will be to evaluate if their frameworks provide an adequate justification for the 
guarantee of a right to a minimum income. Van Parijs’s proposal for an unconditional BI 
has been subjected to a number of criticisms69. Brian Barry argues that a BI contradicts the 
spirit of Dworkin’s notion o f ‘equality of resources’ that underlies Van Parijs’s principle of 
leximin opportunity. One of the principles underpinning Dworkin’s equality of resources is 
that of ‘special responsibility’, which states that, although one must recognise the equal 
importance of the success of all human lives, individuals have a special and final 
responsibility for their own success (Dworkin 2002, p. 5-6). In light of this, one can 
compensate them for being excluded from the labour market, but not for a decision not to 
work (Barry 1992, p. 139).
Other authors such as Van Donselaar and Stuart White have focused on Van Parijs’ 
rebuttal of the exploitation challenge made to the BI. Van Donselaar argues that A exploits 
B if A is better off than he would have been had B not existed, while B is worse off than he 
would have been had A never existed. With this in mind, Van Donselaar argues that a BI 
funded from the employment rents would produce an exploitative situation, where
68 I.e. inequalities that do not result from individual choices.
69 Some authors, such as Galston and Gorz, argue that Van Parijs dismisses too readily the integrative role of 
work. According to Gorz, work is a source o f economic citizenship and full participation in society. A BI, 
rather than improving the job chances for individuals in society, would in fact legitimate the exclusion o f  
certain individuals from the labour market (see http://bostonreview.net/BR25.5/gaIston.html and Gorz 1992, 
p. 181-3). However, this criticism is misplaced. Van Parijs bases his argument for a BI on a premise o f liberal
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individuals who do not want to work take unfair advantage of the redistribution of job 
resources they were not interested anyway (see White 2000, p. 529-30 and Widerquist 
2001, p. 753-4).
Stuart White starts by recalling that the exploitation challenge implies a discussion about 
the principle of reciprocity. He points out that job assets, in contrast to natural resources or 
internal endowments, result from a process of social cooperation, whose redistribution 
must respect the principle of reciprocity. This stipulates that all individuals who want to 
share in the benefits of social cooperation have an obligation to make some kind of 
productive contribution (White 1997, p. 320-1). According to White, the weak effort 
principle does not provide a clear refutation of this challenge. Although it avoids the 
production of brute luck inequalities, it does not establish a strong enough connection 
between contribution and retribution (White 1997, p. 324-5). Instead, White argues that in 
order to receive a minimum income benefit, individuals must be available (depending on 
their contributory ability) to perform a minimum contributory activity (1997, p. 319)70.
Bearing in mind the criticisms made by Barry, Van Donselaar and White, one can argue 
that an unconditional BI would unfairly favour those who do not want to work. This seems 
to give some support to Mead’s claim that the provision of a minimum income guarantee 
should be made conditional to a work requirement. However, this is not to say that one can 
accept the totality of Mead’s argument. In particular, there is significant criticism of the 
author’s stance on the relation between obligations and opportunities and on his disregard 
of the contributory nature of other human activities besides paid employment.
Mead’s criticism of the ‘competence assumption’ (Mead 1997, p. 13) reveals some of the 
author’s own assumptions on the relation between obligation and opportunity. Mead’s 
criticism can be interpreted in two ways. One is that Mead assumes that there are enough 
job opportunities available for all unemployed recipients (see Deacon 2002, p. 54). 
Obligations would be legitimate because everybody had the opportunity to exercise them. 
However, nowhere in his argument does the author explicitly argue that there are enough 
jobs for everybody. Furthermore, there is no suggestion that public authorities should
neutrality (or ‘equal respect’) (1997, p. 28). The overall purpose o f  real freedom is to allow individuals to 
choose the life-style they prefer, regardless o f any conception o f  a good life or common good.
70 Initially, White refers to this as ‘baseline reciprocity’ (1997, p. 319). Later on he develops this principle in 
his notion o f ‘Fair Reciprocity’ (see White 2003, p. 77-96).
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create work opportunities for individuals to exercise their obligation to work. This seems to 
contradict such an interpretation.
Another possible interpretation, which seems more in line with Mead’s thought, is that the 
enforcement of obligations is legitimate regardless of the opportunities available to 
individuals. This is reflected in his argument that it is the effectiveness in enforcing 
individual obligations rather than the availability of jobs in local labour markets that 
explains the effectiveness of WIN programmes (Mead 1986, 159)71. However, as even 
other communitarian authors recognise (see Etzioni 1997, p. 82-3), the enforcement of 
obligations can only be fair in the context of an adequate distribution of opportunities.
Besides the issue of the opportunities to fulfil one’s obligations, Mead has been criticised 
for failing to recognise the different ways in which individuals can contribute to society. 
As mentioned earlier, Mead argues that the duty to work is the most relevant common 
obligation (Mead 1986, p. 243)72. However, some authors, such as Jane Lewis, argue that 
this focus on paid work undermines the value of unpaid care work, which is performed 
mostly by women (1998, p.4). This argument can be extended to unpaid work for the 
community. Mead’s focus on paid work disregards the fact that there are non-marketed 
activities that can contribute to general well-being. Gorz, for instance, argues that work can 
only be seen as a source of economic citizenship when it is performed for the benefit of 
others as citizens. Working in the public sphere is not necessarily to perform some kind of 
service to an employer, but to fulfil social needs that might, or might not be expressed 
through market mechanisms (Gorz 1992, p. 180-1).
In light of the previous paragraphs, it can be concluded that neither Mead nor Van Parijs 
provide an adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. Contrary to Van 
Parijs’ argument, the right to a minimum should be made conditional on some kind of 
contribution requirement, as this would avoid the possibility of unfairly favour those who
71 The author accepts that more effective programmes were those that were more effective in the enforcement 
o f obligations and, crucially, with more employable recipients and favourable labour markets. On the other 
hand, the least performing programmes were those which were less demanding on recipients, had more hard- 
to-employ recipients and worked in the context o f tight labour markets. In light o f these results, Mead does 
accept that the behaviour o f  welfare officers (concerning the enforcement o f  work obligations) could be a 
reaction to labour market conditions (Mead 1986, p. 161). However, based on the results o f  interviews with 
welfare officers alone, the author quickly dismisses this hypothesis. One can argue that this interaction 
should have been statistically tested.
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do not want to work. Furthermore, contrary to what Mead argues, in order to avoid 
situations of unbalanced reciprocity, the enforcement of individual obligations must occur 
in a context where individuals have an effective opportunity to engage in some kind of 
contributory activity. Not only that, but any contribution requirement should recognise the 
variety of activities that make a contribution to society.
2.4. BEYOND MEAD AND VAN PARIJS. FOUNDATIONS FOR AN 
ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION OF THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM 
INCOME
As the previous section shows, Mead and Van Parijs’ fail to provide an adequate 
justification of the right to a minimum income. To some degree this can be explained by 
the problems that are intrinsic to the authors’ assumptions about the relation between the 
individual, the market and society. Van Parijs argument for an unconditional BI is aimed at 
furthering the individuals’ ability to develop themselves. However, as can be seen from his 
handling of work-related assets (Van Parijs 1997, p. 106-9 and White 1997, p. 320-1), Van 
Parijs departs from an individualist approach that detaches individuals from their social, 
cultural and historical background73. This explains why the author disregards the social 
nature of some of the resources that individuals use to pursue their ends, and the 
obligations that this imposes on them.
Mead’s failure to argue for a fair work requirement, on the other hand, stems from two 
basic assumptions that underlie his communitarian argument: that the interest of society 
overrides that of individuals74, and that the market is the main mechanism that regulates 
the functioning of society. In this context, the right to a minimum income is seen, not as 
form of furthering the individuals’ ability to develop themselves, but as subsidiary form of
72 In fact, the centrality o f  work is reinforced by the obligation to learn to become employable, and the 
obligation to support one’s family (Mead 1986, p. 242-3).
73 This needs to be understood within a broader epistemological debate about the relation between the 
individual and society. Van Parijs, for instance, departs from a methodological standpoint (methodological 
individualism) that puts the individual as the starting point for the analysis o f  social reality (Shionoya 1998, 
p. 7; Lukes 1970, p. 78).
74 Mead, departs form a methodological standpoint (methodological holism) that assumes that social 
phenomena are run by laws that cannot be explained in terms o f the aggregate effect o f  individual actions 
(Shionoya 1998, p. 7; Lukes 1970, p. 78).
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protection that should be designed in a way not to disturb the functioning of society, and 
the role of the market as the primary mechanism of social regulation.
This explains Mead’s disregard for the need to create jobs in the case there are no jobs 
available in the labour market. Here individual obligations are not seem as a form of 
compensation for individual rights. They exist regardless of the rights of individuals. This 
also explains Mead’s failure to acknowledge of the contributory potential of other activities 
besides paid employment. Although he recognises that the functioning of society depends 
of other institutions, such as the family or religion (Mead 1986, p. 246), only market-based 
employment is seen as making a contribution to society.
The previous paragraphs are relevant not only in explaining difficulties in the arguments 
posed by Mead and van Parijs, but also because they suggest that a more satisfactory 
justification is possible. In order to provide an adequate justification for the right to a 
minimum income, this alternative argument must be set in the context of an ontological 
framework that gives a normative priority to the development of individuals, but that 
recognises that individuals act in a particular social context that provides them with 
resources to develop themselves, but also requires from them the fulfilment of individual 
obligations. This would open way for the recognition of individual obligations, but at the 
same time guarantee that any contribution requirement is enforced in a context where 
individuals have the opportunity to fulfil their obligations.
Furthermore, in order to secure that the contribution requirement recognises the variety of 
activities that can be considered as making a contribution to society, this alternative 
justification should be based on an ontological framework that encompasses a more critical 
view of the regulatory role of the market, acknowledging the importance of other social 
institutions, such as the family or the state in the regulation of social life.
2.5. CONCLUSION
The chapter has demonstrated that Mead and Van Parijs, which typify the fundamental 
standpoints in the literature, fail to provide an adequate justification of the right to a 
minimum income. Reflecting on difficulties faced by the authors, it was argued that an
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alternative argument is possible. This argument should be set in the context of an 
ontological framework that puts a focus on the promotion of the individuals’ personal 
development, but recognises its social basis, and the obligations that it imposes on them; 
and encompasses a more critical view of the role of the market as a mechanism of social 
regulation.
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3. HOW CAN ONE JUSTIFY A MINIMUM INCOME 
GUARANTEE? THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL 
DEVELOPMENT
Reflecting on Mead and Van Parijs’ failure to provide an adequate justification of the right 
to a minimum income, the previous chapter argued that a more satisfactory alternative is 
possible. This alternative should be set in the context an ontological framework that puts a 
focus on the promotion of the individuals’ personal development, but recognises its social 
basis, and the obligations that it imposes on them; and encompasses a more critical view of 
the role of the market as a mechanism of social regulation.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a normative framework that can provide an 
adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. The first part of the chapter will 
argue that Durkheim’s theory of social justice provides a theorisation of society, market 
and individual from which a more satisfactory justification can be derived. In line with 
Durkheim’s theory of social justice, the second part of the chapter will argue that 
individuals have a right to exploit their talents, a Right to Personal Development. The last 
part will show that the Right to Personal Development, as it recognises that the right to a 
minimum income should be made conditional on the fulfilment of a contribution 
requirement, but that this requirement is enforced in a context where individuals have the 
opportunity to fulfil their obligations and that recognises the variety of activities that make 
a contribution to society, can provide an adequate justification of the right to a minimum 
income.
3.1. SOCIETY, MARKET AND INDIVIDUAL IN DURKHEIM’S 
THEORY OF SOCIAL OF JUSTICE
As the previous chapter demonstrates, a more satisfactory justification of the right to a 
minimum income must be founded on a particular theorisation of society, market and 
individual. This ontological framework must be found in the literature that laid down the 
foundations of modem social and political theory. Based on a comparison with the
43
C hapter 3 - H ow  C an One Justify a  M inimum Incom e G u aran tee?  The R igh t To P erso n a l D evelopm ent
arguments posed by Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill, this section will show that 
Durkheim’s theory of social justice can provide such an ontological framework.
The first part of this section, making use of the heuristic potential of the notion of human 
nature, will describe how Mill, Marx and Durkheim conceive the relation between 
individual, market and society. Based on a comparison with the arguments posed by Mill 
and Marx, the second section will demonstrate why Durkheim’s theory of social justice can 
provide a basis for an adequate justification of the right to a minimum income.
3.1.1. HUMAN NATURE IN DURKHEIM, MARX AND MILL
As seen earlier, this section will describe how Mill, Marx and Durkheim conceive the 
relation between individual, market and society. More than the relevance of their 
contribution to the development of social and political theory 
75, the choice of Marx and Mill as the terms of comparison with Durkheim’s theory of 
social justice is related with the fact that, although they share the same focus on promotion 
of the individuals’ personal development, Marx and Mill provide contrasting views on the 
social basis of individual agency, and the role of the market in the regulation of society. As 
the following section will show, this will serve to highlight the advantages of the 
ontological framework proposed by Durkheim.
In order to achieve the objective afore mentioned, it was decided to use an analytical tool 
that facilitates the comparison between the authors’ view of the relation between 
individual, market and society. As it identifies the biological and psychological traits of 
individuals, and the external factors that condition the individuals’ ability to realise their 
true nature (Duncan 1983, p. 6-7), the notion of human nature can provide that analytical 
framework. Hence, the following paragraphs will look at the conception of human nature 
that underpins the work of Mill, Marx and Durkheim76.
75 In the same way as Durkheim (functionalism), these authors made a relevant contribution to social and 
political theory from which different theoretical traditions emerged (Marxism, liberalism/utilitarianism).
76 The existence o f  something like a ‘human nature’ is an issue o f  strong debate. Chomsky argues that only 
the existence o f  a human nature can justify the drive for scientific knowledge and the existence o f  political 
debate. A s an example, he asks what can justify that people struggle against injustice. Foucault, on the other 
hand, doubts that there is such a thing as a human nature. Rather than asking if  human nature exists, Foucault 
argues, social scientists should study the ways this is used in political discourse (Fitzpatrick 2001, p. 95). The
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John Stuart Mill’s conception of human nature can be traced to his writings on 
utilitarianism and liberty. In his book ‘Utilitarianism’ the author tries to develop an 
utilitarian theory of social justice where happiness is desirable, and the only thing 
desirable, as an end”77. According to Gray (1996, p. 192), Mill’s concept of happiness is 
hierarchical and pluralistic. Hierarchical in the sense that happiness relates to the 
enjoyment of higher, rather than lower pleasures78. Higher pleasures are related with those 
activities that allow individuals to make use of their capacity for autonomous thought and 
action79. Pluralistic, in the sense that the individuals’ happiness is related with their 
particular needs, endowments and personality. Hence, the search for happiness involves a 
process of discovery and development of one’s endowments (Gray 1996, p. 192; Ten 1996, 
p. 214, Gray 1998, p. xv).
Marx’s ‘historical materialism’ can then be seen as an account of the way in which 
different socio-economic systems realize/subvert the fundamental traits of human nature. 
The communist society, as the conclusion of the historical movement of human evolution, 
can be seen as the stage where social conditions are the expression of human essence 
(Forbes 1983, p. 25-6). In light of this, one can find the main aspects of Marx’s conception 
of human nature in his analysis of capitalist and socialist mode of production.
Marx view of the capitalist mode of production is illustrated by the notion of alienated 
labour. Underlying this notion is one of the fundamental dimensions of Marx’s conception 
of human nature: the ability for conscious creative activity80. The capitalist mode of 
production is structured in such a way that workers are obliged to sell their labour power to 
guarantee their physical survival - ‘market alienation’ (Giddens 1971, p. 228). This
use o f  the notion o f  human nature here is in line with Foucault’s approach. Rather than arguing for a 
particular view o f  human nature, the purpose here is to identify a standpoint in political theory that can 
provide an adequate justification for the right to a minimum income.
77 Mill quoted by Gray (1998, p. x).
78 This distinction needs to be related with what Mill calls the ‘laws o f the mind’ (Smart 1983, p. 44), i.e. the 
psychological mechanisms that determine how practical experience is assimilated and processed by 
individuals. The most relevant laws in Millian psychology are the Taws o f association’. According to M ill, “a 
desire, an emotion, an idea o f  the higher order o f  abstraction, even our judgements and volitions when they 
have become habitual, are called up by association, according to precisely the same laws as our simple ideas” 
Mill quoted by (Smart 1983, p. 44).
79 In this sense, the enjoyment o f higher pleasures is also dependent on education, as a mean to develop the 
capacity for autonomous thought (Smart 1983, p. 47-8).
80 Marx considers that what distinguishes man from other animals, our ‘species-being’, is the fact that human 
labour responds not to natural needs, but to conscious reflection. This must be interpreted in light o f  Marx’s 
epistemology, which is based on the premise that human cognition is not a passive activity, but implies an 
active production o f reality, which in turn shapes man and his relations with other human beings (Avineri 
1968, p. 71).
45
C hapter 3 - H ow  C an One Justify a  M inimum Incom e G uaran tee? The R igh t To P erson a l D eve lopm en t
alienates individuals from their essence, i.e., the free exercise of their creative capacities 
(Giddens 1971, p. 228-9 and Avineri 1968, p. 72). The increased specialisation, the 
impossibility to plan and control the productive process, and the repetitive and arid 
character of industrial production constitute a further curtailment of the individuals’ 
capacity to use their conscious creative ability -  ‘technological alienation’ (Giddens 1971, 
p. 228-9).
From this capacity for conscious creative activity, Marx derives the second dimension of 
his conception of human nature: the social nature of individuals81. In opposition to Kantian 
individualism, Marx sees all human activity as social and other-oriented, i.e., it depends 
on, or affects other individuals. Marx’s criticism of the capitalist mode of production, 
founded on the right to private property, is based on the fact that this is not compatible with 
the other-oriented character of human production (Avineri 1968, p. 86-91). This is 
confirmed in Marx’s description of communist society. The elimination of private 
property, by abolishing the separation between labour and product and offsetting the 
conditions that determine the organisation of productive processes, allows individuals to 
develop their conscious creative ability (Avineri 1968, 88-9).
Having described Marx’ s and Mill’s standpoints, one can now turn to the conception of 
human nature underlying Durkheim’s ‘theory of social justice’, developed in his study of 
‘The Division of Labour in Society’ (1984)82. According to Durkheim, human behaviour is 
guided by two contradictory forces: our individual conscience (or personality), i.e. that 
which each one of us owns, and that differentiates us from others; and our common 
counsciousness, which can be defined as “... a set of beliefs and sentiments common to the 
average members of a single society which forms a determinate system that has its own 
life” (Durkheim 1984, p. 84). The transition from mechanical to organic societies implies 
the transformation of the articulation between individual personality and collective 
consciousness in the production of social solidarity (Lukes 1973, p. 139, 149 and Jones 
1986, p. 33).
81 Again, this must be understood in light o f the fundamental premises o f  Marx’s epistemology (see note 68).
82 A second conception o f  human nature is sketched in his essay “The Dualism o f  Human Nature and its 
Social Conditions” and is further extended in his later writings on morality. Underlying this conception o f  
human nature is the need o f  individuals to submit themselves to the demands o f  society, as a superior moral 
entity, thus restraining themselves from acting on the basis o f  internal egoistic appetites (Lukes 1977, p. 83).
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Whilst in mechanical societies social solidarity is based on the effacement of individual 
personalities with regards to the collective consciousness, in organic societies this depends 
on the ability of individual personalities to flourish. This means both the reduction in the 
scope of the collective consciousness and a structural change in its content. Whereas in 
(small scale) mechanical societies social solidarity depends on a set of very specific and 
enforceable collective values, in (large scale) organic societies the common consciousness 
becomes more abstract, in order to cover the diversity of individuals and experiences. At 
the same time, the content of the common consciousness changes from the focus on the 
superior interests of society to the focus on the individual -  the ‘cult of the individual’ 
(Lukes 1973, p. 147-58).
In this context, social justice becomes a fundamental condition for the guarantee of social 
solidarity in organic societies. According to Durkheim: “ ... the division of labour only 
produces solidarity if it is spontaneous (...) But spontaneity must mean not the absence of 
any deliberate, formal type of violence, but of anything that may hamper, even indirectly, 
the free unfolding of the social force each individual contains within himself’ (Durkheim 
1984, p. 313). In order to be spontaneous, the division of labour must occur in a context of 
‘absolute equality in the external conditions of struggle’ (Durkheim 1984, p. 313). This 
requires the elimination of the direct and indirect constraints to individuals’ choices over 
the best way to exploit their talents.
The elimination of direct constraints on personal development involves the abolition of all 
the situations where the allocation of social functions is made by criteria other than the 
merit of individuals. This means the abolition of all forms of institutionalised 
favouritism83, and the reduction of economic inequalities, through the elimination of 
hereditary transmission of wealth, and support to individuals in disadvantaged positions 
(Durkheim 1984, p. 315). The elimination of indirect constraints is related to the promotion 
of contractual justice. A fair exchange, Durkheim argues, implies that the goods or services 
exchanged represent an equivalent social value84. For this to happen, the parties need to be
83 Or, in Rawlsian terms, careers open to all (Rawls 2001, p. 68).
84 Durkheim defines social value as “ ... the part o f th a t... (to ta l)... effort capable o f  producing socially 
useful effects, that is, effects that correspond to normal needs” (1984, p. 317). This metric is far from clear. It 
implies a function between the total effort needed in the production o f  the goods or services, the intensity o f 
the needs these might satisfy and the satisfaction it affords (Jones 1986, p. 54).
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under equality of conditions in the exchange of goods and services (Durkheim 1984, p. 
319).
3.1.2. DURKHEIM’S THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM INCOME
Having described the way in which Mill, Marx and Durkheim conceive the relation 
between individual, market and society, this section will provide a more thorough analysis 
of the authors’ stand on the social character of personal development and on the role of the 
market as a mechanism of social regulation. This will demonstrate that the ontological 
framework proposed by Durkheim can provide the basis for a more satisfactory 
justification for a right to a minimum income.
Mill is ambiguous with regards to the social character of personal development. On the one 
side, personal development depends on practical experience. Hence, it can only occur in 
the context of society. However, personal development also requires a person to reflect on 
her position, and detach herself from society (Gray 1996, p. 201 and Lindley 1986, p. 52). 
The latter element, though, seems to have more weight in Mill’s argument. This explains 
Mill’s disregard for the obligations that the social character of personal development 
imposes on us. As Gray points out (Gray 1996, p. 193), the principle of liberty is expected 
to protect our ability to pursue our happiness, not to demand it.
In contrast with John Stuart Mill, Marx views society as a fundamental condition for 
fulfilment of our species-being. In fact, personal development implies the surmounting of 
one’s own individuality. In Marx’s own words: “ ... though a man is a unique individual -  
and it is just his particularity which makes him an individual, a really individual communal 
being -  he is equally the whole, the ideal whole, the subjective existence of society as 
thought and experience”85. However, the author does not acknowledge that the social 
character of personal development implies any obligations on individuals. In fact, no 
obligation would be necessary, as the abolition of private property in communist society 
would allow individuals to recognise their inter-dependency (Avineri 1968, p. 90-1).
85 Marx, quoted by Avineri (1968, p. 88).
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Durkheim argues that personal development can only occur in the context of society. 
However, in contrast with Marx, the social nature of the personal development implies an 
obligation to exploit one’s talents. This obligation is inscribed in the morality of advanced 
societies which “... requires us only to be charitable and just towards our fellow-men, to 
fulfil our task well, to work towards a state where everyone is called to fulfil the function 
he performs the best and will receive a just reward for his efforts” (1984, p. 338). This 
obligation will be enforced through the use of restitutive sanctions. Unlike repressive 
sanctions, which are aimed at punishing individuals for a particular crime, restitutive 
sanctions are intended to restore the normal relationship between the parts. This can be 
done either by restoring the exchange between the two parts, or by annulling the exchange 
altogether (Durkheim 1984, p. 29).
In light of the previous paragraphs, it can be agued that, as far as the issue of the social 
nature of the personal development is concerned, Durkheim’s theory of social justice 
provides an ontological framework from which an adequate justification of the right to a 
minimum income can be justified. In contrast with Mill’s utilitarianism, Durkheim’s theory 
of social justice is able to conciliate the normative priority to the development of 
individuals with the recognition that the latter depends of their social context. Moreover, in 
contrast with Marx, Durkheim acknowledges that the social character of personal 
development imposes obligations on individuals.
Having analysed the authors’ view of the social character of personal development, one 
can now turn to their conception of the role of the market in the regulation of society. Marx 
fails to acknowledge the importance of the market, as it provides a mechanism to identify 
and satisfy social needs, in the regulation of society. In fact, as his analysis of the alienated 
character of labour under capitalism shows, Marx argue that when social relations are 
regulated by private property, and consequently the market, individuals tend to grow apart 
form each other, which in turn puts at stake the normal functioning of society. The 
elimination of private property in communist societies, as it allows individuals to assume 
their social nature, is the necessary guarantee to secure the functioning of society (Avineri 
1968, p. 90-1).
Mill’s view of the role of the market in the regulation of society is evident in his defence of 
laissez-faire, which reduces the possibility of state intervention to those areas that
49
C hapter 3  -  H ow  C an One Justify a  M inimum Incom e G uaran tee? The R igh t To P erson a l D evelopm en t
independent individuals cannot adequately manage by themselves, as a principle of social 
organisation. As Schwartz demonstrates (1968, p. 119-23), underlying Mill’s defence of 
laissez-faire is a belief on the efficiency of the market86, as opposed to State inefficiency, 
in satisfying the needs and wants of individuals and of solving conflicts of interests 
between them. State intervention it self, should be limited to those areas that would help 
individuals to develop themselves87: the provision of education and the guarantee of equal 
treatment to all individuals (Hollander 1985, p. 670).
In the same way as Mill, Durkheim enshrines the market as a fundamental mechanism of 
social regulation. This is clear in Durkheim’s in the fact that his theory of social justice is 
mostly concerned with market-based employment88. However, this is in contradiction with 
the spirit of the Division of Labour. Underlying Durkheim’s analysis of the division of 
labour in organic societies is the idea that each part of society performs a function that is 
essential for the functioning of society.
For instance, Durkheim does recognise the role of the State as a mechanism of social 
regulation. However, in contrast with Mill, the role of the State here is not solely to 
supplement the market. It acts as an organ of ‘social thought’, which interprets the 
common good and, as it secures the respect for individual rights, as an organ of social 
justice (Giddens 1986, p. 28, 48-9). Not only that, acknowledging the organic character of 
modem societies, Durkheim also highlights that the social solidarity is dependent on the 
action of of smaller social groups, namely the family and professional groups (Durkheim 
1984, p. 17-21, 242-5)89.
In light of this, one can argue that Durkheim’s theory of justice, when interpreted in the 
context of his conception of the functioning of organic societies, provides a more attractive
86 The superiority o f  the market derives from the system o f incentives to personal development guaranteed by 
the existence o f  property rights, and from the advantages o f  the price system as an information-gathering 
mechanism, especially when compared with centralised forms o f  information-gathering (Schwartz 1968, p. 
122).
87 Mill does accept that the State can intervene to deal with market inefficiencies. M ill’s argument for the 
need o f  mechanism public relief to deal with poverty, or the need to compensate individuals displaced by 
machinery, are good examples o f  M ill’s recognition o f some o f  the existence o f  market inefficiencies.
88 A further evidence o f  Durkheim’s view o f  the role o f the market in organic societies is visible in the 
author’s defence o f  the property an inheritance law, as means o f  marking the boundaries between the 
different parts o f  society (Durkheim 1984, p. 72-5).
89 In fact, as his the preface to the second edition o f ‘The Division o f  Labour in Society’ attests, as his career 
develops, Durkheim devotes increasing attention to the role o f secondary groups in the production o f social 
solidarity (Durkheim 1984, p. xxxi-lvii).
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framework to analyse the role of the market in the regulation of society than that presented 
by Mill and Marx. In the same way as Mill, and in contrast with Marx, Durkheim 
recognises the role of the market in identifying and satisfying needs in society. Not only 
that, Durkheim also acknowledges that the functioning of society depends of the regulatory 
action of various social institutions.
Bearing in mind the previous paragraphs, one can then conclude that Durkheim’s theory of 
social justice, as it provides an ontological framework that focuses on the promotion of the 
individuals’ personal development, but recognises its social basis, and the obligations that 
it imposes on them, and acknowledges that the functioning of society depends not only on 
the on the regulatory action of the market, but also of that of other social institutions, can 
provide the basis for a more satisfactory justification of the right to a minimum.
3.2. FROM DURKHEIM’S THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE TO THE 
RIGHT TO PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
The purpose of this section is to propose a normative framework that, building on 
Durkheim’s theory of social justice, is able to provide a more adequate justification for the 
right to a minimum income. As a starting point, in line with Durkheim’s theory of social 
justice, one can argue that social solidarity in organic societies depends on the ability of 
individuals to exploit their talents. This can be guaranteed by instituting a Right to 
Personal Development90. The section starts by discussing some of the most problematic 
issues in Durkheim’s theory of social justice. The remaining subsections will show how, 
bearing in mind the problems identified in Durkheim’s original framework, one can outline 
the conditions for the exercise of the Right to Personal Development. The final subsection 
will define the fundamental premises of the Right to Personal Development.
90 Despite writing extensively on the relation between individual rights and organic solidarity, Durkheim’s 
‘The Division o f  Labour in Society’ (1984) never makes a specific connection between rights and social 
justice. He does this later when he analyses the role o f  the state as an organ o f  social justice (Giddens 1996, 
p. 45-50). In a posthumous article published in the ‘Revue Philosophique’, the author states: “ ... the progress 
o f justice is measured by the degree o f  respect accorded to the rights o f  the individual” (Durkheim quoted by 
Giddens (1996, p. 49)).
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3.2.1. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DURKHEIM’S THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
As mentioned earlier, Durkheim’s theory of social justice will provide the background for 
an alternative normative framework, the Right to Personal Development, which should be 
able to provide a satisfactory justification of the right to a minimum income. However, in 
order to be successful, this normative framework must acknowledge some of the problems 
that are evident in Durkheim’s theory of social justice.
As can be seen from the previous sections, Durkheim develops a meritocratic conception 
of social justice which combines both talent and desert-based elements (see note 55, p. 28). 
Its main purpose is to propose a social and redistribuitve system that enables individuals to 
exploit their talents, which in turn legitimises the inequalities that might arise from the use 
of these talents (see White 2003, p. 13-4). At the same time, Durkheim stresses that the 
individual’s ability to exploit their talents depends of a broader cooperation mechanism, 
which in turn requires individuals to exploit their talents.
As with other meritocratic arguments, Durkheim’s theory of social justice displays an 
idealised, if not teleological, view of the functioning of society. In particular, the 
spontaneous division of labour is only possible in a context where the distribution of 
natural talents matches the distribution of social functions91. Besides the objective 
unlikelihood of such a scenario92, this reflects the shortcomings in the author’s conception 
of talents and of the conditions in which individuals exploit them.
Durkheim’s conception of talents can be summarised in four ideas. First, these are 
‘hereditary tendencies’ (Durkheim 1984, p. 310), in the sense that they are related to the 
internal endowments of individuals. Second, individuals have a limited set of abilities, 
which limits their potential for personal development93 (Durkheim 1984, p. 310-1).
91 This is clear when the author tries to justify the need for equality o f  opportunities as a way o f  promoting 
social cohesion. Besides guaranteeing that social functions are fulfilled by those who are best suited to 
perform them, equality o f  opportunity can produce social cohesion by avoiding feelings o f  suffering and 
resentment that result from the inability o f  individuals to exploit their talents (see Durkheim 1984, p. 311-12, 
315). Although Durkheim does not recognise it, this means that, even in a context o f  absolute equality in the 
external conditions o f  struggle, the mismatch between the distribution o f  natural abilities and the distribution 
o f social functions would be a constant threat to the social cohesion o f organic societies.
92 If anything, this premise would require the existence o f markets functioning under perfect information, or 
the absolute mobility o f individuals, which cannot be found in objective reality.
93 In the Durkheim’s own words: “ ... we are certainly not predestined from birth to any particular form of  
employment, but we nevertheless possess tastes and aptitudes that limit our choice” (1984, p. 310-1)
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Thirdly, despite asserting that talents are related to the performance of social functions, 
Durkheim tends to relate them solely with paid employment (Durkheim 1984, p. 310). 
Fourthly, although the process is open to trial and error, under a context of equality of 
opportunities, individuals will normally perform the social function they are naturally 
inclined to fulfil (Durkheim 1984, p. 310, 312).
As the previous paragraph shows, Durkheim provides a rather vague conception of talents 
and of how individuals develop themselves. For instance, Durkheim does not clarify the 
process by which individuals discover their talents. Second, Durkheim neglects the role of 
education in the individuals’ ability to exploit their talents. Thirdly, as it departs from an 
idealised vision of the functioning of society, Durkheim fails to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the processes that regulate the allocation of individuals to social 
functions.
This puts serious questions to Durkheim’s conception of equality of opportunity94. This 
cannot be guaranteed solely by the elimination of institutionalised favouritisms. 
Furthermore, it is hard to believe that the elimination of all inherited wealth alone, as a 
means of reducing economic inequality, will be enough to guarantee that individuals have 
the same opportunities to exploit their talents95. This suggests that in order, to guarantee an 
effective equality of opportunity for individuals to exploit their talents, the Right to 
Personal Development must provide a more comprehensive conception of human talents 
and of how individuals exploit them.
Another problematic issue concerns the Durkheim’s narrow understanding of the range of 
activities that can be considered as fulfilling a social function, and consequently as a space 
for personal development. As mentioned earlier, Durkheim’s theory of social justice seems 
to be restricted to paid-employment, thus neglecting the contributory nature of a diversity 
of non-paid activities such as care work, community work, etc. (Levitas 1996, p. 12). In 
light of this, in order to extend personal development to other activities besides paid 
employment, the Right to Personal Development must accommodate a broader
94 A s Wright-Mills mentions, Durkheim’s theory o f  justice is more about equality o f  conditions than equality 
o f opportunity (1996, p. 129).
95 In fact, one can argue that the elimination o f all inherited wealth will harm the development prospects o f  
the poorest in society.
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understanding of the type of activities that can be considered as fulfilling a social function, 
i.e. as making a contribution to society.
Bearing in mind the previous paragraphs, it will be argued that in order to provide a 
satisfactory justification of the right to a minimum income, the Right to Personal 
Development must, in line with Durkheim’s theory of justice, reflect a more 
comprehensive understanding of individual talents are, how individuals exploit them, and 
of the type of activities that can be considered as fulfilling a social function. The next two 
sections will provide further discussion on these issues.
3.2.2. INDIVIDUAL TALENTS AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
One can start by arguing that talents have a biological/physical basis. However, one should 
differentiate between a ‘basic talent’, which refers to a particular physical or sensory 
endowment, and a ‘complex talent’, which refers to the combination of a variety of 
physical or sensory gifts in the performance of a particular activity (Smith 2001, p. 19). As 
they are related with the fulfilment of social functions, talents here are conceived in the 
latter sense.
One should also point out that human talents, despite their specialised character (i.e. they 
are solely related to the performance of a social function96), they are obviously dependent 
of the features that secure human agency. Hence, in line with the argument put forward by 
Doyal and Gough (1991, p. 56-69), the individuals’ ability to exploit its talents is 
dependent of their cognitive capacity (human intelligence, learning skills, reflective skills), 
emotional stability and physical condition (physical strength, agility, overall bio-functional 
equilibrium, etc.).
In the same way as Durkheim, one should also recognise that the individuals’ ability to 
exploit their talents is socially conditioned. First, because a person’s ability to exploit her 
talents depends on the opportunities to exercise them. As Roberts shows (1990, p. 1), 
talents can only be recognised through practical performance. This is to say that, 
individuals hold ‘recognizable talents’ that are identified when performing a given activity
96 Human agency refers to a much broader range o f human activities, such as political participation, personal 
ethics, etc.
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or function, and ‘hidden talents’ that individuals hold but are unaware of. Hence, personal 
development depends on the opportunities to engage one’s talents in the performance of a 
given activity/social function (Roberts 1990, p. 2-3).
Second, as the debate about the distinction between talent and impairment makes evident, 
talents are themselves socially constructed. According to Smith, rather than a purely 
medical and static condition, physical impairments are a social construct, which must be 
analysed in terms of the individuals’ participation opportunities. When physical 
impairments are conceived in these terms, the latter could be reconstructed as talents - 
‘impairment-talent transferability’97 (Smith 2001, p. 30). This, of course opens news 
opportunities for individuals to exploit their talents (Roberts 1990, p. 2-3).
One should also point out that the individuals’ ability to exploit their talents is conditioned 
by education and training. The role of education can be traced back to the importance of 
cognitive ability for human agency in general. Doyal and Gough demonstrate the 
importance of the educational system as a provider of cognitive skills such as use of 
language, reading literacy or mathematical literacy, which are central for the development 
of human autonomy (Doyal and Gough 1991, p. 181-4; 214-216). Training, on the other 
hand, allows individuals to transform their natural talents into skill that can be used in the 
production of goods or services. The role of training and education becomes even more 
important in the context of the ‘knowledge-based society’, as this requires that education 
and training systems provide a framework that enables individuals to be engaged in 
learning throughout their lives - lifelong learning (ILO 2002, p. 12).
Finally, as the existence of unemployment exemplifies, the distribution of opportunities for 
personal development does not necessarily match the distribution of talents in society. Be it 
due to market imperfections (such as imperfect information and limits to mobility of 
labour), or to the effects of technological progress on the demand for certain skills, or the 
effects of economic cycles, there are situations of mismatch between the supply and 
demand of talents in the labour market (see Hudson 1988, p. 11-27). In all cases the State, 
by improving the support to individual job-search, by promoting mobility in the labour 
market, by promoting the creation of training opportunities, or by promoting policies that
97 The case o f  the relation between gigantism and basketball, is a clear example o f  this approach.
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increase the consumption of goods and services98, can have a relevant role in increasing the 
opportunities for individuals to exploit their talents.
Bearing in mind the criticisms made to Durkheim, one can argue that the conception of 
talents and personal development proposed here bears three fundamental advantages. First, 
it shows that individuals hold an indeterminate number of talents, some recognisable, 
others hidden. Personal development then consists of an open process where individuals 
choose either to use their recognisable talents or explore hidden ones. Second, it recognises 
that personal development is not just about the possibility of using one’s talents in the 
performance of a given social function. It also involves the improvement of one’s human 
capital as this will enhance individuals’ ability to exploit their talents. Finally, it shows that 
equality of opportunities for personal develop depends, not on the elimination of inherited 
wealth, but on the existence of effective opportunities for individuals to exploit their 
talents, be they opportunities to exploit new talents, opportunities that enable the 
impairment-talent transferability, or to improve their human capital.
3.2.3. SOCIAL FUNCTIONS AND PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
As already seen, despite the broadness of Durkheim’s notion of social function, his theory 
of social justice fails to acknowledge the contributory nature of other activities besides 
paid employment. The purpose here, based on Durkheim’s original notion of social 
function, is to determine what activities respond to social needs. In order to guarantee the 
success of this endeavour, one can build on Stuart White’s notion of ‘civic labour’99. In 
line with Durkheim’s notion of social function, civic labour refers to all “ ... labour that 
provides a significant service for, or on behalf of, the wider community” (2003, p. 97). In 
order to determine what are the activities that might be considered as a form of 
contribution to society, one needs to identify “ ... what kind of work is sufficiently valuable 
to other citizens to count in reciprocation for the goods and services they have supplied.” 
(White 2003, p. 99). The most obvious mechanism to determine the value citizens assign
98 Be it through public investment, or by lowering taxes or, where possible, by reducing interest rates to 
improve investment. (Hudson 1988, p. 12)
99 As mentioned elsewhere (section 2.1.2.), White argues that those individuals who, in the context o f  just 
economic institutions, require a high share o f  the social product available should be expected to perform a 
minimum amount o f work, or civic labour.
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to a given good or service is the market. In light of this, civic labour refers, in the first 
instance, to market-generated paid employment, or self-employment (White 2003, p. 99).
Nevertheless, the author recognises that some forms of paid employment are not market­
generated, but located in the public sector. Still, given the existence of state inefficiencies, 
only certain types of activities can be considered as civic labour. In light of this, the author 
argues, civic labour can only include work activities related to the production of public 
goods, i.e., goods that are available for the (indiscriminate) use of all individuals and in 
which individual consumption does not diminish their availability to other individuals; and 
merit goods, i.e., goods that respond to claims of distributive justice (that can be structured 
around the notion of need) or to other moral reasons (White 2003, p. 101-3).
Besides work activities related with the production of public and merit goods, White’s 
conception of civic labour also includes work performed in the household, namely parental 
care and care of the infirm100. Parental care work can be seen as providing both a merit 
good, in the sense that it provides for the needs of individuals (i.e., children) who cannot 
take care of themselves; and a public good, in the sense that it guarantees the 
intergenerational continuity of society, even for those who do not whish to have children. 
The care of the infirm, on the other hand, can be seen as a merit good, in the sense that it 
secures the needs of the infirm (White 2003, p. 111-2).
White’s conception of civic labour, despite its relevance, is not without problems. 
Although it acknowledges the existence of other contributory activities besides paid 
employment, it does not ascribe to them the same moral value. This is clear when he 
argues that work performed in production of public and merit goods can only be 
considered as a form of civic labour to the point that the provision of these goods is not 
excessive with regards to societal needs (White 2003, p. 101-8)101. This is also clear, when
100 This excludes other forms o f household work as, White argues, they fulfil domestic and personal rather 
than social functions (2003, p. 111-2).
101 In order to measure the provision o f  public goods and merit goods that respond to claims o f distributive 
justice, the author suggests the possibility o f using a revised version o f  Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance 
market. This would consist in estimating the preferences o f the average member o f  the community 
concerning the level and range o f merit goods it would buy. This mechanism should be complemented by a 
set o f  mechanisms, such as deliberative opinion polls and citizens’ juries, that improve the deliberative and 
participatory nature o f  public decision-making institutions (White 2003, p. 103-9). In the particular case o f  
merit goods that respond to other moral reasons, White argues that “ ... the provision o f  such goods arguably 
is legitimate if  the pattern o f provision reflects the preferences o f majority and minority in proportion to their 
respective tax contributions” (White 2003, p. 101-3).
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he argues that the basic work expectation, for a person with parental responsibilities, will 
only be reduced, depending on the age of the child, to something like half the basic work 
expectation (White 2003, p. 115-6). In the end, this reflects White’s assumption that the 
market is the most suitable mechanism for identifying the contributory nature of productive 
activities102.
A second problem with Stuart White’s conception of civic labour, is that the author 
neglects the role of non-state organisations in the provision of merit goods. Underlying the 
notion of ‘social economy’ (or not-for-profit, or voluntary sector or third sector) is a set of 
organisations, such as social enterprises or voluntary organisations, which provide a 
number of goods and services aimed at fulfilling the needs of individuals and communities 
that are not satisfied by either the market or the public sector (see Defoumy, Favreau and 
Laville 2001, p. 3-4, 20-5). Hence, any paid or unpaid work carried out within this type of 
organisations can be said to make a contribution to society.
Despite the problems mentioned above, Stuart White’s definition of civic labour can be 
used as a guide to identify the activities that can be seen as fulfilling a social function. 
These can include:
• Market-based paid employment, in the sense that it satisfies needs that other 
individuals are interested in paying for;
• Public sector paid employment, in the sense that it contributes to the production of 
public and merit goods which are essential for the functioning of society;
• Paid and unpaid work in social economy organisations, in the sense that it 
contributes to the production of goods and services that satisfy social needs that are 
not met by the market or the public sector;
• Parental care, in the sense that it guarantees the basic conditions for social 
reproduction;
• Care of infirm, disabled or older individuals, in the sense that it satisfies the needs 
of those who cannot provide for themselves.
102 This is proved by the fact that the author does not question the contributory role o f  work engaged in the 
production o f  goods and services that are aimed at fulfilling luxurious tastes, rather than social needs. The 
author does accept that certain paid activities, such as activities who might be harmful to the basic interests 
o f individuals (such as prostitution) or that involve as excessive risk o f  self-harm (such as drug-dealing), 
cannot be considered as civic labour. However, he never considers the issue o f  expensive tastes, which is a 
key criticism o f  the author’s assumptions about the role o f the market in identifying the contributory nature 
o f productive activities.
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However, in contrast with White’s argument, these activities, as they are equally important 
in guaranteeing the functioning of society, bear the same contributory value. This is 
particularly important in the case of non-paid work, be it in the household or in voluntary 
organisations, which should be seen as equivalent to paid employment as a way of 
contributing to society.
As can be seen, in contrast with Durkheim’s original framework, personal development is 
here seen as not just about the performance of paid-employment. Here this refers to a 
variety of paid and unpaid activities, and to the participation in education and training. This 
has further implications for the use of Durkheim’s theory of justice as the basis of the 
Right to Personal Development. Specifically, this means that Durkheim’s argument for the 
need to eliminate all direct constraints on the individuals’ choice over the way option to 
exploit their talents needs to acknowledge the diversity of activities that this can cover. The 
same applies to Durkheim’s argument for the obligation to exploit one’s talents.
3.2.4. POSTULATING THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
Bearing in mind the previous sections, one can now advance the fundamental premises of 
the Right to Personal Development. As before, it will be argued that the production of 
social solidarity in organic societies depends on the ability of individuals to exploit their 
talents, i.e. the ability to nurture their talents through education and training and to exercise 
them in the performance of a social function. This can be guaranteed by instituting a Right 
to Personal Development.
In order for individuals to exercise their Right to Personal Development, it is necessary to 
secure certain conditions. Bearing in mind the importance of a person’s physical condition, 
cognitive capacity and emotional stability, if she is to be able to exploit her talents, it will 
be argued that social actors and institutions must first meet the individual’s basic 
consumption needs, namely the access to an adequate income, healthcare and housing.
The exercise of the Right to Personal Development also requires that individuals must be 
free to choose the way they want to exploit their talents. In line with Durkheim’s theory of 
justice, this requires the removal of all the norms that restrict access to the whole range of
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activities that enable a person’s personal development; and the removal of all the 
mechanisms that might indirectly condition or influence a person’s choices over the best 
option for personal development.
However, a person’s ability to exploit her talents does not depend on direct or indirect 
constraints alone. As the previous section showed, she needs effective opportunities to 
exploit her talents. In light of this, it will be argued that they should be provided with the 
opportunity to exploit their talents, be it new opportunities to use recognisable talents, 
opportunities to discover hidden talents (even including the transformation of impairments 
into new talents), or opportunities to engage in training or education.
Finally, the Right to Personal Development carries with it a corresponding responsibility, a 
reciprocity requirement. As mentioned earlier, the existence of a Right to Personal 
Development is justified by the assumption that collective life is dependent on a 
cooperation process where individuals use their talents in the exercise of a given social 
function. Hence, every individual has a duty, using their talents, to participate in the 
cooperation process that secures the functioning of collective life, and consequently the 
possibility for other individuals to develop themselves. Furthermore, in line with 
Durkheim’s original framework, this obligation can be enforced through the use of 
restitutive sanctions.
In light of this last requirement, one can summarise the Right Personal Development in the 
following terms:
Every individual has a right to exploit its talents, which can be exercised whilst performing 
a social function in society, such as paid employment, performing unpaid work in social 
economy organisations or providing care to dependent family members; or improving their 
human capital through education or training. In order to secure this right, social actors and 
institutions must:
• meet the individual’s basic consumption needs
• eliminate direct and indirect constraints to the individual’s choices on the best way 
to exploit its talents
• provide the individual with opportunities to exploit its talents
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• enforce, through the use of restitutive sanctions, the individual’s obligation to 
exploit its talents as to enable the personal development of others.
3.3. THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
GUARANTEE OF A MINIMUM INCOME
Having put forward the fundamental premises of the Right to Personal Development, this 
section will show how this framework can provide an adequate justification of the right to 
a minimum income. First of all, one needs to demonstrate how one can derive the right to a 
minimum income guarantee from our normative framework. Bearing in mind the definition 
of the Right to Personal Development advanced earlier, one can argue that it is possible to 
justify the need for a right to a minimum income as a form of guaranteeing the individuals’ 
basic consumption needs.
As seen earlier, in order to provide a more satisfactory justification, a minimum income 
guarantee based on the Right to Personal Development, must fulfil three basic 
requirements. First, that the exercise of the right to a minimum income is conditional to 
some kind of contribution requirement. As the previous sections show, the Right to 
Personal Development involves an obligation to exploit one’s talents reciprocity 
requirement. Furthermore, it was argued that this obligation should be enforced through 
restitutive sanctions. In light of this, it can be argued that making the right to a minimum 
income conditional to a requirement to exploit one’s talents, be it by participating in 
education and training or the performance of a social function in society, is consistent with 
the Right to Personal Development.
The second requirement is that the enforcement of individual obligations occurs in a 
context where individuals have an effective opportunity to engage in some kind of 
contributory activity. As the previous sections show, the Right to Personal Development 
recognises the need for individuals to have effective opportunities to exploit their talents. 
Hence, it can be argued that the contribution requirement which conditions the exercise of 
the right to a minimum income, should be enforced in a context where individuals have 
effective opportunities to use recognisable talents, opportunities to discover hidden talents
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(even including the transformation of impairments into new talents), or opportunities to 
engage in training of education.
The final requirement is the need to recognise the variety of activities that can be 
considered as an appropriate form of contributing to society. As the previous sections 
show, the Right to Personal Development recognises the contributory potential of a variety 
of social activities. In light of this, it can be argued that the contribution requirement which 
conditions the exercise of the right to a minimum income, besides the engagement in 
education or training, should cover a variety of activities such as such as paid employment 
in the private or public sector; paid or unpaid work in social economy organisations, 
parental care, or care for dependent family members. Bearing in mind the previous 
paragraphs, it will be argued that the Right to Personal Development can provide an 
adequate justification for the right to a minimum income.
3.4. CONCLUSION
As mentioned elsewhere, the introduction of activation requirements in GMI schemes 
prompted a debate about the justification of the right to a minimum income. The previous 
chapter showed that Mead and Van Parijs, which typify the fundamental standpoints in this 
debate, fail to provide a satisfactory justification. Reflecting on the limitations of the 
arguments posed by the two authors, namely in what concerns the authors’ assumptions 
about the relation between society, market and individual, it was argued that more 
satisfactory alternative is possible.
This chapter was set to develop a normative framework that could provide a more 
satisfactory justification of the right to a minimum income. The first part of this chapter 
demonstrated that Durkheim’s theory of social justice, as it makes provides an ontological 
framework which is able to establishing a relationship between organic solidarity, personal 
development and social obligation, can provide the basis for a more satisfactory 
justification of the right to a minimum income. Building on Durkheim’s theory of social 
justice, the chapter then argued that individuals have a Right to Personal Development.
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Finally, the chapter showed that, as it recognises that the right to a minimum income 
should be made conditional to the fulfilment of the obligation personal development; that 
individuals should have effective opportunities to exploit their talents, and that recognises 
the contributory potential of a variety of social activities, this normative framework can 
provide an adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. In light of this, it will 
be argued that the Right to Personal Development should be used as the normative 
standpoint to analyse the balance between fairness and effectiveness in the activation of 
GMI recipients.
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4. THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE RELATION 
BETWEEN THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF 
GMI SCHEMES AND THEIR RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT 
TO PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
Has seen earlier, the introduction of activation requirements in GMI schemes prompted 
two, complementary, debates. Whilst, the first is concerned with the terms in which one 
can justify the right to a minimum income, the second is related to the balance between 
fairness and effectiveness in the activation of GMI recipients. The previous chapters have 
shown that the Right to Personal Developpment can provide an adequate justification for 
the right to a minimum income. In light of this, it was argued that the Right to Personal 
Development should be used as the normative standpoint to analyse the balance between 
fairness and effectiveness in the activation of GMI recipients.
This chapter will present the methodological basis for a comparative study of the relation 
between the respect of the Right to Personal Development and the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes in EU member countries. The chapter starts by reviewing 
the literature on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. The remaining sections 
will describe the methodology that will be used to analyse the relation between respect of 
the Right to Personal Development and the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes in 
EU member countries.
4.1. THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF GMI SCHEMES -  
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This section first examines the literature on the employment effectiveness of GMI
schemes. Starting with the comparative evidence, where no comparative literature is
available, relevant country-based studies will be used. The section starts by revising the
existing comparative evidence on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. It then
examines how the various mechanisms and strategies devised to activate GMI recipients
impact on the schemes’ employment effectiveness. Finally, it identifies the main strengths
and shortcomings in the existing literature, and discusses how these will affect the design
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of the methodological framework for the analysis of the relation between the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes in EU member countries and their respect for the right to 
Personal Development.
4.1.1. MEASURING TRANSITIONS FROM GUARANTEED MINIMUM INCOME 
TO WORK
As Hanesh and Baltzer rightly mention (2001, p. 32), there is little comparative evidence 
on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes in EU member countries. In 1999, the 
European Commission gathered institutional/administrative data on the effectiveness of 
GMI schemes in a number of EU member countries. As Table 5 shows 
103, most GMI schemes had significant problems in returning recipients back to the labour 
market. The French RMI was the most effective, as 27% of recipients were able to find a 
job. In Denmark and Spain close to 15% of recipients entered the labour market. The least 
effective scheme was the Revenu Minimum Guaranti in Luxembourg (European 
Commission 1998, p. 28). However, as it does not differentiate between subsidised and 
unsubsidised employment, this study fails to provide an accurate representation of the 
employment effectiveness of GMI schemes.
103 As can be seen in Table 5, there are significant limitations in the data gathered by the European 
Commission. For instance, the Commission study does not clarify the time frame in which transitions to 
employment occur (see European Commission 1998, p. 28).
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D enm ark 49 2 0 - 3 0 15 / 34 501
Germ any 8.4 / / / / /
Spain 1002 / 133 0.054
France >  28 33 27 6 52 (47 job seekers)
Luxem bourg 12.0 6.055 4.7 3.9 3.5 79.56
Netherlands / 32.9 11.6 0.6 18.87
Portugal 21.8 / 9.7 / 21.5 50.1s
* N o information given 
: Not available
1 -  In supplement to other benefits
2 - In theory
3 - Protected employment
4 - Social integration projects (healthcare, children’s education, etc)
5 - In 96
6 - Exempt from MSC
7 - O f which 4 have moved abroad; 4 marriages
8 - 18.6, healthcare; 23.7, social support; 7.8, housing
Adapted from: European Commission (1998, p. 28).
Nicaise et al. ’s (2003) study of GMI schemes in the European Union, based on comparable 
data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), provides a more 
sophisticated portrait of the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. If one looks at the 
average yearly probabilities of transition between GMI and work (Table 6)104, one notices 
that Austria and Denmark, alongside Finland and Spain, are the most effective at returning 
recipients back into the labour market. In contrast, Ireland and Germany present the lowest 
levels of effectiveness.
104 In order to build this indicator the authors started by producing yearly transition rates, i.e. the probability 
o f a GMI recipient, in any given month, being in work in the next 12 months. These yearly transition rates 
were then averaged (Nicaise et al. 2003, Annex 7, p. 76).
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Source: Nicaise et al.2003, Annex 7
Despite its significance, this study bears some limitations105. In particular, it does not take 
into account the influence of labour market conditions on the effectiveness of GMI 
schemes, particularly their ability to re-integrate unemployed persons106. One would expect 
that more buoyant labour markets would absorb a larger share of GMI recipients. For 
instance, Theodore and Peck, argue that the relative success of workfare schemes in the US 
must be understood in the context of a booming economy, which was creating new jobs 
anyway (2000, p. 87).
Unfortunately, there is little evidence of impact of labour markets on the effectiveness of 
GMI schemes. A study carried out by the White House Council of Economic Advisers’ 
showed that, in what the US is concerned, there is a connection between the level of 
unemployment and the percentage of individuals on welfare. For instance, in the period 
between 1993-96, a share of 26% to 36% of the overall decline in the percentage of 
welfare recipients was due to improvements in the labour market. After the introduction of 
TANF, which increased the positive and negative incentives to force recipients into the 
labour market, only 8% to 10% of the decline in welfare caseloads could be ascribed to
105 As the authors themselves admit, ‘yearly transition rates’ consist o f  estimates, rather than actual 
transitions between states. Furthermore, the methodology adopted does not take into account duration effects, 
i.e. the influence that the time spent in a given situation can have on the individual’s likelihood o f  moving on 
to a different state. Thirdly, the average transition probabilities ignore variations within countries (Nicaise et 
al. 2003 -  Annex 7, p. 76).
106 The picture becomes even more complex when one takes into account the interaction between the 
performance o f  labour markets and the impact o f ALMP. For instance, Anxo, Carcillo and Erhel (2001) 
suggest that ALMP have a significant positive impact on total hirings from unemployment. Belmand and 
Lehmann (1990) also show some positive effects on outflows from unemployment, but only for job creation 
schemes. On the hand, De Koning et al. (1995), based on the evaluation o f  ALMP in the Netherlands, argue 
that ALMP have no effects on total hirings from unemployment. For a more detailed discussion o f  the 
impact o f ALMP see De Koning (2001).
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labour-market conditions (Council Of Economic Advisers 1999, p. 23). Comilleau, 
Demailly and Papin try to estimate the effect of growth of employment creation on RMI 
caseloads (France). The authors argue that during the period between 1997-99, the creation 
of 870 000 jobs contributed for a reduction of 51 000 individuals in the RMI 
(approximately 5% of the recipient population) (2000, p. 7). However, these studies must 
be analysed with caution as they do not differentiate between entries and departures from 
social assistance and, in the later category, transitions from benefit to work.
One way of trying to account for labour market conditions in the measurement of the 
effectiveness of GMI schemes consists in the realisation of quasi-experimental evaluations. 
Dahl and Pedersen carried out a systematic review of this type of studies in Europe. 
However, as the authors notice, the available studies use different methodological 
approaches, which limit their comparability. Nonetheless, the systematic review suggests 
that activation programmes have a positive net-employment effect. In France, studies show 
that 25% of RMI recipients are able to enter employment, whereas in the Netherlands this 
amounts to around to 18% (Dahl and Pedersen 2002, p. 71-2)107.
4.1.2. RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS AND THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF 
GMI SCHEMES
As mentioned earlier, this section will review the existing evidence on the impact of the 
various mechanisms and strategies devised to activate GMI recipients on the schemes’ 
employment effectiveness. The initial subsections will look at the evidence on the impact 
of the activation incentives imposed on GMI recipients on the schemes’ employment 
effectiveness. The last subsection will turn to evidence on the impact of human capital 
development and labour-market attachment strategies.
107 Dahl and Pedersen’s review also suggests that job training in private companies or programmes that are 
closer to real labour-market conditions are the most effective. Furthermore, the authors indicate that young 
people, with higher educational levels and less social problems, are those who benefit the most from 
participating in activation schemes. In fact, this might be related to the fact that welfare officers tend to 
assign more employable individuals to participate in activation programmes. This reinforces the idea that 
activation programmes entail significant deadweight effects (2002, p. 73).
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4.I.2.I. Positive incentives and the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes
As seen earlier, GMI recipients are entitled to participate in a variety of programmes 
designed to enhance their chances of entering the labour market: job-search assistance, 
training courses, incentives to individuals (earnings supplements, tax credits or self- 
employment programmes), job-creation schemes and subsidies to employers108 (see section
1.2.2.). According to Meager and Evans, when separated from the effects of other policy- 
variables (such as sanctions or participation in active labour market programmes) the 
employment-effect of job-search assistance programmes is modest. Nonetheless, the 
evidence suggests that this type of programme might be of value when included in tailored- 
made support-strategies (Meager and Evans 1997, p. 66-7).
The literature suggests that training courses have little impact on the employment chances 
of long-term unemployed. However, according to the Meager and Evans, these results are 
not definitive. First, the impact of training courses needs to be analysed in the medium or 
long-term. Second, the evidence shows that small-scale schemes, targeted at disadvantage 
groups and focussing on specific skills, may be more effective than large-scale schemes. 
Finally, some studies show that the introduction of on-the-job training elements, and a 
better adjustment of training offers to the needs of employers, might increase the 
employment-effectiveness of training programmes (Meager and Evans 1997, p. 65-6).
In regards to the impact of incentives to individuals one should notice the added value of 
earnings supplements. In Ireland, the Back to Work Allowance was proven to increase the 
employment rate of participants by 58%. In the UK, the evaluation of the pilot stage of the 
Jobmatch programme estimated that the employment-effect was around 28% (Gardiner 
1997, p. 38-9). In their review of the evaluations of in-work benefits in the US, Bloom and 
Michalopoulos show that the effectiveness of earnings supplements is conditioned by its 
size and the number of hours individuals are required to work to be entitled to further 
support. Hence, lower supplements are less effective at inducing people back to the labour 
market. Furthermore, schemes that are targeted at part-time work can act as a disincentive 
to individuals who would be prepared to work full-time (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001, 
p. 27-31).
108 The available literature on the employment effectiveness o f  active labour market programmes does not 
focus on GMI recipients per  se, but on long-term unemployed. However, given their importance in GMI 
caseloads, I decided to use if  as a proxi for GMI recipients.
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Just as with earnings-supplements, tax credits seem to be very effective at inducing GMI 
recipients to take up jobs. In the US, Hotz, Mullin and Scholz show that the Earned Income 
Tax Credit has been very successful in increasing employment rates of low-skilled 
workers, especially those who receive social assistance benefits (2005, p. 36). In the UK, 
MacKay suggests that the Working Family Tax Credit was influential in increasing the 
labour market participation of unemployed persons, especially lone parents (2003, p. 31-3). 
As for self-employment programmes, these appear to be of little help to long-term 
unemployed. Targeting these programmes on long-term unemployed, might reduce the 
associated deadweight-effects, but would reduce their employment impact (Meager and 
Evans 1997, p.68-9).
Having analysed the impact of the incentives given to GMI recipients, one can now turn to 
the evidence on the impact of traditional job-creation schemes. However, as Meager and 
Evans show (see 1997, p. 33-7) this is far from conclusive. Some studies, such as Ackum 
Agell (1995), Disney et al. (1992), Spitznagel E. (1989) or Bonnal, Fougere and Serandon 
(1994) show little or no long-term impact on the recipients’ employment chances and 
significant displacement effects. Others, such as Lechner, Reiter and Riesenfelder (1996), 
De Koning, Gravesteijn-Ligthelm and Olieman (1994) or Breen (1991) show positive 
impacts.
There is, nonetheless, evidence of the factors that might increase the effectiveness of this 
type of programmes. For instance, programmes that offer more labour market-oriented 
work experience tend to be more effective. The same happens with programmes that 
combine work with training and provide support for personal or family problems. In 
addition, evidence shows that small-scale schemes can have a bigger impact as they can 
provide more genuine work experience to recipients and reduce displacement effects 
(Meager and Evans 1997, p. 60-2).
The evidence on the employment effectiveness of subsidies to employers is quite 
disappointing as they present high deadweight effects - see Breen and Halpin (1989). Some 
schemes also have significant substitution effects - see De Koning (1993). However, as 
Meager and Evans rightly argue (1997, p. 59), this can entail positive equity effects in 
terms of the distribution of opportunities of labour market participation. Nonetheless,
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improving the targeting of subsidy programmes can reduce deadweight and displacement 
effects and improve the employment prospects of long-term unemployed persons (Meager 
and Evans 1997, p. 59).
4.I.2.2. Negative incentives and the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes
The literature on the impact of negative incentives imposed on GMI recipients has 
focussed on work-requirements, sanctions, time-limits, the reduction of unemployment 
traps and insertion contracts. According to Meager and Evans (2001, p. 67), the evidence 
on effectiveness of work-requirements in GMI schemes is not conclusive. For instance, the 
evaluation of Restart programme in the UK - see Bellmann and Lehmann (1990) - has been 
cited as an example of the added value of mandatory job-search. There is also evidence 
that mandatory job-search programmes have higher long-term employment effects than 
voluntary programmes (Blundell 2001, p. 25). However, it is difficult to know to what 
degree the impact of job-search requirements can be differentiated from the impact of 
sanctions. In fact, more recent research on the Restart experience argued that benefit 
sanctions had a significant role in the success of the programme (Meager and Evans 1997, 
p. 67).
In the same way as with work-requirements, the evidence on the impact of sanctions on the 
recipients’ employment prospects is far from conclusive. According to Kaplan (1999, p. 6), 
the studies on the impact of sanctions in TANF have produced contradictory results. Some 
studies, such as Pavetti et al. (1996) or Fraker, Nixon and Losby (1997), suggest that both 
the threat of sanctions and the enforcement of sanctions increase the recipients’ compliance 
with work requirements. Other studies, such as Hamilton et al. (1997) and Bloom (1997), 
appear to contradict this idea. In the UK, New Deal Personal Advisers suggested that 
jobseekers that were sanctioned with a 26-week benefit suspension increased their job- 
search efforts (Saunders, Stone and Candy 2001, p. 41).
The evidence on the relation between the harshness of the sanctions and their employment 
effectiveness is also unclear. Interviews with New Deal Personal Advisers in the UK 
suggest that 26-week sanctions seem to be more effective at conditioning recipients’ 
behaviour than 2 or 4-week sanctions (Saunders, Stone and Candy 2001, p. 50). In the US,
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on the other hand, there is evidence that full-family sanctions are no more effective than 
moderate sanctions (Kaplan 1999, p. 6-7).
As for time limits, some US-based evidence seems to suggest the presence of an increase 
in transitions to employment just before the predicted imposition of time-limits. However, 
the existing data do not differentiate the impact of time-limits from other policy-variables, 
such as earned income disregards or mandatory employment services. Furthermore, the 
employment-effect of those programmes was no larger than that of programmes without 
time-limits (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001, p. 38-9). In the UK, Blundell suggests that 
part of the success of New Deal programmes is related to the introduction of time-limits to 
JSA entitlement (2001, p. 18). However, again, it is difficult separate its effect from that of 
other policy-variables, such as mandatory job-search assistance or benefit sanctions.
The evidence on the impact of time-limits on recipients’ subsequent behaviour is also 
problematic. Follow-up studies show that once time-limits were enforced on unemployed 
recipients, they then found a job. However, there is no way to determine if the same would 
have happened without the enforcement of time-limits. In fact, the studies that compare the 
recipients’ situation, before and after the imposition of time-limits, do not support the idea 
that they are effective at making people go back to work (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001, 
p. 41).
The literature on unemployment traps can be traced back to Mortensen’s (1977) study on 
the impact of unemployment benefits on individual job-search behaviour. In short, the 
notion of unemployment trap illustrates a situation where the difference between the 
disposable income from benefit and the expected income from work (the net replacement 
rate) is so high that there is no incentive for individuals to look for work (see Carone and 
Salomaki 2001, p. 22-5). However, as Holmlund points out (1998, p. 5), the empirical 
evidence does not provide positive support to that assumption. On a study of job-search 
behaviour in Sweden, Harkman et al. (1997) found that a reduction in net replacement 
rates, from 80% to 90% in 1983, increased transitions from unemployment to employment. 
Jones (1996), on the other hand, found that a reduction of replacement rates in Canada 
(from 60% to 57%) produced an increase in unemployment spells.
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As for the effectiveness of insertion contracts, a study carried out by Laurent Fraisse in 
France showed that they seem to improve the probability of participating in CES, a 
subsidised-jobs programme. However, this does not seem to enhance the chances of 
finding an unsubsidised full-time job. According to the author, insertion contracts failed to 
improve the employment prospects of less qualified recipients. This is due to the fact that 
social workers tend to privilege more employable individuals, namely graduates between 
25 and 39, in the implementation of insertion contracts (Fraisse 2002, p. 18).
4.1.2.3. Human capital development and labour-market attachment strategies and the 
employment effectiveness of GMI Schemes
As the previous sections show, most of the literature on the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes as focussed on the independent effect of the incentives used to activate 
recipients. The exception lays in the literature on the comparative effectiveness of ‘human 
capital development’ and ‘labour-market attachment’ approaches (see section 2.2.2.1.). 
Bloom and Michalopoulos argue that while labour-market attachment oriented 
programmes have higher effectiveness rates in the first year, this diminished over the next 
two years, as persons had problems in retaining their jobs. In contrast, the employment- 
effects of human capital development oriented schemes grew over time. So much that, 
after a 3 year period, the employment effects of job-search-first and education-first were 
equivalent (Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001, p. 10-16)109. Despite its relevance, this study 
fails to explain how the differences in the policy-mix offered to GMI beneficaires 
conditions the effectiveness of those schemes.
4.1.3. EVALUATION OF THE EXISTING LITERATURE
The purpose of this section has been to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing literature and to demonstrate how these can be taken into account in the study of
109 Bloom and Michalopoulos’ study also shows that one-size-fits-all approaches (especially, job-search first) 
are not necessarily more effective. The available evidence also shows that the effectiveness o f the schemes 
depends not only on the availability o f differentiated services, but also on a clear transmission o f  the 
programmes objectives, a careful monitoring o f recipients’ activities and adequate funding o f parallel support 
services (namely, childcare) (2001, p. 10-16).
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the relation between the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for 
the Right to Personal Development. As far as the measurement of the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes is concerned, the literature review suggests that, given the 
comparability problems of existing country-based evaluations, the European Community 
Household Panel (ECHP) may provide a valuable source of comparable data on the 
effectiveness of GMI schemes. However, as the study by Nicaise et al. (2003) illustrates, in 
order to provide a more precise assessment of the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes, it is necessary to adjust ECHP data on individual transitions from benefit to work 
as to take into account variations in labour market conditions.
As for the impact of the rights and obligations ascribed to recipients on the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes, the review reveals that apart from the literature on the 
impact of ALM programmes110, the comparative evidence is scarce. In particular, there is a 
significant gap in European-based literature on the impact of sanctions and time-limits. 
Even where the literature deals with the factors that affect the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes, it fails to provide conclusive evidence. If anything, the existing evidence 
points to the positive impact of eamings-supplements and tax-credits. Furthermore, it 
suggests that although more restrictive schemes can be more effective in the short-run, 
human capital development-oriented schemes tend to be as effective in the long run.
Finally, as the literature on the impact of work-requirements and time-limits demonstrates, 
the literature fails to recognise that the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes depends 
on the interaction between different policy-instruments. This suggests that a study on the 
relation between the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the 
Right to Personal Development must adopt a methodological framework that recognises 
both the independent impact of various policy-instruments, and the interaction between 
them.
110 However, as mentioned earlier, this literature does not focus on GMI recipients p er  se, but on long-term 
unemployed.
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4.2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
This section describes the methodology that will be used to analyse the relation between 
respect of the Right to Personal Development and the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes in EU member countries. The first stage will consist in the specification of the 
research question that will guide the empirical analysis. The following sections will discuss 
the methodological bases for this comparative study and describe the selection of cases for 
comparative analysis. The remaining sections will discuss the operationalisation of the 
research question. This will involve the creation of an Index of respect for the Right to 
Personal Development, the definition of a strategy to measure the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes using ECHP data, and the presentation of a technique to 
adjust the effectiveness of GMI schemes to labour market conditions.
4.2.1. RESEARCH QUESTION AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
As mentioned earlier, the second part of this thesis will analyse the degree to which the 
respect for the Right to Personal Development conditions the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes. Bearing in mind what was said about the need to adjust data on the 
employment effectiveness of GMI schemes to take account of labour market conditions, 
the research question that will guide this empirical study will be defined in the following 
terms:
How does the employment effectiveness o f GMI schemes, once labour market conditions 
are accounted for, vary by reference o f their respect o f  the Right to Personal 
Development?
As the previous sections show, the existing literature fails to provide any conclusive 
evidence as to how the rights and obligations ascribed to recipients condition the 
employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. This thesis will advance the argument that the 
Right to Personal Development, as it combines positive (namely opportunities to exploit 
one’s talents) and negative incentives (namely, an obligation to exploit one’s talents) to 
recipients, can have a positive impact on the schemes’ employment effectiveness. Hence, 
this thesis will test the hypothesis that:
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GMI schemes that show more respect for the Right to Personal Development, once labour 
market conditions are accounted for, are more effective at returning recipients to the 
labour market.
4.2.2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
The purpose of this section is to define the methodological approach that will guide the 
comparative study that will test this research hypothesis. Earlier, it was pointed that 
existing studies fail to acknowledge that the effectiveness of GMI schemes depends on 
both the independent impact of various policy-instruments and the interaction between 
them. In recent years, Charles Ragin has developed two tools that are aimed at capturing 
the complex patterns of causation in social phenomena: QCA and Fuzzy-Set Analysis.
QCA makes use of Boolean Algebra to analyse how a given outcome is produced by the 
presence or absence of certain conditions. Each case is seen as a combination of different 
causal conditions, which are understood in relation to one another and as constituting a 
particular configuration (Ragin 1987, p. 52, 92-3). Both the dependent and the independent 
variables are represented using a binary nominal scale, where 1 means the presence of a 
certain condition, and 0 means its absence. The various combinations are then subjected to 
a Boolean minimisation procedure that allows the researcher to identify different 
explanatory combinations (Ragin 1987, p. 86-9).
Fuzzy-Set Analysis emerges as a response to some of the criticisms made to QCA (see 
section 4.2.2.2.). First, because it provides a more flexible way to measure social 
phenomena. Fuzzy-sets measure set membership in a scale from 0 to 1. Here, 1 represents 
full membership, whilst 0.8 indicates strong, but partial membership. Values bellow 0.5 
show that the case is more out than in the set, and 0 represents full non-membership. 
Furthermore, fuzzy-set can be organised in verbal labels that identify qualitative 
differences between the cases111 (Ragin 2000, p. 160). Second, because, as it involves the
111 For example, i f  a case scores 1, this means that i f  fully in the set under analysis. If a case scores between 
0.5 and 1 in a given set, one can say that the case is more in than out, and so forward (Ragin 2000, p. 160).
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use of probabilistic rather than Boolean procedures, it provides a less deterministic mode 
of identifying patterns of social causation112.
Despite the higher flexibility offered by Fuzzy-Set Analysis, its probabilistic nature 
reduces its applicability in those situations where there is a small number of cases113, as it 
is the case here. In light of this, one can argue that QCA, given its ability to capture both 
the independent impact of various policy-instruments and the interaction between them, 
provides a good methodological basis for this comparative study.
However, QCA is not without its problems. Hence, the following sections will propose a 
more comprehensive methodological framework that making use of heuristic potential, is 
also able to overcome its main limitations. Section 4.2.2.1. describes the epistemological 
foundations of QCA. Section 4.2.2.2., bearing in mind the most relevant criticisms to 
QCA, will then argue that the relation between the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development can be better analysed by 
combining QCA with correlational tools and cluster analysis.
4.2.2.I. Epistemological Foundations of QCA
As mentioned earlier, the main advantage with QCA lies in its ability to capture both the 
independent impact of different variables and the interaction between them. In contrast 
with traditional quantitative methods114, QCA assumes social causation is both 
conjunctural and multiple (Ragin 1987, p.25). Conjuntural, in the sense that it assumes that
112 For instance, a causal condition/combination is considered necessary, but not sufficient, if  its membership 
pattern is consistently higher (65%, using a 0.05 significance level) than the membership to the outcome set 
(Ragin 2000: 218, 226-29). The assessment o f  sufficiency is exact inverse o f  the necessity test. This means 
that the membership scores in the cause are consistently less than or equal (65%, using a 0.05 significance 
level) to the membership scores in the outcome (Ragin 2000: 230-34).
113 In the same way that QCA has bee hailed as better equipped to deal with a small number o f  cases than 
traditional quantitative methods (see Swyngedouw 2004, p. 162 and Rihoux and Ragin 2004, p. 2, 7), then the 
same would apply, given its probabilistic nature, to Fuzzy-Set Analysis.
114 According to the author (Ragin 1987, p. 55-61), the validity o f  quantitative studies is dependent on two 
hidden simplifying assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that, given their structural character, social phenomena 
tend to change very slowly. This diminishes the role o f  time in the analysis o f  causal processes. Hence, if  one 
studies a given phenomenon at a particular moment in time, one can still derive general statements about that 
phenomenon. Secondly, variables are seen as independent o f  each other, and that it is possible to determine 
the effect o f  an independent variable on a dependent variable, regardless o f  the values o f  the other variables - 
additive model o f  causation. This allows the researcher not only to determine causal relations that are 
independent o f  their context, but also, to extrapolate general statements to non-observed cases (Ragin 1987, 
p. 58-61).
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a given outcome results from the combination of a set of causal conditions. Whereas 
traditional quantitative methods tend to analyse the independent effect of variables on the 
final outcome, here the researcher is asked to look at the interaction between a set of 
conditions in a particular time and space. Hence, causation is explained by the presence or 
absence of certain causal conditions, rather than by variations in the values of the 
explanatory variable.
Multiple in the sense that, in contrast with traditional quantitative methods, where 
causation is seen as the result of the sum of the independent effects of a set of variables 
(additive model of causation), QCA recognises that an outcome can result from different 
causal combinations (1987, p. 25). Here causation is described in terms of necessity (as in, 
when a cause is always present when an outcome occurs) and sufficiency (as in, when a 
cause can produce the outcome by itself). In order to capture the variety of causal 
processes, the researcher will look at the various combinations of necessary and sufficient 
causes:
■ When there is only one explanatory condition to the outcome, then the cause is both 
sufficient and necessary;
■ When a cause is present in all combinations, but cannot produce the outcome by 
itself, this is a necessary, but not sufficient causal condition;
■ When various causes can produce the outcome by themselves, these will be 
sufficient, but not necessary causes;
■ When a cause only appears in a subset of combinations that produce the outcome, 
then this cause is neither necessary nor sufficient.
The latter category is the one that best expresses the combinatorial nature of Ragin’s QCA, 
in the sense that it demonstrates that a given outcome results from the combination of 
various causal conditions.
By using the properties of Boolean algebra, QCA is able to reduce the complexity of social 
reality and to produce parsimonious explanatory statements. This nonetheless requires a 
reciprocal relation between theory and evidence. This starts with the selection of both 
positive and negative cases. As the researcher gains more knowledge on the cases under 
analysis, he/she might decide to exclude some cases (or include new ones); or,
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alternatively, to refine the theoretical framework that sustains the research question (Ragin 
1987, p. 42-44,52, 113-18).
4.2.2.2. In search for a more comprehensive methodological framework
As mentioned earlier, QCA is not without it problems. Most of the criticisms directed at 
QCA reflect the deterministic nature of the model of causation that underpins Ragin’s 
method. QCA can only function under the assumption that social reality can be classified 
in terms of clear-cut dichotomies, that there are no random effects, and that all relevant 
variables have been identified (see Bennett 1999, p. 18-9). For instance, one of the basic 
criticisms to Ragin’s method is that the use of crisp dichotomies to analyse social reality, 
besides disregarding the possibility of measurement errors, involves a significant loss of 
information and amounts to an over-simplification, which of course limits the analytical 
potential of QCA (Kangas 1994, p. 361).
Another problem concerns the instability of the results produced by QCA. Given its logical 
nature, a simple alteration in the value of one of the causal conditions can completely 
change the results of the analysis (see Bennett 1999, p. 18-9 and Kangas 1994, p. 361). 
This instability is reinforced by the fact that QCA is dependent on the selection of cases, 
i.e. when applied to different cases it produce might different results (Swyngedouw 2004, 
p. 162). This, of course, limits the ability of QCA to produce general explanatory 
statements.
A further problem is that, when compared with traditional quantitative methods, QCA 
limits the researcher’s ability to identify the relative importance of explanatory variables. 
This might lead to an over-exaggeration of the importance of less relevant variables (or 
configurations), or even producing spurious causation phenomena (see Nelson 2004, p. 
114 and Kangas 1994, p. 361). Finally, as Janosky and Hicks argue, QCA discards too 
easily the value of additive models of causation (1994, p. 17). According to the authors, 
the identification of patterns of association (as in the case of QCA) does not necessarily 
have more explanatory potential than the identification of patterns of variation.
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Although one cannot disregard these criticisms, some of them might have been somewhat 
exaggerated. For instance, binary sets can be made more flexible, in order to incorporate 
both qualitative and quantitative differences. In fact, the researcher can test how different 
cross-over points impact in the analysis of causal relations, hence reducing the possibility 
of loss of information. The same applies to the charge on the volatility of the results 
produced by QCA. The likelihood of measurement errors can be reduced through an 
effective manipulation and understanding of the cases under analysis and of the foregoing 
theoretical framework. One can also argue that the focus on combinations, rather than on 
variables, limits the dependency on the selection of cases. Moreover, in cases where QCA 
is applied to a highly circumscribed population, such as EU member countries, the issue of 
generalisation is not essential.
If the problems of loss of information and the volatility of the results produced by QCA 
can be, if not eliminated, considerably reduced, the same cannot be said about the QCA’s 
limitations in measuring the relative importance of explanatory variables, and its 
vulnerability to spuriousness charges. Here it will be argued that these difficulties can be 
overcome by combining QCA with traditional quantitative methods115. As Ragin himself 
admits (see 1987, p. x-xi), there are advantages to this. As they are based on an additive 
model of causation, traditional quantitative methods are able to identify patterns of co­
variation that Boolean algebra cannot capture. This, in turn, will capture the relative 
importance of explanatory variables in explaining a given outcome. Furthermore, as they 
depart from a probabilistic approach, traditional quantitative methods will reduce the 
impact of measurement errors on the results produced by QCA.
In light of this, the analysis of the relation between the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development, will be based on a 
methodological framework that combines the heuristic potential of QCA traditional 
correlational tools and cluster analysis. QCA is expected to identify the different 
arrangements in the activation of GMI recipients and analyse how these can impact on the 
schemes’ employment effectiveness. Traditional correlational tools will enable a more 
sensitive analysis of the relative impact of explanatory variables, which goes beyond the 
ability to identify patterns of necessity/sufficiency offered by QCA. Cluster analysis, as it
115 A good example o f  the added value o f combining QCA with traditional quantitative methods can be found 
in Kangas’ study o f  welfare state expansion in OECD countries (see 1994).
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based on an additive model of causation, offers an alternative way of identifying the 
different arrangements in the activation of GMI recipients and analysing how these can 
impact on the schemes’ employment effectiveness.
4.2.3. SELECTION OF CASES
Having defined the methodological basis for the comparative study of the relation between 
the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal 
Development, the purpose of this section is to present and discuss the criteria that will 
guide the selection of cases that will be included in the empirical analysis. Here the unit of 
analysis are GMI schemes in European countries. Here GMI schemes are defined as 
schemes that provide a financial safety-net for unemployed individuals whose 
personal/household income is below the national social minimum. These schemes should 
then respect the following criteria:
■ The scheme should be means-tested;
■ Amongst others, the scheme should provide a safety-net for unemployed 
individuals, i.e., jobless persons that are able/available for work;
■ The scheme should be subsidiary to other forms of protection (except in the case of 
family benefits);
■ The scheme should not apply any previous contribution requirements.
One should highlight how the definition of case here reflects some of the fundamental 
assumptions underlying QCA. Here, each case (i.e. each GMI scheme) reflects a specific 
policy-configuration in a particular social and historical context. This has two immediate 
implications. Firstly, this means that the same scheme can be analysed in different 
moments in time, as long there are internal (ex: changes in GMI legislation or activation 
framework) or external factors (ex: variations in labour market conditions) that justify it. 
Second, this also means that the unit of analysis cannot be confused with the scheme’s 
country of reference.
The selection of cases for empirical analysis was conditioned by a number of factors. 
Firstly, with the purpose of taking full advantage of the heuristic potential of QCA, it was
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decided to increase (as much as possible) the number of policy-conflgurations for analysis. 
In order to achieve this, it was decided to create new cases for those schemes where there 
were relevant changes in the regulating legislation or the recipients’ activation framework 
(see Table 7). The purpose here is not to evaluate if the changes in the legislation had an 
impact on the scheme’s employment effectiveness, but solely to allow for maximum causal 
complexity (see Ragin 1987, p. 105).
The selection of cases was limited by the availability of data for the measurement of the 
schemes’ respect for the Right to Personal Development. This limited the selection of cases 
to the policy-configurations in effect between 1997 and 1999116, and where the information 
regulatory framework for the implementation of GMI schemes is comparable117. In 
addition, given the limitations posed by ECHP data on the measurement of the 
employment effectiveness of GMI schemes (see section 4.2.4.2.), this comparative study 
will only include cases for which there is reliable information on the schemes’ employment 
effectiveness118.
Finally, the selection of cases had to take into account the fact that, since 1996, the 
provision of a minimum income guarantee for unemployed individuals in the United 
Kingdom is done through the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)119, which is not the typical 
GMI scheme. This benefit is composed of a contributions-based component, which 
consists of a flat-rate payment, payable for 182 days, targeted at all unemployed persons 
who have the necessary national insurance contributions; and of an income-based 
component, which is a differential benefit for those individuals who do not have the 
necessary National Insurance Contributions or have exhausted their entitlement to the 
contribution-based component of JSA (Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 20). In light of the
116 This study will make use o f the spurt o f comparative evidence that emerged in the final part o f  the 1990’s 
and which provides valuable information for the period between 1997 and 1999.
117 More specifically, this led to the exclusion o f the regional GMI schemes in Spain (Rentas Minimas) (see 
Heikkila 2001, p. 17); the Reddito Minimo d’lnserimento in Italy, where the activation o f  GMI recipients 
varies from locality to locality (see Heikkila 2001, p. 17); and the Minimex in Belgium, where there is 
significant variation in the activation o f  GMI recipients between the various regions (OECD 1998, p. 119).
118 This mean the exclusion o f all the cases for which there was no reliable data, i.e. sample size is less than 
20 (see note 127, p. 88). This implied the exclusion o f Socialbidrag in Sweden. Second, in the case o f the 
Irish Supplementary Welfare Allowance, the Revenu Minimum d’lnsertion in France or the Rendimento 
Minimo Guarantido in Portugal, this led to focus on the policy configuration in force in 1998, rather than 
more recent policy-configurations. Finally, in the case of Social Bistand in Denmark, although the changes in 
the legislation occurred in 1998, as there was no reliable data for 1999, it was decided to focus on the policy- 
configuration in 1998.
119 Income support, on the other hand, provides income protection for jobless individuals who are not entitled 
to JSA, i.e. that are not able/available for work (see Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 17-21).
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definition advanced earlier, this thesis will focus on the income-based component of JSA 
as the representative case of GMI in the UK120.
Bearing in mind the previous paragraphs, the comparative study of the relation between the 
employment effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal 
Development will cover the following cases:
Table 7 - List of cases for empirical analysis
Country GM I scheme Year Case
Denmark Social Bistand (Social Assistance) 1997 Dk - SB97
1998 Dk - SB98121
Finland Toimeentulotuki (Social Assistance) 1997 Fin - TTK97
1999 Fin - TTK99122
France Revenu Minimun d’lnsertion 1998 Fr - RMI98
Germany Sozialhilfe123 1997 D e - BSHG97
1999 D e - BSHG99124
Ireland Supplementary Welfare Allowance 1998 SWA98
Netherlands Algemene Bijstand 1997 AB97
1999 A B99125
Portugal Rendimento Minimo Garantido 1998 RMG98
United Kingdom JSA (non-contributory) 1997 JSA97
1999 JSA99126
120 This poses obvious comparability problems. Due to the eligibility criteria for the entitlement to income- 
based JSA, namely in the case o f individuals who were previously receiving the contributions-based JSA, 
this scheme will have a higher percentage o f more employable GMI recipients than traditional GMI schemes.
121 This second case is justified by the changes in the provision o f social assistance introduced by the Act on 
Active Social Policy in 1998 (Rosdahl and W eise 2000, p. 171).
122 This second case is justified by the changes introduced by the new Social Assistance Act o f  1998 and the 
Employment Action Plan o f  1998, which introduced a number o f  new ALMP (Heikkilla and Keskitalo 1999, 
]jx9; Heikkilla and Keskitalo 2000, p. 31).
The Sozialhilfe constitutes the safety-net for individuals in need. This scheme involves two distinct 
benefits, p. the HLU (subsistence assistance) and the HBL (assistance in special situations) (Hanesh and 
Baltzer 2001, p. 16-7). This thesis will only discuss the HLU component o f  social assistance.
124 This second case is justified by the activation framework o f  GMI recipients. Up until 1998 the framework 
o f activation programmes for these individuals was defined in the Employment Promotion Act (AFG). From 
1998 onwards, the AFG is replaced by the Social Code, in particular its 3rd volum e (SGBIII) (Hanesh and 
Baltzer 2001, p. 22-35 and Evans 2001, p. 16).
125 This second case is justified by the changes in the activation framework o f  GMI recipients, namely the 
introduction o f  the Jobseeker’s Employment Act in January 1998 (see Spies and van Berkel 2000, p. 118).
126 This second case is justified by the changes in the activation framework o f  GMI recipients, namely the 
introduction o f  the New Deal for Young People in April 1998 and the N ew  Deal for Long-Term Unemployed 
pilot schemes initiated in June 1998 (see Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 32-3).
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4.2.4. OPERATIONALISATION
The purpose of this section is to identify the indicators that will operationalise the research 
question posed earlier. The section starts by presenting the indicators that will measure the 
schemes’ respect for the Right to Personal Development. This is followed by a description 
of the strategy used to measure the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. The final 
stage of this section will describe the technique used to adapt the scheme’s employment 
effectiveness to the existing labour market conditions.
4.2.4.1. Index of respect for the Right to Personal Development
This section will describe the construction of an Index of respect of the Right to Personal 
Development. The section starts by identifying the indicators that will measure the 
schemes’ respect for the Right to Personal Development. Subsequently, it discuss how the 
various indicators will be combined in order to produce an overall Index of respect of the 
Right to Personal Development.
As seen earlier, the Right to Personal Development can be defined in the following terms:
Every individual has a right to exploit its talents, which can be exercised whilst performing 
a social function in society, such as paid employment, performing unpaid work in social 
economy organisations or providing care to dependent family members; or improving their 
human capital through education or training. In order to secure this right, social actors and 
institutions must:
• meet the individual’s basic consumption needs
• eliminate direct and indirect constraints to the individual’s choices on the best way
to exploit its talents
• provide the individual with opportunities to exploit its talents
• enforce, through the use of restitutive sanctions, the individual’s obligation to 
exploit its talents as to enable the personal development of others.
The selection of the indicators that will measure the schemes’ respect for the Right to
Personal Development will follow three criteria. First, and most obvious, the indicators
83
C hapter 4  - The C om parative Study o f  the Relation betw een the E ffectiveness o f  G M I Schem es a n d  their
R espect f o r  the R ight to P erso n a l D evelopm ent
must reflect the fundamental dimensions of the normative framework under analysis. 
Second, so that they can be used in the analysis of the relation between the schemes’ 
employment effectiveness and their respect for the Right to Personal Development, the 
indicators must refer to policy-instruments used in the activation of GMI. Thirdly, as to 
produce parsimonious explanations, and reduce the possibility of spuriousness, the 
selection of process should focus on indicators that are shown to have a relevant impact on 
the schemes’ employment effectiveness.
With these criteria in mind, one can now turn to the selection of the indicators that will 
measure the degree to which schemes’ satisfy the recipients’ basic consumption needs127. 
Bearing in mind the literature on unemployment traps, this will be measured in terms of the 
households’ ‘total net disposable family income’ (TNDFI) as a share of the poverty line128.
Reflecting on the literature on activation (see Trickey 2000, p. 268-74), one can identify 
two situations where individuals’ face direct constraints on their ability to choose the best 
way to exploit their talents. One area, concerns on their freedom to choose other activities 
instead of paid employment as a form of exploiting their talents. This can be measured in 
terms of the possibility of participating in education and training; or performing voluntary 
work in social economy organisations; or providing care to children or dependent adult 
relatives. The other area concerns the individuals’ freedom to choose the job that they 
consider to be the best option to exercise their talents. Bearing in mind the existing 
literature (see Bloom and Michalopolous 2001, p. 14 or Standing 2000, p. 20), this will be 
measured in terms of the possibility for recipients to refuse a job that does not match their 
previous occupation, or their level of qualification129.
127 As the previous chapter shows, the satisfaction o f the individual’s basic consumption needs also involves 
access to healthcare or housing. However, in order to produce more parsimonious explanations, and given the 
relevance o f  unemployment traps on the literature on the employment effectiveness o f  GMI schemes, it was 
decided to focus solely on the difference between the recipients’ TNDFI and the poverty line.
128 In order to improve the comparability between the different cases, it was decided to calculate the TDNFI 
as a percentage o f  the poverty line for four different households, and then to derive an average value. The 
household’s TDNFI is the product o f  the sum o f the value o f  the GMI benefit and Family Allowances, 
subtracted by the amount o f benefit subject to taxation (where applicable). The poverty line here is set at the 
60% o f  the median equivalised income (Eurostat 2003, p. 3). For further details see Annex 1.
129 In some countries, such as the UK (see Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 22), recipients can refuse a job on the 
grounds that it pays less than their previous job. However, the right to choose the best way to exploit one’s 
talents refers to the type o f  jobs one can perform, not the rate o f pay one can get. A s a consequence, it was 
decided to exclude this type o f  condition from this study.
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Besides these direct constraints, one can argue that the individuals’ freedom to choose the 
best way to exploit their talents is indirectly constrained by level of discretion built-in the 
structures that secure the implementation of minimum income schemes130,131. Ideally, this 
should measured by the level of level of discretion enjoyed by social workers. However, 
given the impossibility of finding comparable evidence on this topic132, one can instead 
derive the level of discretion from the level of decentralization of the structures that secure 
the implementation of minimum income schemes133. Bearing in mind the existing literature 
(see Trickey 2000, p. 266), this can be measured in terms of the division of funding 
responsibilities between central and regional/local authorities; and the decentralization of 
benefit administration, i.e. decisions concerning the bestowal, or termination, of benefit.
As discussed earlier, an individual’s opportunity to exploit its talents depend on both the 
opportunities available in society, or the market, and on the government’s effort to create 
additional opportunities to cover for market/societal insufficiencies134. However, in line 
with the normative framework developed earlier135, the measurement of the opportunity to 
exploit one’s talents here will focus the latter aspect. Bearing in that the opportunity to 
provide family care, or perform voluntary work in social economy does not depend of 
government intervention, the focus here will on the governments’ effort to create
130 The individuals’ freedom to exploit their talents is also conditioned by other institutional variables, such 
as the level o f  participation o f recipients in the decision-making bodies that secure the implementation o f  
minimum income schemes, or the guarantee o f a right o f appeal from administrative decisions. However, in 
order to guarantee the production o f  parsimonious explanations, the decision here was to focus solely on the 
issue o f discretion.
131 In contrast with those, such as Titmuss (1971), who argue that obedience to rigid rules and procedures 
ignores the intensity o f different needs o f  individuals, this thesis w ill side with those, such as Davies (1971), 
who see discretion as increasing the level o f arbitrariness, inequality and dependency in the relation between 
recipients and social workers (see Adler and Asquith 1981, p. 11).
132 Although there is some comparative evidence on this topic (see Trickey 2000, p. 276-8), this does not 
cover all the cases that w ill be under analysis.
133 Trickey, whilst analysing the level o f discretion o f  social workers in the application o f  sanctions and in 
the negotiation o f  placements to social assistance recipients, pointed to a correlation between the level o f  
decentralisation and the level o f discretion given to social workers. Hence, more decentralised schemes, such 
as Norway and Germany, tend to be more discretionary. On the other hand, more centralised schemes, such 
as the UK and the Netherlands, allow for less discretion. (2000, p. 265-6, 276). Bonny and Bosco, in their 
study o f  the application o f  eligibility regulations, came to a similar conclusion. The authors concluded that 
right-based schemes (such as in Helsingborg or Gothemburg) are closer to the bureaucratic regulation model, 
whereas schemes where recipients’ rights are less institutionalised (such as Porto or Cosenza), tend to allow  
for more discretion (Bonny and Bosco et al. 2002, p. 87-88).
134 This distinction is particularly relevant in what concerns the individuals’ opportunities to work. This o f  
course depends on the vacancies available on the labour market, or on the governments effort to create jobs 
in the public sector or to finance job creation in the market and social economy sectors.
135 See discussion on Durkheim’s difficulties with the idea o f  equality o f  opportunity and how these are dealt 
in the normative framework (see section 3.2.1., 3.2.2. and 3.2.3.).
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additional opportunities to work and to participate in education/training courses136. This 
will be measured by the level of public expenditure in active labour market programmes as 
a percentage of GDP137.
Bearing in mind the typology used by the EUROSTAT’s Labour Market Policy 
database138, the additional opportunities to work will therefore be measured by the level of 
public expenditure on:
■ ‘Direct job creation’ programmes, i.e. programmes that create additional jobs for 
long-term unemployed or other hard to employ publics, and where the majority of 
labour costs are covered by public finances;
■ ‘Employment incentives’, i.e. programmes that facilitate the recruitment of 
unemployed or target groups, and where the majority of labour costs are covered by 
the employer. This can include both recruitment incentives and employment 
maintenance incentives;
■ ‘Start-up incentives’, i.e. programmes that help unemployed persons to create their 
own business or become self-employed. Assistance may take the form of loans, 
bursaries, provision of facilities, or advice and training in business management;
■ ‘Job rotation’ and ‘Job sharing’ programmes, i.e. programmes that facilitate the 
creation of jobs for unemployed persons, or by replacing an employed person for a
136 Here one should again recall that the additional opportunities to work and to participate in 
education/training fulfil a double role. On the one side, they express a social obligation to provide individuals 
with an opportunity to exploit their talents. On the other side, they can be seen as an incentive to help 
individuals back to the labour market. This later aspect is o f special importance, as it raises the issue o f  the 
quality o f  the opportunities/incentives given to the individuals. This obviously puts the question about, given 
the doubts about the effectiveness o f ALMP (see section 4.1.2. and 4.1.3.), these programmes constitute a 
real opportunity to exploit one’s talents. Here one can argue that these programmes, besides providing an 
additional opportunity for individuals to exploit their talents, have employability and distributive effects (see 
section 4.1.2.1.) which makes them a valuable alternative for individuals.
137 Ideally, this indicator would be based on the (Purchasing Power Parities adjusted) level o f expenditure per 
GMI recipients. However, as there is no information on expenditure targeted at GMI recipients, nor on the 
number o f GMI recipients participating in ALM programmes, this option had to be abandoned. A second 
alternative, based on the ratio between the level o f public expenditure on passive and active unemployment 
policies, was considered. However, as this indicator is more focussed on the effort to activate individuals on 
unemployment benefits (rather than on GMI recipients), it was decided to abandon this option.
138 The measurement o f  the individuals’ opportunity to work, or to participate in education/training, will 
obviously depend on the available comparative data on public expenditure in various ALMP. Two options 
were considered: the OECD Labour Market Statistics database and the EUROSTAT Labour Market Policy 
database (1998-2002). Both databases present comparability problems. The EUROSTAT Labour Market 
Policy database does not provide information on expenditure on intensive counselling and job-search 
assistance. Furthermore, the database does not provide data for the year 1997. The OECD database, on the 
other hand, as it includes a category which focuses on the level o f  expenditure on ALMP for young 
unemployed, does not allow for a full comparison o f  expenditure in ALM programmes in the cases under 
analysis. In light o f  this, it was decided to use the EUROSTAT Labour Market Policy Database (1998-2002).
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fixed period (job rotation), either by partially substituting an employed person for a 
limited number of working hours (job sharing) (EUROSTAT 2000, p. 9-11).
The opportunity to participate in education/training139 will be measured by the level of 
public expenditure in:
■ ‘Training’ programmes, i.e. publicly funded programmes that involved some kind
of formalised instruction and are aimed at improving the employability of
unemployed individuals (and other groups);
■ ‘Special support for apprenticeships’, i.e. incentives for employers to recruit
apprentices, or any form of training/apprenticeship allowance for disadvantaged 
groups (EUROSTAT 2000, p. 8-9).
Besides measuring the individuals’ freedom and opportunities to exploit their talents, one 
needs to examine how schemes enforce their personal obligations. As most of the schemes 
for which there is comparative evidence already impose some kind of activation 
requirement on recipients, the focus here will be on the restitutive/repressive character of 
the sanctions regime. As seen earlier, repressive sanctions are aimed at punishing 
individuals for a particular crime, whilst restitutive sanctions are intended to restore the 
normal relationship between the parts (Durkheim 1984, p. 29).
Bearing in mind the existing literature (see Trickey 2000, p. 277 or Saunders, Stone and 
Candy 2001, p. 50), one can argue that the restitutive character of the sanction regime can 
be measured through three indicators: the possibility of cancellation of the entitlement on 
GMI protection in case of infringement, the maximum penalty in the case of a first 
infringement, and the use of progressive sanctions140. Here, it will be argued that the 
schemes where the enforcement of sanctions does not lead to the cancellation of the 
entitlement to GMI protection, that impose moderate penalties in the case of a first 
infringement, and that use progressive sanctions tend to emphasise the restitutive character
139 Unfortunately, there are no specific data for the measurement o f  the individuals’ opportunities to 
participate in education courses. One option would be to look at the level o f  expenditure on Institutional 
Training, which refers to programmes where more than 75% o f training time is spend in a training intuitions, 
such as schools/colleges or training centres (EUROSTAT 2000, p. 8-9). Yet, the NEW  CRONOS database 
does not provide information on this sub-category. In light o f  this, I was decided to use the expenditure on 
Training and Special Support for Apprenticeships as proxy indicators o f  the opportunities o f Guaranteed 
Minimum Income recipients to engage in education.
140 One could add other indicators such as use o f  family sanctions, or the curtailment o f  future entitlement 
rights. However, as seen earlier (see section 1.2.2.), these are marginal elements in the activation o f  GMI 
recipients in European countries. Hence, it was decided to exclude them from this analysis.
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of sanctions. In contrast, schemes where the enforcement of sanctions may involve the 
cancellation of the entitlement to GMI protection, that impose harsher penalties in the case 
of a first infringement, and that do not use progressive sanctions tend to emphasise the 
repressive character of sanctions.
Table 8 - Index of respect for the Right of Personal Development
Dimensions Sub-Dimensions Weight Indicators




Satisfaction o f  
Incom e Needs
0.4 Disposable incom e as a percentage o f  the poverty
line
Freedom to 





o f Paid 
Employment
0.05 Freedom to participate in education 
Freedom to participate in training 
Freedom to provide childcare 
Freedom to provide other family care 
Freedom to perform unpaid work in social 
economy organisations
Freedom to 
Choose Type o f  
Job
0.05 Level o f  qualification as a justifiable excuse to
refuse a job
Previous job as a justifiable excuse to refuse a job
Freedom from 
Discretion
0.05 Decentralization o f  funding responsibilities 
Decentralization o f  benefit administration
Opportunity to 





0.075 Expenditure in direct job creation as % o f  G DP  
Expenditure in employment incentives as % o f
G DP
Expenditure in start-up incentives as % o f  GDP  






0.075 Expenditure in training (excluding special support 
for apprenticeships) as % o f  G D P  
Expenditure in special support for apprenticeships
as % o f  G DP
Obligation to 
Exploit O ne’s 
Talents
Use o f  
Restitutive 
Sanctions
0.3 Possibility o f  cancellation o f  the entidement to
GMI
Maximum sanction for first infringement 
U se o f  progressive sanctions
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Having identified the indicators that will measure the schemes’ respect for the Right to 
Personal Development, the following table is to show how the various indicators will be 
combined in order to create an Index of respect of the Right of Personal Development. The 
ascription of weights will take in to consideration two fundamental criteria. First, the Index 
should acknowledge the importance of the satisfaction of the individuals’ basic 
consumption needs as a basic condition for exercise of the freedoms, opportunities and 
obligations involved in the individuals’ Right to Personal Development. Second, bearing in 
mind the requirement of balanced reciprocity that underlies this normative framework, the 
index should ascribe the same weight to the individuals’ obligations as it does to the 
freedom and opportunity to exploit one’s talents.
4.2.4.2. Measuring the Employment Effectiveness of GMI Schemes
Having chosen the indicators that will measure the schemes’ respect for the Right to 
Personal Development, the two following sections will focus on the measurement of the 
schemes’ employment effectiveness. This section will discuss the terms in which the 
ECHP can be used to measure the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. The 
following section will propose a technique to adjust the data on individual transitions to 
work to labour market conditions.
The employment effectiveness of GMI schemes will be measured as the percentage of 
recipients who, one year after being on GMI, have made a transition to unsubsidised 
work141. As it provides comparable micro-data for EU15 member countries142, this thesis 
will use ECHP data to measure the schemes’ employment effectiveness. However, as seen 
earlier (section 4.2.3.), the ECHP is not without problems. Given the subsidiary nature of 
GMI schemes in protection systems, and the attrition effects characteristic of panel data143,
141 The exploratory phase o f date analysis did consider the possibility o f  using a two year-lag. However, 
given that in the cases referring to 1997, the transitions from benefit to work would be measured in a 
different policy environment from that which is under analysis, this option was abandoned.
142 The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a survey based on a standardised questionnaire 
that involves annual interviewing o f a representative panel o f  households and individuals in EU15 member 
states, between 1994 and 2001. The first wave, back in 1994, only included 12 Member States. Since then, 
Austria (1995) and Finland (1996) and Sweden (1997) have joined the project. See
http ://forum. europa. eu. i nt/i rc/dsi s /  ech panel/in fo/ data/informati on .html.
143 Attrition refers to the loss o f  cases that occurs when respondents leave the panel or there are failures in the 
follow-up o f  cases (Ruspini 2002, p. 71). Given its cumulative nature, attrition grows as the number o f panel 
waves increases. This is particularly notorious in waves 7 and 8 o f ECHP.
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the ECHP will produce only a small sample of GMI recipients for the cases under analysis. 
This will require the exclusion of cases that do not provide a reliable number of 
observations for analysis144.
Besides the problems regarding the size of the sample, the ECHP does not provide 
information on the duration of unemployment episodes of jobless respondents, nor does it 
differentiate between individuals on unemployment insurance and those on unemployment 
assistance. Finally, as with any other large-scale survey, the ECHP presents some 
inconsistencies in the data concerning the individuals’ availability for work145.
Measuring the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes depends on a number of factors. 
First of all, this should focus only on GMI recipients that are able/available for work146. 
This will require the combination of information on the respondents’ source of income and 
their activity status. Second, it should focus only on individuals for whom GMI constitutes 
the main source of income. This implies the exclusion of all respondents who combine a 
GMI benefit with unemployment benefits. Thirdly, it needs to accommodate the specificity 
of British case, by developing a specific strategy for the measurement of the employment 
effectiveness of income-based JSA.
Given the need to combine information on the respondents’ source of income and the 
activity status, it was necessary use a retrospective design for data collection (see Ruspini 
2002, p. 3)147. Hence, in order to select the sample of GMI recipients in To, this thesis will
144 Although there is no official information on the thresholds o f  reliability for ECHP data, this thesis w ill use 
those provided by EUROSTAT (see Lehmann and Wirtz 2004, p. 7). Hence, where the sample size is less 
than 20, then information is not considered reliable. Where the sample size is between 20-49, the data is 
considered to show low reliability. Where the sample size is more than 50 the information is considered 
reliable.
145 For instance, there were 22 respondents who a year prior to the date o f  the interview were in training and 
education but, nonetheless, said they did not attend any course during the previous year. There were also 4 
cases o f respondents whose activity status a year from the time o f  interview was in education or training but 
that nonetheless said they did not attend any training/education course during the previous year. Finally, there 
was 1 case o f  a respondent who during the previous year attended some kind o f education or training course, 
but for which there was no information on the type o f  course attended. Given their inconsistency, these cases 
were excluded from the empirical analysis.
146 This thesis acknowledges that different countries/schemes have different understandings o f availability for 
work and that, especially in the case o f individuals heading single-parent families, this might create some 
comparability problems.
147 As Ruspini points out (see 2002, 96-100), the reliability o f  retrospective data depends on the (often 
unconscious) factors that condition the individual’s memory o f  facts. For instance, the quality o f  the data 
diminishes as the recall period becomes longer. Important events can be omitted in the interview (omission 
effect), or not remembered accurately (telescope effect). Finally, memorisation processes are always 
selective, i.e. the individual’s interests, state o f mind; and they are continuous, in the sense that individuals 
reinterpret events as life develops.
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use information from the subsequent wave (Ti). Hence, the sample of GMI recipients will 
include individuals who:
• sometime during the previous year received social assistance148;
• a year from the date of their interview were ‘unemployed’, or ‘working with an 
employer in paid apprenticeship (15+ hours / week)’, or ‘working with an employer 
in training under special schemes related to employment (15+ hours / week)’, or ‘in 
education and training’149150;
• have not received ‘unemployment related benefits’ throughout the previous year151.
In order to identify the recipients’ transitions to work, one needs to look at the person’s 
current activity status152. Here, all individuals whose current activity status falls in the 
following categories:
• working with an employer in paid employment (15+ hours / week);
• self-employment (15+ hours / week);
• unpaid work in a family enterprise (15+ hours / week);
• working less than 15 hours.
will be considered as having made the transition from GMI to ‘work’. Hence, the
percentage of individuals whose current activity status falls in the ‘work’ category will
constitute the indicator of the scheme’s employment effectiveness.
148 This information was derived from variable PI137A, which measures the ‘assigned social assistance’, i.e., 
the individual’s share in the amount o f social assistance received by the household in the previous year (see 
EUROSTAT 2002, p. 89 and EUROSTAT 2003, p. 327). Unfortunately, the ECHP does not present any 
information on the duration o f the benefit episode. Hence, it is impossible to determine when the benefit 
episode started, or when it ended.
149 In order to get this information it was necessary to create a new variable (LPE001) which identifies the 
activity status o f  the respondent in the previous wave.
150 This implies the exclusion o f  all individuals doing housework, looking after children or other persons, in 
retirement, or economically inactive.
151 This information was derived from variable PI 131, which measures the ‘unemployment related benefits’ 
received in the previous year (see EUROSTAT 2003, p. 318).
152 In order to get this information it was necessary to create a new variable (NPE001). This variable 
reclassified the current activity status o f  respondents into four categories:
• ‘Work’, as described above;
• ‘Education/Training/Job Creation’, for individuals whose current activity status is ‘in education or 
training’, ‘working with an employer in paid apprenticeship (15+ hours /  week), ‘working with an 
employer in training under special schemes related to employment (15+ hours /  w eek)’;
• ‘Unemployed’, for individuals whose current activity status is ‘unemployed’;
• ‘Other’, for individuals whose current activity status is ‘retired’, ‘doing housework, looking after 
children or other persons’, ‘in community or military service’, or ‘other economically inactive’ (see 
EUROSTAT 2003, p. 208).
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The strategy for measurement of the employment effectiveness of the income-based JSA in 
the United Kingdom, is conditioned by the fact that the ECHP database does not 
differentiate between individuals receiving unemployment insurance and those receiving 
unemployment assistance. In order to overcome this restriction, it was decided to include 
information on the individuals’ duration of the unemployment spell as a criterion to 
identify income-based JSA recipients153. This made the strategy for the identification of 
income-based JSA recipients particularly complex, combining information from various 
waves (see notes 146, 147 and 149). In short, the sample of income-based JSA recipients 
will include individuals who:
■ have received ‘unemployment related benefits’ during the current year154;
■ whose unemployment episode is at least 6 months long155156;
■ and whose current activity status is unemployed, in training or education, in paid 
apprenticeship or in an employment scheme157158.
In contrast with the strategy adopted for the remaining cases, the transitions from benefit to 
work will be measured by looking at the respondent’s activity status in the following 
year159. As before, all individuals whose activity status falls in the following categories:
153 One option considered was to look at the maximum value o f  the monthly unemployment assistance 
benefit. However, as the ECHP does not provide monthly-based information on personal income, this 
possibility was abandoned.
154 In order to avoid excluding people currently receiving an income from an apprenticeship or an 
employment programme, it was decided to identify the receipt o f ‘unemployment related benefits’ through 
the creation o f  a variable (FPI131), which provides information from the subsequent wave on the receipt o f  
‘unemployment related benefits’ during the previous year.
155 In order to identify individuals who have been unemployed for at least 6 months, it was decided to use 
monthly-based information on the activity status o f  respondents in the previous year. Hence, the sample o f  
income-based JSA recipients is restricted to all individuals who between June and December in the previous 
year (variables PC006 to PC010) were unemployed. Admittedly, this option will exclude persons whose 
unemployment episode is smaller than 6 months, particularly individuals with no work experience and no 
previous social insurance contributions, and individuals with some work experience, but with insufficient 
social insurance contributions.
156 An alternative strategy to identify individuals who have been unemployed for at least 6 months, consists 
in the comparison o f  difference between the date o f  the interview (based on variables PG006 and PG007) and 
the date o f  the end o f  the individual’s last job (based on variables PJ002 and PJ003). However, due to the 
prevalence o f  missing data in the variable concerning the date o f  the end o f  the last job, this option was 
abandoned.
157 This information was derived from variable PE001, which identifies the respondent’s current activity 
status (see EUROSTAT 2003, p. 208).
158 As before, this implies the exclusion all individuals doing housework, looking after children or other 
persons; in retirement, or economically inactive.
159 In order to get this information it was necessary to create a new variable (FNPE001). This variable 
reclassified the activity status o f  respondents in the following year in four categories:
•  ‘Work’, as described above;
•  ‘Education/Training/Job Creation’, for individuals whose current activity status is ‘in education or 
training’, ‘working with an employer in paid apprenticeship (15+ hours / week), ‘working with an 
employer in training under special schemes related to employment (15+ hours / w eek)’;
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• working with an employer in paid employment (15+ hours / week);
• self-employment (15+ hours / week);
• unpaid work in a family enterprise (15+ hours / week);
• working less than 15 hours.
will be considered as having made the transition from GMI to ‘work’. Hence, the
percentage of individuals whose activity status in the following year falls in the ‘work’
category will constitute the indicator of the scheme’s employment effectiveness.
4.2.4.3. Adjusting the Employment Effectiveness of GMI Schemes to Labour Market 
conditions
As section 4.1.1. shows, in order to compare the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes, one needs to take into consideration the existing labour market conditions and, in 
particular, their ability to create jobs for unemployed persons. Traditionally, the labour 
market literature has used the unemployment rate as a proxy of the ability of labour 
markets to absorb unemployed persons. However, as Schomann and Kruppe point out 
(1996, p. 33), traditional stock indicators fail to capture the dynamic processes that go on 
in labour markets. In this particular case, the unemployment rate hides the employment 
creation and destruction dynamics of labour markets.
In light of this, it was decided to create an indicator -  Unemployment Reintegration 
Performance (URP) -  that is able to measure the success of labour markets in creating jobs 
for unemployed persons. Based on the ground-breaking study developed by Kruppe 
(2001), this thesis will argue that a labour market’s URP can be measured by combining 
the information from two indicators160:
• ‘Inflow into dependent employment’, which measures the number of individuals 
that have entered employment in a given year;
•  ‘Unemployed’, for individuals whose current activity status is ‘unemployed’;
•  ‘Other’, for individuals whose current activity status is ‘retired’, ‘doing housework, looking after 
children or other persons’, ‘in community or military service’, or ‘other economically inactive’ (see 
EUROSTAT 2003, p. 208).
160 A sensitivity analysis on the relation between the labour markets’ URP and the schem es’ employment 
effectiveness (Y), showed that the correlation between the two variables is not affected if  the weight ascribed 
to the inflow to dependent employment is located in a interval between 60% and 70% (see Annex 3). As a 
matter o f  precaution it was decided to use the lower value in this interval to define the distribution o f weights 
between the two indicators.
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• ‘Share of flow from unemployment in all inflows into dependent employment’, 
which measures to what degree the creation of new jobs is based on the recruitment 
of unemployed individuals (Kruppe 2001, p. 13).
Assuming that there is a positive correlation between the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes (Y) and the labour market’s URP (X), the one can argue that:
y = E \y\x], x {a*0.6 + /?*0.4}
where:
y  refers to the expected value (E) of the employment effectiveness (y) for a given value of 
the labour market URP (x).
a refers to the value of the Inflow to dependent employment, and
P refers to the value of the share of flow from unemployment in all inflows into dependent 
employment
If one subtracts the value of j; by y \  one can identify the scheme’s ‘marginal effectiveness’ 
(*):
z = y -  y ’
If the value o fz  is positive, this means that the employment effectiveness of the scheme is, 
given the existing labour market conditions, higher than expected (and vice-versa). This 
measure will be used as the basis for the analysis of the relation between the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development.
4.3. CONCLUSION
This chapter has been intended to define the methodological bases for a comparative study 
of the relation between the respect of the Right to Personal Development and the 
employment effectiveness of GMI schemes in EU member countries. The chapter started
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by reviewing the evidence on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. Reflecting 
on this review, it was further argued that the relation between the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development 
would be best analysed by combining Ragin’s QCA with traditional quantitative methods.
The chapter has shown how this relation can be best operationalised. It argued that the 
respect for the Right to Personal Development can be measured in terms of the household’s 
‘total net disposable family income’ (TNDFI) in relation to the poverty line; the freedom to 
choose other activities instead of employment; the freedom to choose the job one wants; 
the level of discretion in the structures of implementation; the opportunity to work and to 
participate in education/training courses; and the restitutive character of the sanctions 
imposed on recipients. Finally, the chapter has shown how ECHP data can be used to 
measure the schemes’ employment effectiveness and proposes a technique to adjust that to 
the capacity of labour markets to create jobs for unemployed persons.
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5. GMI SCHEMES AND THEIR RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT 
TO PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter measures to what degree the GMI schemes under analysis respect the 
recipients’ Right to Personal Development. The chapter starts with a brief presentation of 
the cases selected. The remaining sections will analyse the schemes’ performance with 
regards to the various dimensions of the Right to Personal Development. The final section 
will analyse how the schemes are positioned in the Index of respect of the Right to 
Personal Development.
5.1. BASIC DESCRIPTION OF CASES UNDER ANALYSIS
This section describes the fundamental characteristics of the cases that will be compared. 
In particular, it focuses on the entitlement conditions to GMI protection and the framework 
for the activation of GMI recipients.
5.1.1. GERMANY (BSHG97 AND BSHG99)
The Bundessocialhilfegesetz (BSHG) was introduced in 1961 and is composed of two 
components: the Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen, which provides a bridge benefit for 
emergency situations; and the Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt, which provides income support 
to individuals who cannot support themselves (Hanesh and Baltzer 2000, p. 16-7). This 
thesis will focus on the latter component of the Bundessocialhilfegesetz. In order to be 
entitled to BSHG, individuals must have exhausted all the means to support him/herself, 
and be willing to register as unemployed with the federal employment authorities (BfA), 
and accept any work or training opportunities that are offered to them (Heikkila 2001, p. 
37).
GMI recipients are, in principle, not entitled to participate in employment programmes 
organised by BfA. Instead, they can only participate in Hilfe zum Arbeit (Help Towards 
Work) programmes (HZA), organised by local authorities. These programmes might 
involve subsidised work in the primary labour market, or work in non-profit/public welfare
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sectors (Hanesh and Baltzer 2000, p. 32 and Voges, Jacobs and Trickey 2000, p. 85). 
Nonetheless, there is the possibility for GMI recipients to participate in federal 
employment programmes through agreements between local municipalities and local BfA 
agencies (Evans 2001, p. 17)
161. In this context, one needs to take into consideration the impact of the introduction of 
the Social Code in 1998, which replaced the Employment Promotion Act (AFG), in the 
activation of BSHG recipients.
5.1.2. DENAMRK (SB97 AND SB98)
The Social Bistand (SB) was introduced in 1974 and provides a minimum income benefit 
for individuals who have experienced an event (job loss, sickness, divorce, etc) which 
affects their ability to support themselves, and that are willing to take any available job 
offers. However, until 1998, local authorities were not obliged to offer activation 
opportunities to SB recipients (Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 113-15). In 1998, the Danish 
government introduced the Act on Active Social Policy. This Act introduced a right and a 
duty to activation. This obliged local municipalities to provide activation opportunities for 
SB recipients, and a consequent obligation on recipients to accept any suitable job offer, or 
to participate in any activation programmes offered by the municipality (Rosdahl and 
Weise 2000, p. 167).
The activation of SB recipients depends on the articulation between the municipalities and 
the Public Employment Services. Municipalities are responsible for the activation of all 
GMI recipients, no matter what their condition. Those whose condition is related to 
unemployment alone, can be integrated in the PES, where they receive the same treatment 
as those under unemployment insurance benefits162.
5.1.3. THE NETHERLANDS (ABW97 AND ABW99)
The new Algemene Bijstands-Wet (ABW) was introduced in 1996. In order to be entitled to 
ABW, individuals must have exhausted all means to support themselves; to be available
161 For a more detailed description o f the activation programmes available to BSHG recipients see Annex 2.
162 For a more detailed description o f the activation programmes available to SB recipients see Annex 2.
97
C hapter 5  -  G M I Schem es a n d  their re sp ec t f o r  the R ight to  P erso n a l D evelopm en t
for work, which can mean active job-search, registration with the public employment 
services, or participation in training or education; and to sign a personal plan, which 
defines the steps that need to be taken to return to the labour market (De Haan and 
Verboon 2000, p. 7-8).
The framework for the activation of ABW recipients was significantly reformed with the 
introduction of the Jobeseeker’s Employment Act (WIW) in January 1998, which merged a 
number of ALM programmes163. WIW gives the municipalities the responsibility of 
providing the necessary means for long-term unemployed individuals to find a job, and 
offers participants three possibilities: subsidised employment with a regular employer, 
subsidised employment with a municipal employment organisation, and a training or social 
activation option (Van Oorschot and Engelfriet 1999, p. 27-8; Spies and van Berkel 2000,
p. 116).
5.1.4. FRANCE (RMI98)
The Revenue Minimum d ’Insertion (RMI) was introduced in 1988, and revised in 1992. It 
provides minimum income protection for individuals aged above 25164, who cannot support 
themselves, and are willing to sign an insertion contract, that defines the objectives and 
stages for their social insertion. This involves an holistic approach that covers a number of 
areas such as work, training, housing, health, etc. In this context, the obligation to work is 
as important as the obligation to better one’s health or housing situation (Enjolras et al. 
2000, p. 50; Gautrat, Fraisse and Bucollo 2000, p. 9).
The social insertion of RMI recipients depends on the articulation of Conseil Departmental 
d ‘Insertion (Departmental Insertion Council), at the regional level, and the Commission 
Local d ’Insertion (Local Insertion Committee), at the local level. The first includes 
representatives from central government and other authorities concerned with the provision 
of welfare, employment and training services165. Its role is mainly connected with the 
planning and monitoring of insertion strategies at the regional level. Local Insertion
163 For a more detailed description o f  programmes merged into WIW, see van Oorschot and Engelfriet (2000, 
p. 27-8).
164 Except those with children (Gautrat, Fraisse and Bucollo 2000, p. 9)
165 For a more detailed description o f  the activation programmes available to RMI recipients see Annex 2.
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Committees are responsible for the preparation, monitoring and evaluation of insertion 
contracts, and for the creation of partnerships that can further the insertion opportunities of 
RMI recipients (Gautrat, Fraisse and Bucollo 2000, p. 14-6, Enjolras et al. 2000, p. 46-7 
and Evans 2001, p. 14-5).
5.1.5. PORTUGAL (RMG98)
The Rendimento Minimo Guarantido (RMG) was introduced in 1996 on an experimental 
basis and only came to full implementation in July 1997. In order to be entitled to 
minimum income protection, individuals must have exausted all means to sustain 
themselves, and be willing to agree an insertion contract, a document that defines their 
rights and responsibilities in the social insertion process. In particular, recipients are 
required to be available to work or to attend an education/training course; to participate in 
temporary activities that can further their future employability, or that satisfy community 
or environmental needs; and to engage in processes that promote their social insertion 
(healthcare, housing, etc.)166 (Cardoso and Ramos 2000, p. 15 and Capucha 1998, p. 38).
The social insertion of RMG recipients is ascribed to Comissdes Locais de 
Acompanhamento (Local Support Committees). These bodies comprise representatives 
from central government agencies, local municipalities and local organisations, and are 
responsible for the definition, implementation and evaluation of insertion contracts. 
Despite the initial intention of decentralising local delivery, the Ministry of Solidarity and 
Social Security has a leading role in the delivery of the measure, not only because the head 
of the Local Support Committees is nominated by the Regional Social Security 
Commission (CRSS), but also because the ministry provides the majority of material 
resources that secure the implementation of the measure (Cardoso and Ramos 2000, p. 16 
and Capucha 1998, p. 32-6).
166 For a more detailed description o f  the activation programmes available to RMG recipients see Annex 2.
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5.1.6. IRELAND (SWA98)
The Supplementary Welfare Allowance (SWA) was introduced in 1993, but was revised in 
1995. It provides a minimum income benefit to individuals that cannot support themselves, 
and that are registered with the National Training and Employment Authority (FAS) 
(Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 215-6; Collins 2000, p. 11). The main responsibility for the 
activation of SWA recipients lies with the Training and Employment Authority (FAS), 
which runs the majority of employment related activation programmes167. Nonetheless, the 
Department of Education and Science, the Revenue Commissioners, and the Department 
for Social, Community and Family Affairs (which has its own Employment Support 
service) also play a role in the activation of SWA recipients (Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 214; 
Collins 2000, p. 15-6).
5.1.7. FINLAND (TTK97 AND TTK99)
The Toimeentulotuki (TTK) was introduced in 1984 by the Social Welfare Act, and was 
revised with the introduction of the Social Assistance Act in 1998. Although it retains most 
of the previous legislation, the Social Assistance Act puts a clear emphasis on the 
activation of recipients, which is reflected in the increase of benefit sanctions and the 
reduction of benefit levels (Heikkila and Keskitalo 1999, p. 9).
The institutional framework for the activation of TTK recipients is mainly the 
responsibility of employment authorities168. Nonetheless, some local authorities have 
engaged in the creation of employment projects for GMI recipients. (Heikkila and 
Keskitalo 2000, p. 31). Curiously, under the Social Welfare Act, there was no explicit 
obligation to find work. In fact, an appeal court ruled that claimants did not have an 
automatic obligation to take paid work (Eardley et al 1996, p. 128-9; OECD 1998, p. 15). 
On the other hand, recipients were expected to register with the PES and to present proof 
of active job search. Furthermore, the Act included sanctions for individuals who failed to 
search for jobs or to take part in activation measures. The introduction of the Social
167 For a more detailed description o f the activation programmes available to SWA recipients see Annex 2.
168 For a more detailed description o f the activation programmes available to TTK recipients see Annex 2.
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Assistance Act did not clarify this obligation (Heikkila and Keskitalo 1999, p. 9; Heikkila 
2001, p. 31).
5.1.8. UNITED KINGDOM (JSA97 AND JSA99)
The Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) was introduced in October 1996. As mentioned earlier 
(section 4.2.3), the scheme involves a contributions-based and of an income-based 
component. In order to be entitled to JSA, individuals must sign a Jobseeker Agreement, 
and engage in active job search. This can include applying for jobs, seeking information 
from advertisements and from companies, registering with private employment agencies, 
preparing a CV, building a list of possible employers, or looking for information on 
alternative occupations (Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 21).
In 1998, the British government introduced the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) and 
the New Deal for Long-Term Unemployed (NDLTU), with the purpose of increasing the 
opportunities of JSA recipients to find work. The NDYP is compulsory for all individuals 
aged between 18 and 24 who have been receiving JSA for more than 6 months and 
involves three main stages: the ‘Gateway’, the ‘New Deal Options’ and the ‘Follow 
Through’ stage. The Gateway phase consist of an additional 4 months period of assisted 
job-search. In case of unsuccessful job-search, recipients are obliged to take part in one of 
the New Deal Options: subsidised employment, full-time education and training, work in 
the voluntary sector, or work in the ‘Environment Task Force’. After this period, 
unemployed recipients are given a 6-month follow-through period of assisted job-search 
The NDLTU is targeted at JSA recipients who have been unemployed for at least two 
years. The programme includes advisory interviews, employer subsidies and access to 
work-based training (Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 33).
5.2. MEASURING RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL 
DEVELOPMENT
As the previous chapter shows (section 4.2.4.1.), in order to measure the schemes’ respect 
for the Right to Personal Development, one needs to examine to what degree they satisfy
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the recipients’ income needs; to what degree they allow recipients to choose other 
activities instead of paid employment; and to choose the type of job they prefer; the 
recipients’ additional opportunities to perform work or to participate in education/training 
courses; and, finally, the restitutive/repressive character of the sanctions regime applied to 
GMI recipients.
5.2.1. SATISFACTION OF BASIC NEEDS
As argued earlier (section 4.2.4.1.), in order to measure to what degree GMI schemes 
satisfy the recipients’ basic consumption needs this thesis will compare the Total Net 
Disposable Family Income (TNDFI) as a proportion of the poverty line. As can be seen in 
Table 9, the ABW in the Netherlands and the SB in Denmark are the schemes where the 
recipients’ TNDFI is closest to the poverty line. The SWA in Ireland should also be 
noticed, as all households have a net income of at least 70% of the value of Poverty Line. 
On the other hand, the RMG in Portugal and the BSHG in Germany are the schemes where 
the recipients’ TNDFI is further away from the poverty line.
One can also observe that some schemes pay more attention to the needs of some particular 
households. For instance, the RMI in France, the ABW in the Netherlands and the JSA in 
the UK, seem to discriminate in favour of lone parent families. The SB in Denmark and the 
SWA in Ireland, tend to privilege couples (with or without children). Finally, the RMG in 
Portugal, the BSHG Germany and the TTK in Finland seem to favour households with 
children.
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Table 9 - Disposable income as a percentage of the poverty line169
Single1
Done parent 




+  2  childrena
Disposable income 
as a percentage of 
the poverty line
(ZJW
D e - BSHG97 0.38 0.62 0.46 0.61 0.52
D e - BSHG99 0.38 0.63 0.46 0.62 0.52
D k - SB97 0.76 0.78 0.92 0.93 0.85
D k - SB98 0.75 0.97 0.91 0.92 0.89
N L  - ABW97 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.97
N L  - ABW99 0.99 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.96
Fr - RMI98 0.54 0.71 0.55 0.62 0.61
Pt - RMG98 0.39 0.56 0.50 0.63 0.52
Irl - SWA98 0.70 0.71 0.75 0.74 0.73
Fin - TTK97 0.54 0.78 0.61 0.78 0.68
Fin - TTK99 0.51 0.70 0.57 0.70 0.62
U K -JSA 97 0.51 0.65 0.54 0.61 0.58
U K -JSA 99 0.51 0.73 0.54 0.57 0.59
Notes:
a Scoring criteria: Proportional score, where 1 refers to a situation where value o f  TDFI is equal to, or higher 
than, the value o f  the poverty line.
b The values in this column represent the mean value o f the previous columns
Finally, one should notice that, between 1997 and 1999, there was a noticeable decrease in 
the TNDFI of families on TTK in Finland, in particular households with children. This 
appears to be associated with the introduction of the new Social Assistance Act that 
imposed some reductions in benefit rates (Heikkila and Keskitalo 2000, p. 10). In contrast, 
in the same period, there was an increase in the TNDFI of lone parent families on SB 
(Denmark) and JSA (UK). Nonetheless, in the UK this was accompanied by a decrease in 
the TDNFI of couples with children.
5.2.2. FREEDOM TO CHOOSE OTHER ACTIVITIES INSTEAD OF PAID 
EMPLOYMENT
As can be seen in Table 10, the RMG in Portugal, the BSHG in Germany and the ABW in 
the Netherlands are the schemes where GMI recipients have more freedom to choose other 
activities instead of paid employment. In contrast, the SWA in Ireland and the JSA in 1997 
are the cases where there are more constraints on individuals’ choices. With regards to the
169 For further details on the methodology used to compare the recipients’ household TNDFI as a percentage 
o f the poverty line, see Annex 1.
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latter case, one should highlight the impact of the introduction of New Deal programmes in 
1998, which brought in education and training options for JSA recipients and, 
consequently, expanded their freedom of choice (Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 32-3). The 
low score of the French RMI reflects the paternalistic character of the social exclusion 
paradigm that underlies it (Jordan 1996, p. 3-4). Although there is an intention to guarantee 
an holistic approach to the recipients’ social insertion, the latter have no mechanisms that 
guarantee their effective ability to choose what is the best way to exploit their talents. 
Instead, it is up to social workers to determine what is the recipients’ best interest.
As Table 10 demonstrates, most schemes allow recipients to participate in education and 
training courses. Nonetheless, the RMI in France, the SWA in Ireland and the JSA in UK 
do deny entitlement to individuals in full-time education (Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 215, 
Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 21, Guibentif and Bouget 1997170). There are also significant 
restrictions to individuals who are interested in providing child-care. The RMI in France 
and the SWA in Ireland do not make any exceptions for individuals with childcare 
responsibilities (Gautrat, Fraisse and Bucollo 2000, p. 11-13; Enjolras et al. 2000, p. 50-1; 
Eardley et al 1996b, p. 216). In other cases, like the RMG in Portugal, the SB in Denmark 
and the TTK in Finland, recipients are only allowed to care for their offspring when there 
are no alternative forms of provision (Rosdahl and Weise 2001, p. 171, Heikkila and 
Keskitalo 2000, p. 34171).
170 See also Guibentif and Bouget 1997, French Questionnaire.
171 Decree 196-A/97
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. . .  Freedom to perform Freedom to provide . .  , .
, ., unpaid work, in social economy other family care r  .
a) organisations
a)
Freedom to choose other 
activities instead of paid 
employment
(L I 5)
D e  - B SH G 97 0.51 0.51 1 1 0 0.60
D e  - B SH G 99 0.5 0.5 1 1 0 0.60
D k  - SB97 1 1 0.53 0 0 0.50
D k  - SB98 1 1 0.534 0 0 0.50
N L  - A BW 97 1 1 l 5 0 0 0.60
N L  - A BW 99 1 1 l 5 0 0 0.60
Fr - RM I98 0.52 1 0 0 0 0.30
Pt - R M G 98 1 1 0.53 0.53 0 0.60
Irl - SW A98 0.52 1 0 0 0 0.30
Fin - T TK 97 1 1 0.53 0 0 0.50
Fin - T T K 99 1 1 0.53 0 0 0.50
U K -J S A 9 7 0 0 0.36 0 .36 0 0.12
U K -J S A 9 9 0.52 1 0.36 0 .36 0 0.42
a Scoring criteria: 1 -  Yes; 0.5 -  Yes, with some restrictions; 0.3 - Yes, with significant restrictions; 0 - No  
b The values in this column represent the mean value o f the previous columns
Notes:
Local discretion
2 - With restrictions
3 - If there is no alternative available
4 - If child is under 6 months
5 -  If child is under 5
6 - Recipients with caring responsibilities can reduce the amount o f  work they are expected to perform.
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Table 10 also shows that there are important constraints on the possibility of providing care 
to sick or old family members. The BSHG in Germany is the only case where recipients 
are excused from job search where they have dependent adults in the family (Vogues, 
Jacobs and Trickey 2000, p. 78, Eardley et al 1996, p. 164). In the case of the RMG in 
Portugal, this is an option only when there are no alternative forms of provision164. JSA 
recipients with care responsibilities are entitled to a reduction of the minimum amount of 
hours of work they would be expected to perform165 (European Employment Observatory 
1999). Finally, no scheme allows recipients to perform unpaid work in social economy 
organisations as an alternative to paid employment
5.2.3. FREEDOM TO CHOOSE THE JOB ONE WANTS
As Table 11 shows, GMI schemes put significant restrictions on individuals’ choices of the 
type of job they wish to perform166. The SWA in Ireland, despite being very much work- 
oriented, is the only scheme that allows individuals to refuse jobs that do not match their 
qualifications or previous job experience167. The TTK in Finland, the RMG in Portugal and 
the RMI in France and the SB in Denmark, on the other hand, do not consider any kind of 
exceptions to the obligation to accept work if offered. Nonetheless, in the latter case, there 
is a general requirement that social workers do not force individuals into jobs that are not 
adjusted to their characteristics or situation (Rosdahl and Weise 2001, p. 167).
164 Decree 196-A/97.
165 Unemployed JSA recipients are expected to work at the least 40 hours week. Persons with care 
responsibilities are expected to work a minimum 16 hours (European Employment Observatory 1999).
166 Here, it will be assumed that where there is no specific information on the exceptions to the requirement 
to perform work, then individuals are forced to accept any job.
167 The Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act o f 1993 (section 120). See 
http ://www. ir i shstatutebook. ie/ZZ A27 Y 1993. html
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Table 11 - Freedom to choose the job one wants
Justifiable excuses forjob refusal
Level of Previous 
qualifications1 job*
Freedom to choose 
the job  one wants
(yjz?
D e  - B SH G 97 0 1 0.50
D e  - B SH G 99 0 1 0.50
D k  - SB97 0 0 0.00
D k - SB98 0 0 0.00
N L  - A BW 97 0.51 0 0.25
N L  - A BW 99 0 .51 0 0.25
Fr - RM I98 0 0 0.00
P t - R M G 98 0 0 0.00
Irl - SW A98 1 1 1.00
Fin - T TK 97 0 0 0.00
Fin - T T K 99 0 0 0.00
U K -J S A 9 7 0 1 0.50
U K -J S A 9 9 0 1 0.50
a Scoring criteria: 1 -  Yes; 0.5 -  Yes, with some restrictions; 0.3 - Yes, with significant restrictions; 0 -  No 
b The values in this column represent the mean value o f the previous columns
Notes:
1- Only for individuals with higher qualifications
Table 11 also shows that national authorities tend to see the individuals’ previous 
occupation, rather than their level of qualification, as a valid motive for refusing a job. This 
is the case of the BSHG in Germany, the SWA in Ireland and the JSA in the UK, where 
recipients can refuse a job on the grounds that it does not allow them to pursue their 
previous occupation (see Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 216; Vogues, Jacobs and Trickey 2000, p. 
78; Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 22). The SWA in Ireland and the ABW in the Netherlands 
are the only schemes that allow individuals to refuse a job that does not match their level 
of qualification. Nonetheless, in the latter case, this only applies to individuals with higher 
qualifications, and only for a period of 2 years (see Eardley et al. 1996b, p. 216; Spies and 
van Berkel 2000, p. 109 and van Oorschot and Engelfriet 1999, p. 15).
107
Chapter 5  - G M I Schemes and their respect fo r  the Right to Personal Development
5.2.4. FREEDOM FROM DISCRETION
As mentioned earlier (see section 4.2.4.1.), one can try to derive the level of discretion in 
the structures that support the implementation of GMI schemes by looking at the level of 
decentralization of funding responsibilities and of benefit administration. As can be seen in 
Table 12, local authorities play a fundamental role in both the funding and the 
administration of the TTK in Finland, the SB in Denmark and the BSHG in Germany. In 
contrast, the implementation of the JSA in the UK and the SWA in Ireland is very 
centralised. One should also notice the case of the ABW in the Netherlands, the RMG in 
Portugal and the RMI in France, where the funding depends on central government, but the 
administration of benefits is not centralised.
As Table 12 also shows, there is significant variation in the division of funding 
responsibilities between central government and local authorities. For instance, in the 
Netherlands, local authorities are expected to fund only 10% of the costs of delivery of the 
ABW. In Finland, on the other hand, local authorities are expected to cover around 70% of 
the expenses associated with the implementation of the TTK. In Denmark, the funding of 
SB is shared in equal parts by the central government and local authorities. In Germany, 
local authorities cover 75% of the implementation costs of BSHG. The remaining costs are 
allocated to the regional authorities (Lander).
One can identify three models of benefit administration. There is group of schemes, where 
one can include the JSA in the UK and the SWA in Ireland, where the benefit is 
administered by central government agencies (see Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 17; Eardley 
et al 1996, p. 214). The second group includes the TTK in Finland, the SB in Denmark, the 
BSHG in Germany and the ABW in the Netherlands, where local authorities are 
responsible for the administration of benefits (see Ditch et al. 1997, p. 30 and OECD 1998, 
p. 161; Oxford Research 2000, p. 25, Hanesh and Baltzer 2000, p. 18).
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D e - BSHG97 0.21 0 0.10
D e - BSHG99 0.21 0 0.10
Dk - SB97 0.61 0 0.30
D k - SB98 0.61 0 0.30
N L - ABW97 0.81 0 0.40
N L - ABW99 0.81 0 0.40
Fr - RMI98 l 1 0,5 0.75
Pt - RMG98 l 1 0 ,53 0.75
Irl - SWA98 l 1 l 4 1.00
Fin - TTK97 0.4123 0 0.20
Fin - TTK99 0.4123 0 0.20
U K  -JSA97 l 1 l 5 1.00
U K -JS A 99 l 1 l 5 1.00
a - Scoring criteria:
1 -  Central Government funds 100% o f  total implementation costs 
0.8 -  Central Government funds between 75% and 99% o f total implementation costs 
0.6 -  Central Government funds between 50% and 74% o f total implementation costs 
0.4 -  Central Government funds between 25% and 49% o f total implementation costs 
0.2 -  Central Government funds less than 25% o f total implementation costs
0 -  Local authorities fund 100% o f total implementation costs
b - Scoring criteria
1 -  Central Government agencies are responsible for benefit administration
0.5 -  Benefit administration depends do multi-layered structures o f  implementation 
0 -  Local authorities are responsible for delivery
0 The values in this column represent the average value o f  the previous columns 
Notes:
1 -  Values refer to 1997 (see MISSOC 1998168)
2- Values refer to 1996 (see MISSOC 1998169)
3 - The Ministry o f  Solidarity and Social Security has a leading role in the delivery o f the scheme
4 - Department for Social, Community and Family Affairs
5 -  Benefits Agency/Department o f Social Security and Department for Education and Employment
In the third group, which includes the RMI in France and the RMG in Portugal, the 
administration of benefit is based on cooperation between central government agencies and 
local implementation bodies. For instance, in France, the decisions on the eligibility of 
applicants and the payment of the benefit are made by the Caisse d’Allocations Familiales 
(CAF), a nation-wide body. However, the termination of benefit is dependent on a decision 




Chapter 5  - G M I Schemes and their respect fo r  the Right to Personal Development
Portugal, the ‘Regional Social Security Commissions’ (CRSS), which are part of the 
ministry for social security, determine the eligibility of applicants, and the payment of the 
benefit. However, as in the French scheme, the termination of benefit is dependent on a 
decision of the ‘Local Support Committees’ (Capucha 1998, p. 34).
5.2.5. ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES TO WORK
As argued earlier (section 4.2.4.1), one can measure the recipients’ additional opportunities 
to work by the level of public expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, in ‘direct job creation’ 
programmes, ‘employment incentives’, ‘start-up incentives’, and ‘job rotation/job sharing’ 
programmes. As can be seen in Table 13, the SWA in Ireland and the SB in Denmark are 
the schemes that provide more work opportunities for GMI recipients. France and 
Germany should also be noticed by their level of investment in the creation of work 
opportunities. The JSA in the UK and, to a lesser degree the RMG in Portugal, are the 
schemes where there is less effort by the public authorities to create additional work 
opportunities specifically for those who are unemployed.
With the exception of the Danish SB, where public authorities put more focus on the use of 
employment incentives, most schemes privilege direct job creation programmes as a form 
of creating work opportunities for GMI recipients. There are nonetheless significant 
variations in the strategies adopted by policy makers. For instance, in the Finish case, 
although the majority of public expenditure goes to direct job creation programmes, there 
is a significant level of investment in job sharing/job rotation programmes. The SWA in 
Ireland, the SB in Denmark and the BSHG in Germany, on the other hand, make a 
significant investment in start-up incentives. Finally, as Table 13 shows, the introduction 
of the New Deal programmes in the UK produced an increase in the work opportunities for 
JSA recipients. The same appears to happen in Germany, with the introduction of the new 
Social Code and, to a lesser degree, in the Netherlands, with the introduction of the 
Jobseeker’s Employment Act.
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Table 13 - Additional opportunities to work
Expenditure on 
direct job  creation as 
% of G D P
Expenditure on 
employment incentives 
as % of G D P
Expenditure on 
start-up incentives 
as % of G D P
Expenditure on 
job  share 1 rotation 
as % of G D P
A dditional opportunities to 
work
D iff. from  
m ax4
D e  - B SH G 974 0 .3 1 9 1 0 .0 6 0 1 0 .0 3 3 1 0 .0 0 0 13 0.412 0.60
D e  - B SH G 994 0.350 0.080 0.038 0.000 3 0.468 0.68
D k  - SB97 0.1611 0 .4 5 4 1 0 .0 4 2 1 0 .0 0 3 1 0.660 0.96
D k  - SB98 0.161 0.454 0.042 0.003 0.660 0.96
N L  - A BW 97 0.3152 0 .0 4 8 1 0 .0 0 0 13 0.000 2 0.363 0.53
N L  - A BW 99 0.315 0.069 0 .0 0 0 3 0.000 3 0.384 0.56
Fr - RM I98 0.307 0.189 0.001 0.0003 0.497 0.72
P t - R M G 98 0.056 0.043 2 0.029 0.0003 0.128 0.19
Irl - SW A98 0.506 0.123 0.057 0.000 0.686 1.00
Fin - T TK 97 0 .2 5 0 1 0 .0 6 2 1 0 .0 1 7 1 0.0611 0.390 0.57
Fin - T T K 99 0.183 0.106 0.014 0.063 0.366 0.53
U K -J S A 9 7 0 .0 0 0 13 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 13 0.000 0.00
U K -J S A 9 9 0.014 0.006 0.000 0.000 3 0.020 0.03
Notes:
1 -  Information not available. Data refers to nearest neighbour, i.e., 1998
2 - Information not available. Data refers to nearest neighbour, i.e., 1999
3 - Not applicable; real zero; zero by default.
4 -  Given the restrictions on the participation of BSHG recipients in ALMP targeted at unemployment insurance recipients, the expenditure in work-related 
programmes might not represent the opportunities available to GMI recipients.
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5.2.6. OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING
In line with the previous chapter (see section 4.2.4.1), the opportunity for GMI recipients 
to participate in education/training will be measured by the level of public expenditure, as 
a percentage of GDP, in ‘training’ programmes and ‘special support for apprenticeships’. 
One can observe that the JSA, after the introduction of the New Deal programmes, the 
RMG in Portugal and the RMI in France are the cases where GMI recipients are given 
more opportunities to participate in training or education. The ABW in the Netherlands, on 
the other hand, is the scheme that provides the least opportunities for recipients to improve 
their human capital. In Ireland, although the investment in training/or education is much 
higher than in the Netherlands, SWA recipients still have comparatively fewer 
opportunities to participate in training/education opportunities than their European 
counterparts.
Table 14 - Opportunity to participate in education and training
'Expenditure on 
training as 
% of G D P
Expenditure on 
special support for 
apprenticeship as 






D e - BSHG974 0.389 1 0.045 1 0.434 0.61
D e - BSHG994 0.411 0.058 0.469 0.66
D k - SB97 0.693 1 0.015 i 0.708 1.00
D k - SB98 0.693 0.015 0.708 1.00
N L  - ABW97 0.055 1 0.040 i 0.095 0.13
N L  - ABW99 0.064 0.038 0.102 0.14
Fr - RMI98 0.318 0.102 0.420 0.59
Pt - RMG98 0.174 0.065 0.239 0.34
Irl - SWA98 0.223 0.000 0.223 0.31
Fin - TTK97 0.4891 0.044 1 0.533 0.75
Fin - TTK99 0.450 0.035 0.485 0.69
U K -JSA 97 0.0391 0.099 1 0.138 0.19
U K -JS A 99 0.046 0.106 0.152 0.21
Notes:
1 -  Information not available. Data refers to nearest neighbour, i.e., 1998.
2 - Information not available. Data refers to nearest neighbour, i.e., 1999.
3 - Not applicable; real zero; zero by default.
4 -  Given the restrictions on the participation o f BSHG recipients in ALMP targeted at unemployment 
insurance recipients, the expenditure in training and education programmes might not represent the 
opportunities available to GMI recipients.
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As Table 14 also shows, countries seem to privilege the investment in training 
programmes, rather than apprenticeships, as a form of creating education/training 
opportunities for GMI recipients. Here, one should notice the Danish case, as that which 
puts the most effort into the provision of training opportunities for GMI recipients. The 
JSA in the UK, on the other hand, is the only case where expenditure on special incentives 
to apprenticeships exceeds investment in general training programmes.
Finally, as in the British case, it appears that the introduction of the new Social Code in 
Germany produced an increase in the level of expenditure on training/education 
opportunities. On the other hand, the changes in the activation framework of TTK 
recipients in Finland or of ABW recipients in the Netherlands, did not have a significant 
impact on the level of expenditure on training/education.
5.2.7. USE OF RESTITUTIVE SANCTIONS
As mentioned earlier (see section 4.2.4.1), one can assess the restitutive/repressive 
character of the sanction regime170 applicable to GMI recipients by looking at three 
indicators:
• The possibility of cancellation of the entitlement to GMI protection in case of 
infringement;
• the maximum penalty in the case of a first infringement;
• the use of progressive sanctions
As the table below demonstrates, the BSHG in Germany and the ABW in Netherlands are 
the schemes that are closer to the ideal-type of restitutive sanctions. In none of these cases 
can the application of benefit sanctions lead to the cessation of entitlement rights. There is 
also a preoccupation of using progressive sanctions to enforce the obligations of recipients. 
Nonetheless, the JSA does impose a higher maximum sanction than the BSHG or the 
ABW.
170 This section will focus solely on the administrative penalties related with the implementation o f  the 
activation requirement that regulates the entitlement to GMI protection. This excludes the sanctions 
applicable in the cases where individuals provide false information concerning their financial situation.
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sanction fo r  
first infringement 
(025 )
Maximum sanction as a 
percentage of the monthly








D e - BSHG97 1 25% 0.75 1 0.94
D e - BSHG99 1 25% 0.75 1 0.94
D k - SB97 0 100% 0 0 0.00
D k - SB98 1 20% 1 0 0.75
N L  - ABW97 1 20% 1 1 1.00
N L  - ABW99 1 20% 1 1 1.00
Fr - RMI98 0 100% 0 0 0.00
Pt - RMG98 0 100% 0 0 0.00
Irl - SWA98 1 100% 0 1 0.75
Fin - TTK97 1 20% 1 0 0.75
Fin - TTK99 1 20% 1 1 1.00
U K -JSA 97 0 50% 0.5 1 0.38
U K  - JSA99 0 50% 0.5 1 0.38
Notes:
a -  Scoring criteria:
1 - N o  
0 - Yes
b -  Scoring criteria:
1 -  Sanction represents less than 25% o f monthly amount o f benefit 
0.75 -  Sanction represents between 25% and 49% o f monthly amount o f  benefit 
0.50 -  Sanction represents between 50% and 74% o f monthly amount o f  benefit 
0.25 -  Sanction represents between 75% and 99% o f monthly amount o f  benefit
0 -  Sanction represents 100% o f monthly amount o f benefit
c -  Scoring criteria:
1 - Yes 
0 - N o
d The values in this column represent the weighted sum o f the values o f  the previous columns
1 -  This excludes restrictions on entitlement rights related with the signature o f  an insertion 
contract/Jobseekers Agreements.
2 - Given the great variation in the sanction regimes under analysis, this indicator was standardised 
according the following rules:
•  When the sanctions are defined as a full-suspension o f weekly benefit, it w ill be assumed that this 
corresponds to 25% o f the monthly benefit;
•  When the maximum penalty is the cancellation o f benefit, it will be assumed that this corresponds to 
100% o f  monthly benefit;
•  In the cases where there are differentiated sanctions for different infractions, the value will reflect 
the maximum penalty for the minor infraction(s);
3 - In cases where schemes set a maximum level o f sanction, and then let social workers to use their 
discretion to determine the level o f sanction that is appropriate, it will be assumed that progressive 
sanctions are in use.
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The most repressive schemes are the SB (before the introduction of the Act on Active 
Social Policy in 1998), the RMI in France, the RMG in Portugal, and the JSA in the UK, 
are. In the French case, recipients who fail to comply with the insertion contract, or fails to 
show to all three evaluation interviews, can have their benefit suspended, or even cancelled 
(Lefevre and Zoyem 1999, p. 2). In Portugal, any RMG recipients who fail to comply with 
the activities agreed in the insertion contract will have their benefit cancelled (Cardoso and 
Ramos 2000, p. 15; Capucha 1998, p. 40). In the UK, if a Jobseekers Agreement is not 
signed by the first 21 days, benefit entitlement can be cancelled (Ditch and Roberts 200, p. 
23). Before the introduction of the Act on Active Social Policy in 1998, all SB who 
refused an activation offer from the local authorities would lose their entitlement to GMI 
(Eardley et al 1996b, p. 115). After 1998, the sanction was reduced to a 20% cut in their 
benefit (Kildal 2001, p. 8).
As Table 15 also shows, the SWA in Ireland, the RMG in Portugal and the RMI in France, 
are the schemes that apply the most severe sanctions to first-time transgressors. As seen 
earlier, in the French and Portuguese cases, a first infringement can lead to the end of 
entitlement. In the Irish case, an initial infraction can lead to the suspension of benefit for 
up to nine weeks (Earldey et al 1996b, p. 150). The JSA in the UK also imposes a harsh 
penalty for first-time offenders. Thus, JSA recipients who fail to attend a job interview, to 
participate in a ‘New Deal Option’ or to follow a ‘Jobseeker’s Direction’171, will receive a 
fixed sanction of 2-week benefit suspension (Trickey and Walker 2000, p. 201-2).
In the remaining countries, the sanction for a first infringement is significantly lower. In 
Germany, BSHG recipients who refuse a job offer for the first time are subject to a 
sanction of up to 25% of the standard rate of benefit (Voges, Jacobs and Trickey 2000, p. 
86-7). In the Netherlands, a first infringement will be sanctioned with a 5% to 20% 
reduction of the ABW benefit (van Oorschot and Engelfriet 1999, p. 15).
Table 15 shows, most schemes use progressive sanctions to enforce individuals’ 
obligations. In the UK, any further transgressions after a first sanction are punished with a 
4-week benefit suspension (Trickey and Walker 2000, p. 201-2). In the Netherlands, 
continuous non-conformity can lead to the full withdrawal of benefit for a month (van
171 When recipients refuse to attend any o f  the opportunities offered by the N ew  Deal, they can be issued with 
a Jobseekers Direction, which defines the guidelines concerning job search, or the attendance o f  N ew  Deal 
Options (Trickey and Walker 2000, p. 201)
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Oorschot and Engelfriet 1999, p. 15). In Germany, BSHG recipients who, after the 
imposition of a first sanction, fail to fulfil their obligations can have their share of the 
household benefit removed (Voges, Jacobs and Trickey 2000, p. 86-7).
In contrast, the Finnish TTK, prior to the introduction of the new Social Assistance Act in 
1998, did not use progressive sanctions. Recipients who refuse a job or training offer, or 
behave in a way that endangered their chances to find work or participate training would 
receive a fixed 20% cut in their benefit. In 1998, the government introduced a progressive 
sanction regime, where recipients who repeatedly fail to accept a job or training offer 
receive a 40% benefit reduction (Heikkila and Keskitalo 1999, p. 15-6; Heikkila and 
Keskitalo 2000, p. 34). In the same way, the Danish SB (before the introduction of the Act 
on Active Social Policy in 1998), the RMG in Portugal, the RMI in France also exclude the 
use of progressive sanctions.
5.3. INDEX OF RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL 
DEVELOPMENT
This section examines how the cases under analysis are positioned in the Index of respect 
for the Right to Personal Development. As Table 16 shows, the ABW in the Netherlands is 
the scheme that scores the highest. Nonetheless, the decrease in the recipients’ TNDFI did 
have a (very small) negative impact on the scheme’s position in the Index. In Denmark, the 
introduction of the Act on Active Social Policy in 1998 had a significant impact on the 
scheme’s position, making it one of the cases with the highest respect for the Right to 
Personal Development. In contrast, the RMI in France and the RMG in Portugal are the 
schemes that least respect recipients’ Right to Personal Development. The JSA in the UK 
also occupies a lower position.
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Table 16 -  Index of respect for the Right to Personal Development
Satisfaction of 
basic consumption needs 
(*0.4)
Freedom to 
take other activities 
instead of paid work 
(*0.05)
Freedom to 


















Rsspect for the 
Right to Personal 
Developmenta
D e  - B SH G 97 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.60 0.61 0.94 0.64
D e  - B SH G 99 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.68 0.66 0.94 0.64
D k  - SB97 0.85 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.51
D k  - SB98 0.89 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.96 1.00 0.75 0.77
N L  - A BW 97 0.97 0.60 0.25 0.40 0.53 0.13 1.00 0.78
N L  - A BW 99 0.96 0.60 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.14 1.00 0.77
Fr - RM I98 0.61 0.30 0.00 0.75 0.72 0.59 0.00 0.36
P t - RM G 98 0.52 0.60 0.00 0.75 0.19 0.34 0.00 0.33
Irl - SW A98 0.73 0.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.31 0.75 0.63
Fin - T TK 97 0.68 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.57 0.75 0.75 0.62
Fin - TTK 99 0.62 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.53 0.69 1.00 0.69
U K -J S A 9 7 0.58 0.12 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.38 0.39
U K -J S A 9 9 0.59 0.42 0.50 1.00 0.03 0.21 0.38 0.41
Notes:
a The values in this column represent the weighted sum o f  the values o f  the previous columns
1 -  One should recognise that the technique used to standardise the information for this indicator, difference from maximum, can introduce some bias in the creation o f  the Index o f respect 
for the Right to Personal Development.
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In the same way as in Denmark, the introduction of the new Social Assistance Act in 
Finland in 1998, as it established a more progressive sanction regime, also had a positive 
impact on the schemes’ position in the Index of respect for the Right to Personal 
Development. Had the level of benefit not been reduced in that same period, and the 
impact would surely be even more visible. In the UK and Germany, the changes in the 
activation framework of GMI recipients, also had a positive, albeit small, impact on the 
scheme’s position in the Index.
When looking at the various dimensions of the respect for the Right to Personal 
Development, the chapter shows that the ABW in the Netherlands and the SB in Denmark 
are the schemes where the recipients’ TNDFI is closer to the poverty line. In what concerns 
the recipients freedom to exploit their talents, the chapter also shows that the RMG in 
Portugal, the BSHG in Germany and the ABW in the Netherlands are the schemes where 
GMI recipients have more freedom to choose other activities instead of paid employment. 
On the other hand, the SWA in Ireland, is the only scheme that allows individuals to refuse 
jobs that do not match their qualifications or previous job experience. Finally, the JSA in 
the UK and the SWA in Ireland as they depend on the very centralised structures of 
implementation, are the schemes where recipients are freer from the discretionary power of 
social workers.
With regards to recipients’ opportunities to exploit their talents, the chapter shows that the 
SWA in Ireland and the SB in Denmark and are the schemes recipients have more 
additional opportunities to work. On the other hand, the JSA, after the introduction of the 
New Deal programmes, the RMG in Portugal and the RMI in France are the cases where 
GMI recipients are given more opportunities to participate in training or education. Finally, 
the chapter shows that the BSHG in Germany and the ABW in Netherlands are the 
schemes that are closer to the ideal-type of restitutive sanctions.
5.4. CONCLUSION
This concludes the first moment in the analysis of the relation between the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the right to a minimum income. Going 
through the various dimensions that operationalise this normative framework, this chapter
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showed that the ABW in the Netherlands is the scheme that scores highest in the Index of 
respect for the Right to Personal Development. In contrast, the RMI in France and the 
RMG in Portugal are the schemes with least respect. The JSA in the UK also scores low. 
The following chapter will focus on the measurement of the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes and analyse its relation with the schemes’ respect for the Right to Personal 
Development.
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6. THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF GMI 
SCHEMES AND THEIR RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT TO 
PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
This chapter will test the hypothesis that GMI schemes that show more respect for the 
Right to Personal Development, once labour market conditions are accounted for, are more 
effective at returning recipients to the labour market. The first section will focus on the 
measurement of the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. The second will use basic 
correlational tools, QCA and cluster analysis to analyse the relation between the schemes’ 
employment effectiveness and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. The 
third section will consider whether the research hypothesis is corroborated by empirical 
evidence.
6.1. MEASURING THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF GMI 
SCHEMES
This section measures the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. The first step in this 
endeavour will consist in the measurement of the percentage of recipients who, one year 
after being on GMI, have made a transition to unsubsidised work. The subsequent step will 
be the measurement of the labour markets’ ability to create jobs for unemployed persons 
(Unemployment Reintegration Performance). The final step will consist in adjusting the 
employment effectiveness indicator to labour market conditions. This will produce an 
indicator of the marginal employment effectiveness of GMI schemes.
6.1.1. MEASURING TRANSITIONS FROM GMI TO WORK
As can be seen from Table 17, on average, only a quarter of recipients were able to find
work after a year on GMI (see final row). Nonetheless, the percentage of individuals in
work is partly related to the percentage of people still in education, training or job creation
schemes. This is particularly visible in ABW99 and the BSHG99 that - compared with
ABW97 and the BSHG97, respectively -  show a higher percentage of individuals in
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education/training/job creation and a lower percentage of individuals in work. However, 
bearing in mind that these variations correspond increases in the investment in ALMP in 
the Netherlands and in Germany (see section 5.2.6), one cannot exclude the possibility 
that, within this time-frame, the percentage of individuals in work might be reduced by 
previous increases in the investment in ALMP
172




In E d/Train  
/Job Creation 





D e  - B SH G 97 18 21.43 23 27.38 27 32.14 16 19.05
D e  - B SH G 99 10 14.71 26 38.24 18 26.47 14 20.58
D k  - SB97 20 29.85 27 40.30 12 17.91 8 11.94
D k  - SB98 14 28.00 23 46.00 8 16.00 5 10.00
N L  - A BW 97 20 20.62 21 21.65 37 38.14 19 19.59
N L  - A B W 99 11 15.07 23 31.51 26 35.62 13 17.80
Fr - RM I98 18 18.37 14 14.29 60 61.22 6 6.12
Pt - RM G 98 9 22.50 5 12.50 18 45.00 8 20.00
Irl - SW A98 40 29.41 A l 34.56 35 25.74 14 10.29
Fin - T TK 97 80 35.09 82 35.96 37 16.23 29 12.72
Fin - T T K 99 46 35.94 32 25.00 36 28.13 14 10.93
U K -J S A 9 7 9 31.03 0 0.00 17 58.62 3 10.35
U K -J S A 9 9 9 28.13 0 0.00 21 65.63 2 6.24
7 7 1 3 25.40 25.18 35.91 13.51
Source: European Community Household Panel (1994-2001)
As Table 17 shows, the TTK in Finland reveals the highest percentage of GMI recipients 
who made the transition to work. The SB in Denmark, the SWA in Ireland and the JSA in 
the UK also present a level of effectiveness above the average. In contrast, the RMG in 
Portugal, the RMI in France, the German BSHG (especially after the introduction of the 
Social Code) and the Dutch ABW (especially after the introduction of the Jobseekers’ 
Employment Act) are the schemes that are least effective in returning recipients to the 
labour market.
172 The British case is more difficult to explain, Although there is a decrease in the JSA’s employment 
effectiveness, the introduction of the New Deal programmes did not produce an increase in the 
‘education/training/job creation’ category. This might be related with the fact that New Deal Options are 
only expected to last only 6 months (see Ditch and Roberts 2000, p. 33).
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6.1.2. MEASURING UNEMPLOYMENT REINTEGRATION PERFORMANCE
As mentioned earlier (section 5.2.4.3), the technique adopted to adjust the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes to the existing labour market conditions involves the 
creation of an Unemployment Reintegration Performance (URP) indicator, that is able to 
measure the success of labour markets in creating jobs for unemployed persons. As can be 
seen in the table below, however, there is little variation in countries’ ability to create jobs 
for unemployed persons. Finland, France and Germany are the countries where the labour 
markets show the best performance. The Netherlands, on the other hand, is the worst 
performer. Finally, one should notice that, between 1997 and 1999, the Finnish, German 
and Dutch labour markets lost some of their capacity of creating jobs for the unemployed.




% of m axa
Share of flow from 
unemployment in all 
inflows into dependent 
employment 
(*0.4)





D e  - B S H G 971 16.60 1.00 18.10 0.37 0.75
D e  - B SH G 99 2 15.60 0.94 16.30 0.33 0.70
D k  - SB97 1 12.40 0.75 18.90 0.39 0.60
D k  - SB 983 11.50 0.69 20.70 0.42 0.59
N L  - A BW 97 1 8.30 0.50 25.70 0.53 0.51
N L  - A BW 99 3 7.90 0.48 22.30 0.46 0.47
Fr - RM I98 3 9.50 0.57 48.80 1.00 0.74
Pt - RM G 98 3 8.00 0.48 36.20 0.74 0.59
Irl - SW A 98 4 11.60 0.70 29.70 0.61 0.66
Fin - T T K 97 1 13.30 0.80 35.30 0.72 0.77
Fin - T T K 99 2 12.20 0.73 32.30 0.66 0.71
U K -J S A 9 7  1 14.00 0.84 17.90 0.37 0.65
U K -J S A 9 9  2 15.10 0.91 12.80 0.26 0.65
a -  In order to standardise the data from sub-indicators that compose URP, it was decided to compare the 
values o f  each case with the best performing case173.
b -  A s seen earlier (section 4.2.4.3.), a labour market’s URP represents the weighted sum o f the scores o f  
the previous columns.
Source: Key Indicators o f  the Labour Market, 3rd Edition (KILM)
Notes:
1 - 1998
2 -  2000
3 - 1999
4 - 1997
173 One possible alternative to standardise this data would be to use central tendency based techniques, such 
as z-scores, or difference from mean. However, as it would not suit the purpose o f  the URP indicator, i.e. to 
identify the countries that perform the best at creating jobs for unemployed persons, this option was 
abandoned.
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One should also notice that the URP indicator reflects different models of job creation. In 
the UK, Germany and Denmark, the labour market’s URP is more related to their overall 
capacity to create new jobs than with the weight of the pool of unemployed in the creation 
of new jobs. In contrast, in France and Portugal, the labour market has a lower capacity to 
create new jobs, but the percentage of the new jobs that go to unemployed persons is 
higher. The Finnish labour market is the only case that combines a high capacity of job 
creation and a great ability to reintegrate unemployed persons back into the labour market.
6.1.3. ADJUSTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GUARANTEED MINIMUM 
INCOME SCHEMES TO LABOUR MARKETS CONDITIONS
Having analysed the ability of labour markets to reintegrate unemployed individuals, one 
can now determine the marginal employment effectiveness of the cases under analysis. As 
seen earlier (section 4.2.4.3), the technique devised to measure the schemes’ marginal 
effectiveness depends on the assumption that the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes (Y) and the labour market’s URP (X) present a positive correlation. This is 
confirmed by the presence of a positive correlation between the two indicators (r = 0.34, 
see Table 20).
Table 19 -  GMI Marginal Effectiveness







Expected value of the 
employment effectiveness 




(Z =  Y -Y ‘)
D e  - B SH G 97 21.43 0.75 28.08 -6.65
D e  - B SH G 99 14.71 0.70 26.76 -12.05
D k  - SB97 29.85 0.60 24.31 5.54
D k - SB98 28.00 0.59 23.85 4.15
N L  - A BW 97 20.62 0.51 21.91 -1.29
N L  - A B W 99 15.07 0.47 20.82 -5.75
Fr - RM I98 18.37 0.74 27.95 -9.58
P t - R M G 98 22.50 0.59 23.86 -1.36
Irl - SW A98 29.41 0.66 25.86 3.55
Fin - T TK 97 35.09 0.77 28.64 6.45
Fin - T T K 99 35.94 0.71 26.97 8.97
U K -J S A 9 7 31.03 0.65 25.60 5.43
U K  - JSA99 28.13 0.65 25.55 2.58
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As Table 19 shows, the TTK in Finland, even when labour market conditions are 
considered, is the most effective scheme at putting recipients back into the labour market. 
The JSA in the UK and the SB in Denmark also show a positive marginal effectiveness. In 
contrast, the BSHG in Germany, especially after the introduction of the Social Code, and 
the RMI in France are the schemes that are the least effective at returning recipients to the 
labour market. The RMG in Portugal and the ABW in the Netherlands, especially after the 
introduction of the Jobseekers Employment Act, also show negative marginal employment 
effectiveness.
This suggests that the changes in the activation framework for BSHG, ABW and JSA 
recipients, rather than improving, prompted a decrease in the schemes’ marginal 
effectiveness. As before, one cannot exclude the possibility that this is related with the 
increase in the opportunities to participate in education/training courses or job creation 
schemes (see section 6.1.1.). In contrast, the introduction of the new Social Assistance Act 
in Finland had a positive impact on the schemes’ ability to return recipients back to the 
labour market.
6.2. ANALYSING THE RELATION BETWEEN THE EMPLOYMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS OF GMI SCHEMES AND THEIR RESPECT FOR 
RIGHT TO PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT
In line with the methodological framework outlined earlier (chapter 4), This section will 
use traditional correlational tools, QCA and cluster analysis to analyse the relation between 
the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal 
Development. Correlational tools will be used to measure the independent effect of 
activation policy-instruments on the schemes’ employment effectiveness. QCA will use 
Boolean algebra to identify the different arrangements in the activation of GMI recipients 
and analyse how these can impact on the schemes’ employment effectiveness. Cluster 
analysis provides an alternative way of identifying the different arrangements in the 
activation of GMI beneficiaries, which is more sensitive to the relative importance of 
explanatory variables in the clustering process, and of analysing how these can impact on 
the schemes’ employment effectiveness.
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6.2.1. CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS
Traditional correlational tools174 suggest that there is no systematic relationship between a 
scheme’s respect for the Right to Personal Development and its marginal employment 
effectiveness. This reflects the variety of situations found in the sample under analysis. For 
instance, the ABW in the Netherlands, which shows the highest respect for the Right to 
Personal Development, presents a negative marginal employment effectiveness. At the 
same time, the RMI in France and RMG in Portugal, which show the least respect for the 
recipients Right to Personal Development, also display a negative marginal effectiveness. 
On the other hand, the SB in Denmark, after the introduction of the new Act on Active 
Social Policy, is able to combine a positive marginal employment effectiveness, with a 
great respect for recipients’ Right to Personal Development.
Table 20 also suggests that improving the satisfaction of the recipients’ income needs and 
their freedom from administrative discretion can have a positive impact on the schemes’ 
marginal employment effectiveness. On the other hand, increasing the recipients’ freedom 
to choose the job they want and, especially, the type of activities they would like to 
perform, would have the opposite effect. Curiously, the available data suggests that 
increasing the restitutive character of the sanctions applicable to GMI recipients will not 
have an impact on the schemes’ marginal employment effectiveness.
174 As this study involves a small number o f  cases, it was decided to use basic correlation measures, namely 
Pearson's product moment correlation coefficient (r), rather than more sophisticated tools such as simple or 
multiple regression analysis (see Fielding and Gilbert 2003, p. 165-8).
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(Z = Y- Y)
D e  - B SH G 97 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.60 0.61 0.94 0.64 0.61 21.43 0.75 -6.65
D e  - B SH G 99 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.68 0.66 0.94 0.64 0.61 14.71 0.70 -12.05
D k  - SB97 0.85 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.96 1.00 0.00 0.51 0.42 29.85 0.60 5.54
D k  - SB98 0.89 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.96 1.00 0.75 0.77 0.66 28.00 0.59 4.15
N L  - ABW 97 0.97 0.60 0.25 0.40 0.53 0.13 1.00 0.78 0.81 20.62 0.51 -1.29
N L  - ABW 99 0.96 0.60 0.25 0.40 0.56 0.14 1.00 0.77 0.81 15.07 0.47 -5.75
Fr - RMI98 0.61 0.30 0.00 0.75 0.72 0.59 0.00 0.36 0.35 18.37 0.74 -9.58
Pt - RM G98 0.52 0.60 0.00 0.75 0.19 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.34 22.50 0.59 -1.36
Id  - SW A98 0.73 0.30 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.31 0.75 0.63 0.75 29.41 0.66 3.55
Fin - T TK 97 0.68 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.57 0.75 0.75 0.62 0.57 35.09 0.77 6.45
Fin - T TK 99 0.62 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.53 0.69 1.00 0.69 0.62 35.94 0.71 8.97
U K -J S A 9 7 0.58 0.12 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.19 0.38 0.39 0.51 31.03 0.65 5.43
U K -J S A 9 9 0.59 0.42 0.50 1.00 0.03 0.21 0.38 0.41 0.54 28.13 0.65 2.58
r / Y -0.06 -0.39 -0.11 0.12 -0.06 0.30 -0.09 -0.08 -0.13 - - -
r / Z 0.19 -0.31 -0.14 0.17 -0.07 0.17 -0.06 0.02 0.01 - - -
r / U R P - - - - 0.03 0.40 - - 0.34 - -
Notes:
a -  Here, the index o f  the Right to Personal Development does not consider the recipients’ Opportunity to Work and to Participate in Education and Training (for further details, see Table 2 
in Annex 4).
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The analysis of impact of the recipients’ additional opportunities to work or to participate 
in education and training in the schemes’ employment effectiveness should take in 
consideration, first, the fact that the latter is conditioned by the ability of labour markets to 
create new jobs for unemployed persons (see section 6.1.3.) and, second, the possibility, 
suggested by the model developed by Layard and Nickel (1986)177, that this in turn is 
influenced by the level of investment in ALMP. This would suggest that there is a co­
linearity between the investment in ALMP and the schemes’ (non-adjusted) employment 
effectiveness.
This hypothesis appears to be confirmed by the positive correlation between the labour 
market’s URP and the investment in training and education programmes (r = 0.40, see 
Table 20)178. This is further reinforced by the positive correlation between the labour 
markets’ URP and the total investment in ALMP {r = 0.24, see Table 1 in Annex 4). A 
final confirmation, albeit of minor relevance given the dimension of the numbers involved, 
is the fact that, as Table 20 shows, if one excludes the opportunity-related variables, there 
is a further decrease in the correlation between the schemes’ respect for the Right to 
Personal Development and their marginal employment effectiveness179.
Bearing in mind the weight of the literature that supports the hypothesis of the impact of 
ALMP in the labour markets’ URP, and the evidence advanced in the previous paragraph, 
it will be argued that there is a co-linearity between the investment in ALMP and the 
schemes’ (non-adjusted) employment effectiveness. In order to avoid the errors that such
177 In a seminal study o f  the macro-economic effects o f  ALMP Layard and Nickel (1986) develop a model 
that demonstrates that ALMP, as they enhance the size and employability o f  labour supply, which in turn 
facilitates recruitment and has a moderating effect on wages, have a positive impact on employment. This 
effect is further enhanced by the impact o f ALMP in the reduction o f  friction between labour demand and 
labour supply. The model, then, predicts that ALMP will enhance labour supply and employment, reduce 
unemployment and have a moderating effect on wage formation (see de Koning 2001, p. 718). The positive 
impact o f  ALMP in reducing unemployment was confirmed in later studies (OECD 1993 or Bellmann and 
Jackman 1996).
178 As Table 20 shows, the Additional Opportunities to Work indicator has a positive, albeit very week, 
correlation with the ability o f  labour markets to create jobs for unemployed persons. This seems to confirm 
the results o f the evaluation o f job creation programmes. Martin, for instance argues that subsidies to private 
companies involve significant dead-weight and displacement effects (1998, p.20). Meager and Evans also 
show that direct job creation programmes in the public sector have significant employment effects (1998, p. 
61). This, however, does not contradict the premises o f  the model developed by Layard and Nickel. In fact, 
the higher correlation between the expenditure in training and education programmes only confirms that the 
impact o f  ALMP on the employability o f  labour supply and, consequently, on employment.
179 As expected, this also has consequences in final score o f  some o f  the cases that make more investment in 
ALMP. Thus, the SB in Denmark or the TTK in Finland, show a decrease in their respect for the Right to 
Personal Development. At the same time, cases that invest less in ALMP, such as the JSA in the UK or the 
ABW  in the Netherlands, improve their position in the Index.
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co-linearity might produce, it was decided to exclude opportunity-related variables from 
the following stages of analysis of the relation between the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development.
In conclusion, the results produced by traditional correlational tools do not cannot confirm 
the hypothesis that GMI schemes that show more respect Right to Personal Development, 
once labour market conditions are accounted for, present higher levels of employment 
effectiveness. Nonetheless, bearing in mind the SWA in Ireland, one can argue that is 
possible to combine a high respect for the individuals’ Right to Personal Development and 
positive marginal employment effectiveness. In addition, the variation in the interaction 
between the different components of the Index and the marginal employment effectiveness 
of the schemes, seem to suggest that employment effectiveness of GMI schemes depends 
of the combination between different causal conditions, rather than on their additive effect.
6.2.2. QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYIS
This section will use Ragin’s QCA to analyse the relation between the schemes’ respect for 
the Right to Personal Development and their employment effectiveness. As seen earlier, 
QCA makes use of Boolean Algebra to analyse how a given outcome is produced by the 
presence or absence of certain conditions. Each case is seen as a combination of different 
causal conditions, which are understood in relation to one another and as constituting a 
particular configuration (Ragin 1987, p. 52, 92-3). Here, the dependent and the 
independent variables are represented using a binary nominal scale, where 1 means 
presence of a certain condition, and 0 means its absence. Once the raw data have been 
recoded in binary variables, or crisp-sets (or simply sets), they are presented in a Truth 
Table. Each row represents a logical combination of independent variables associated with 
a given output value of the dependent variable. The various combinations are then 
subjected to a minimisation procedure that allows the researcher to identify different 
explanatory combinations (Ragin 1987, p. 86-9) 18°.
The application of Ragin’s QCA will encompass three distinct moments. The first will 
entail mapping the different policy-configurations under analysis. The next stage will
180 For a more detailed description o f  the functioning o f  QCA see Annex 5.
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identify the causal combinations that condition the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes. The final stage will consist in using QCA to test the research hypothesis under 
examination.
6.2.2.1 Mapping diversity in Guaranteed Minimum Income schemes: creating crisp- 
sets and building a Truth Table
The first step in mapping the diversity of cases under analysis consists in the 
transformation of the variables used in the measurement of the scheme’s respect for the 
recipients Right to Personal Development into crisp-sets (see notes a, b, c, d, e and f in Table 
21). In order to reduce the loss of information associated with the creation of crisp-sets, the 
cross-over point181 will be defined in such a way as to reflect both qualitative and 
quantitative differences in the cases under analysis. Hence the option, for some variables, 
to create crisp-sets that identify cases that show more respect for the Right to Personal 
Development, rather than those that fulfil its ideal-type.
Nonetheless, in some variables, this process will still involve some loss of information. 
This is particularly visible in the set ‘More effective schemes’. First of all, the set will not 
reflect the variations in the marginal employment effectiveness of the schemes, such as the 
BSHG in Germany, the ABW in the Netherlands, the TTK in Finland, or the JSA in the 
UK, where there were changes in the activation framework of GMI recipients182. Second, 
this set does not discern the strength of the schemes’ marginal employment effectiveness. 
This is particularly problematic in those cases, such as the RMG in Portugal and the ABW 
before the introduction of the Jobseeker' Employment Act, where the value of marginal 
employment effectiveness indicator is close to 0. However, a sensitivity analysis has 
shown that this loss of information will not affect the results presented in the following 
paragraphs183.
181 I.e. the point that determines if  a given condition is present (1) or absent (0).
182 As argued earlier (section 6.2.1.), this might be related with increases in the recipients’ opportunity to 
participate in education/training courses or job creation schemes.
183 In order to eliminate the possible bias associated with this loss o f  information, a new analysis was 
performed, this time excluding the cases where the increase in investment in ALMP could have an impact in 
the percentage o f  recipients who find a job (BSHG99, SB98, ABW 99 and JSA99), and where marginal 
effectiveness is close to 0 (RMG98, ABW 97). For further details, see Annex 6.
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Table 21 - Truth Table on the causes that produce More Effective Schemes
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D k  -SB97 
D k  -SB98 
Irl - SW A98 
Fin - TTK 97; Fin - T TK 99  
U K  - JSA97; U K  - JSA99 
N L  - A BW 97; N1 - A BW 99  
Fr - RMI98; Pt - RM G 98  
D e  - B SH G 97; 
D e  - B SH G 99
a - Scoring Criteria
Here, it is assumed that those schemes where the average TDNFI as a % o f the poverty line is above the mean (0.68) (see section 6.2.1.) belongs to the set ‘Income needs are better satisfied’ 
b - Scoring Criteria
Here, it is assumed that schemes that recognise the right to provide child or family care or to perform unpaid work in social economy organisations (see section 6.2.2.) , belong to the set 
‘More freedom to choose other activities instead o f  paid employment’. This set excludes all the cases, such as the SB in Denmark, the RMG in Portugal, or the TTK in Finland, where 
recipients are allowed to provide care only when there is no alternative form o f  provision; and cases, such as the JSA in the UK, where recipients with care responsibilities are only entitled 
to reduce the number o f  hours o f  work they are expected to perform.
c -  Scoring Criteria
Here, it is assumed that that schemes that allow recipients to refuse a job on the basis o f their previous job, or their level o f qualification (see section 6.2.3.), belong to the set ‘More 
Freedom to Choose the Job One Wants’. This set excludes the ABW in the Netherlands, as it only provides a qualification-based exception for individuals with a university degree, which 
are not part o f the traditional GMI target population.
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d -  Scoring criteria
Here, it is assumed that the cases where the funding and the administration o f benefit is fully centralised (see section 6.2.4.), belong to the set ‘More Freedom From Discretion’, 
e -  Scoring criteria
Here, it is assumed that schemes where the application o f  benefit sanctions does not lead to the cessation o f  entitlement rights (see section 6.2.5.), belong to the set ‘Use o f Restitutive 
Sanctions’.
f  -  Scoring criteria
Here, it is assumed that schemes that display a positive marginal employment effectiveness (see section 6.1.3.) belong to the set ‘More Effective Schemes’
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Once the raw data has been recoded into binary variables, the various configurations are 
put together in a ‘truth table’ (Table 21). This shows us that, with the exception of 
Denmark, in most countries, the changes in the framework of the activation of GMI 
recipients did not produce a qualitative change in the schemes’ respect for the Right to 
Personal Development. Table 21 also shows us that, with the exception of the RMG in 
Portugal and the RMI in France, there are significant differences in the cases under 
analysis. The result is that the 13 cases under analysis have produced 8 combinations.
Although there is a significant level of diversity in the sample under analysis, one still 
needs to determine to what degree this is representative of the complexity in the 
phenomena under analysis. This is important as it defines the possibility of extrapolating 
the results of this analysis to non-observed cases 184 (Ragin 1987, p. 104-6). In order to 
achieve this, it is necessary to compare the number of combinations in the sample with all 
the possible logical combinations for the design of GMI schemes. Assuming that 32
1 O C
combinations are possible , and that the cases under analysis only produce 8 
configurations, one can conclude that the sample under analysis represents only 25% of all 
possible combinations. This rather limits the possibility of extrapolating the results of this 
analysis to non-observed cases.
Turning to the configurations on the Truth Table, one can observe that there is more 
diversity in the cases that are more effective at putting recipients back into the labour 
market. Here, one should highlight the SWA in Ireland as the scheme that shows the most 
respect for the recipients’ Right to Personal Development. On the other hand, the TTK in 
Finland is the scheme that shows the least respect. As for the schemes that are less 
effective at returning recipients to the labour market, one should contrast the RMG in 
Portugal and the RMI in France, as the schemes that show the least respect for the 
recipients’ Right to Personal Development, with the ABW in the Netherlands and the 
BSHG in Germany, as the those that show the most respect.
184 Ragin discusses this in terms o f the existence o f ‘limited diversity’ in social reality (Ragin 1987, p. 104-6).
185 According to Ragin (1987, p. 87), the number o f  logical combinations is defined according to the formula 
2k, where K is the number o f independent variables under analysis. In this particular case, the number o f  
logical combinations is equal to 2 , i.e. 32.
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6.2.2.2. Analysing the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes
Having identified the policy-configurations in the cases under analysis, the next step will 
consist in the analysis of the causal conditions that determine the effectiveness of GMI 
schemes. As Ragin shows (1987, p. 93), this implies the application of the Boolean 
minimisation procedures186 to the policy configurations that are more effective at returning 
recipients back to the labour market, first, and those that are least effective, second. This 
minimisation procedure consists of an experiment-like process where pairs of 
configurations, differing in just one cause, are compared in order to find a simpler 
expression. This is expected to determine the simplest way to explain a larger subset of 
configurations.
The application of minimisation procedures to the policy configurations that are more 
effective at returning recipients back to the labour market produced the following 
explanatory function:
GMIEFF = INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*freeemp*FREEJ OB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT 187188
As can be seen, the minimisation procedure produced a fairly complex explanatory 
function. However, as Ragin suggests (Ragin 1987, p. 110-11), this can be simplified with 
the help of Boolean factoring189. This produced the following explanatory function:
GMIEFF = FREEDISC*freeemp*FREEJOB (incneed *resanct + INCNEED*RESANCT) + 
freedisc*freeemp*freejob (INCNEED + RESANCT)
186 This minimisation procedure follows a basic premise: “if  two Boolean expressions differ only in one 
causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal conditions that distinguishes the two 
expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression” 
(Ragin 1987, p. 93).
187 Uppercase signifies the presence in a set (1) and lowercase signifies the absence o f  from a set (0). For 
further details, see Annex 5.
188 In Boolean algebra ‘+ ’ is the equivalent to the logical operator ‘OR’, and is the equivalent to the 
logical operator ‘A N D ’. For further details, see Annex 5.
189 Boolean factoring involves the use o f  the commutative law, the associate law, the distributive law or the 
identity law. For further details, see Annex 5.
133
C hapter 6  - The em ploym ent effectiveness o f  GM I schem es a n d  th e ir R esp ect f o r  the R ight to P erson a l
D evelopm en t
As seen earlier (section 4.2.2.1.), in QCA causation is described in terms of necessity (as 
in, when a cause is always present when an outcome occurs) and sufficiency (as in, when a 
cause can produce the outcome by itself). In line with the results produced earlier, the 
explanatory function suggests that restricting the individuals’ freedom to choose other 
activities instead of employment is a necessary condition for more effective GMI schemes. 
Most importantly, bearing in mind the type of restrictions imposed on the individuals’ 
choices over the type of activity they wish to perform (see section 5.2.2), this highlights the 
negative impact of the recipients’ freedom to provide child care in the schemes’ 
employment effectiveness.
One can identify two explanatory models of the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes. The first model, which can explain the effectiveness of the JSA in the UK and the 
SWA in Ireland, is based on a centralised structure of implementation (hence, with less 
room for discretion) where recipients have some freedom to choose the job they want, but 
that have significant restrictions on their freedom to choose the type of activity they wish 
to perform. This model, as it can be successfully articulated with a better satisfaction of the 
recipients’ income needs and with a more restitutive sanction regime, can provide the most 
satisfactory option for combining the respect for the Right to Personal Development and 
the need to improve the scheme’s employment effectiveness.
The second model, which can explain the effectiveness of the TTK in Finland and the SB 
in Denmark, is based on the combination of a decentralised structure of implementation 
(hence, with more room for discretion), and restrictions on the recipients’ freedom to 
choose the type of activity and the job they whish to perform. Furthermore, in order to be 
effective, these schemes cannot combine higher level of benefits and the application of 
restitutive sanctions to recipients. This only reinforces the idea that decentralised schemes 
can only be effective by restricting the recipients’ Right to Personal Development.
Having identified the causal combinations that explain the success of more effective GMI 
schemes, one can now turn to the analysis of the combinations that are less effective at 
returning recipients back to the labour market190. The application of the Boolean
190 Ragin suggests two methods for the analysis o f  negative cases (see Ragin 1987, p. 98-9). The first option 
is to apply Morgan’s law to the function that identifies the casual conditions that explain the positive cases 
(see Annex 5). The second option consists in recoding the output variable in such a way that more effective 
schemes are classified as 0, and less effective schemes are classified as 1. The application o f  the traditional
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minimisation procedures to less-effective policy-configurations produced the following 
explanatory function:
gmieff = incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*resanct + INCNEED*FREEEMP*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT 
+ incneed*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*freedisc*RESANCT
As before, this can be further simplified:
gmieff = FREEEMP*freedisc*RESANCT (INCNEED*freejob + incneed*FREEJOB) + 
incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*resanct
The first term of the explanatory function reinforces the idea that decentralised schemes 
that show more respect for Right to Personal Development tend to be less effective at 
returning recipients to the labour market. Hence, whenever these schemes combine a 
restitutive sanction regime and more freedom to choose the type of activities recipients can 
perform, with either higher benefit levels or more freedom to choose the job one wants, 
they become less effective at moving recipients back into the labour market.
The second term of the explanatory function, which can be seen as reflecting the 
experience of the RMG in Portugal and the RMI in France, seems to contradict some of the 
ideas about the factors that condition the effectiveness of more discretionary/decentralised 
schemes. Hence, despite imposing restrictions on the recipients freedom to choose the 
activities and the job they want to perform, and imposing lower levels of benefits and more 
repressive sanctions, these schemes fail to present higher levels of employment 
effectiveness.
However, rather than questioning the results produced earlier, this second model seems to 
reflect the difficulties of QCA, given its rigid nature, to capture the specificities of the 
‘social insertion’ paradigm that underpins the implementation of the RMI in France and the 
RMG in Portugal. One hypothesis is that the focus on social insertion (see sections 6.1.4 
and 6.1.5.) de-prioritises the importance of finding work. The existing evidence on this 
topic is not conclusive. A survey carried out by INSEE in 1998 showed that close to 90%
Boolean minimisation procedures to this new Truth Table should allow us to identify the causal 
conditions/combinations that produce less effective schemes. Given the complexity o f the first explanatory 
function (GMIEFF), it was decided to use the second option.
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of the insertion contracts signed in France included job-search activities (see Lefevre and 
Zoyem 1999, p. 4). However, as Fraisse shows, this does not necessarily reflect the reality 
on the ground. According to the author (see 2002, p. 18), social workers tend to prioritise 
more employable recipients in the signature of insertion contracts, which might explain the 
importance of work-related actions in the contracts signed.
An alternative explanation is that, given the importance of social workers in the activation 
of the recipients (see section 6.2.2.), this can be the result of shortages in the availability of 
administrative resources for the implementation of the schemes. A good indicator of this is 
the fact that, at the local level, the percentage of RMI recipients with signed insertion 
contracts decreases as the percentage of unemployed recipients increases (see Fraisse 2002, 
p. 18). In Portugal, Cardoso and Ramos suggest that the lack of human resources is a 
significant obstacle in the social insertion of RMG recipients (2000, p. 83).
Finally, there is the possibility that that the scheme’s low employment effectiveness might 
be related to the complexity of their structure of delivery and implementation. As seen 
earlier (see sections 6.1.4 and 6.1.5.), in both cases the activation of recipients depends of 
the coordination between a variety of actors. However, the available evidence suggests that 
this is far from effective. In Portugal, Cardoso and Ramos show that the central role of 
regional social security services (CRSS), in the Local Support Committees, creates 
significant coordination problems in the delivery of services (Cardoso and Ramos 2000, p. 
81). In France, Gautrat, Fraisse and Buccolo also report a lack of cooperation between the 
team of local integration counsellors and the public employment services (2000, p. 112)
6.2.2.3. Validation of the research hypothesis
This section will use QCA to test the empirical validity of the research hypothesis 
advanced earlier. As Ragin shows (1987, p. 118-21), this involves three, complementary, 
operations. The first step is to determine if the research hypothesis is confirmed by 
empirical data. The second step is to verify if, on the contrary, the existing empirical 
evidence rebuts the research hypothesis. The final step consists in identifying the 
shortcomings of the research hypothesis.
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One can determine if the research hypothesis is confirmed by empirical data by mapping 
the areas of agreement between the research hypothesis (T’GMIEFF), and the function that 
explains the success of the schemes that are more effective at putting recipients back in the 
labour market (GMIEFF). Assuming that:
T’GMIEFF = INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT
and
GMIEFF = INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed* freeemp*FREEJ OB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT
Then:
(T’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = (BASNEED*FREEACT*FREEJOB*DISCRET*RESTSANCT) 
(INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT)
(T’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = 0191
The empirical analysis does not validate the hypothesis that GMI schemes that show more 
respect Right to Personal Development, once labour market conditions are accounted for, 
present higher levels of employment effectiveness. This obviously reflects the fact that 
restricting the recipients’ freedom to choose the type of activities they wish to perform is a 
necessary condition to produce more effective GMI schemes.
In order to verify if the existing empirical evidence rebuts the research hypothesis it is 
necessary to intercept the latter (T’GMIEFF) with the explanatory function for less 
effective’ schemes (gmieff). Assuming that:
T’GMIEFF = INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT
and
191 For a more detailed description o f  the minimisation procedure, see Annex 6.
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(T’GMIEFF) (gmieff) = (INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT) 
(incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*resanct + INCNEED*FREEEMP*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*freedisc*RESANCT)
(T’GMIEFF) (gmieff) = 0192
This confirms the idea that, although the existing data do not validate the research 
hypothesis, this cannot be rebutted either. In fact, as the SWA in Ireland shows, it is 
possible to articulate higher levels of employment effectiveness and a greater respect for 
recipients’ Right to Personal Development.
In light of this, one can try to identify the shortcomings in the research hypothesis. This 
can be done by intercepting the causal combinations that were not theorized by the 
research hypothesis (t’GMIEFF)193 and the function that explains the success of more 
effective schemes (GMIEFF). Assuming that:
tGMIEFF = incneed + freeemp + freejob + freedisc + resanct
Then:
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = (incneed + freeemp + freejob + freedisc + resanct) 
(INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT)
192 For a more detailed description o f the minimisation procedure, see Annex 6.
193 This can be done by applying Morgan’s Law to the term that represents the research hypothesis 
(T’GMIEFF), see Annex 5.
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(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*resanct +
incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*freeernp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT 194
This function highlights two main ideas. First, in line with the previous paragraphs, that 
decentralised GMI schemes can be effective only by restricting the recipients’ Right to 
Personal Development. Second, it again highlights the case of the SWA in Ireland, as that 
which displays the best articulation between the respect for the recipients’ Right to 
Personal Development and effectiveness in returning recipients to the labour market.
6.2.3. CLUSTER ANALYSIS
This section uses cluster analysis to analyse the relation between the schemes’ employment 
effectiveness and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. The first part of this 
section will combine hierarchical cluster analysis and K-cluster to identify the most 
adequate option to examine the relation between the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. The following stage will 
explore the relation between the two variables, by cross-tabulating the GMI clusters with 
the cases’ marginal employment effectiveness.
6.2.3.I. Identifying GMI clusters
This section will combine hierarchical cluster analysis and K-means cluster analysis to 
most adequate option to examine the relation between the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. Whereas the 
hierarchical cluster analysis will identify the natural clusters in the sample, the K-means 
cluster analysis, as it allows the researcher to uncover the relative importance of the 
different variables in the clustering process and to map the internal consistency of the 
clusters will be of help in identifying the final cluster solution.
194 For a more detailed description o f the minimisation procedure, see Annex 6.
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If one applies hierarchical cluster analysis to the available data195, this produces the 
following clusters:
Table 22 -  Clusters of GMI schemes, using hierarchical cluster analysis
Cases
Cluster 1 D e  - B SH G 97  
D e - B SH G 99  
D k  - SB98  
N L  - A BW 97  
N L  - A B W 99  
Fin - T TK 97  
Fin - T T K 99
Cluster 2 Fr - RM I98  
Pt - R M G 98  
D k  - SB97
Cluster 3 Irl - SW A98  
U K -J S A 9 7  
U K  - JSA99
When compared with the results produced by QCA, the hierarchical cluster analysis 
confirms the similarities between the JSA in the UK and the SWA in Ireland. Furthermore, 
although it recognises the similarities between the Portuguese RMG and the French RMI, 
these are included in the same cluster as the SB, before the introduction of the Act on 
Active Social Policy. Finally, this method puts together a series of decentralised schemes 
that QCA has, however, shown to have significant differences among them.
195 In order to produce more robust clusters, it was decided to use the ‘complete distance’ method (see 
Maroco 2003, p. 304). In order to test for the impact o f different clustering methods, the ‘singe linkage’ 
method was also used. However, despite slight variations in the distance coefficient, both methods produced 
the same outcome.
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Table 23 - Cluster membership and distance from cluster centre, using K-Means cluster analysis
Case




K =  5  
Cluster Distance
K = 6  
Cluster Distance
K =  7 
Cluster Distance
K =  8  
Cluster Distance
D e  - B SH G 97 2 .390 1 .390 1 .000 1 .000 1 .000 1 .000
D e  - B SH G 99 2 .390 1 .390 1 .000 1 .000 1 .000 1 .000
D k  - SB97 3 .357 3 .357 3 .357 3 .000 3 .000 3 .000
D k  - SB98 2 .319 1 .319 4 .196 5 .196 4 .192 4 .116
N L  - A BW 97 2 .300 1 .300 4 .260 5 .260 5 .005 5 .005
N L  - A BW 99 2 .292 1 .292 4 .254 5 .254 5 .005 5 .005
Fr - RM I98 3 .230 3 .230 3 .230 6 .157 2 .157 8 .157
P t - R M G 98 3 .245 3 .245 3 .245 6 .157 2 .157 8 .157
Irl - SW A98 1 .426 4 .000 5 .000 2 .000 6 .000 2 .000
Fin - T T K 97 2 .283 1 .283 4 .255 5 .255 4 .103 4 .116
Fin - T T K 99 2 .269 1 .269 4 .271 5 .271 4 .202 6 .000
U K -J S A 9 7 1 .267 2 .150 2 .150 4 .150 7 .150 7 .150
U K  - JSA99 1 .254 2 .150 2 .150 4 .150 7 .150 7 .150
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Table 23 shows that, if one specifies a 3-cluster solution, the K-means cluster analysis will 
produce the same outcome as hierarchical cluster analysis. Furthermore, as the analysis of 
variance shows, whereas in QCA schemes’ are combined according to the level of 
discretion (which is obviously dependent of the structure of implementation) and the 
freedom for recipients to choose the activity and the job they whish to perform, here 
clusters are aggregated according to the character of the sanctions regime and, to a lesser 
degree, of the level of discretion. This explains why the SB, prior to the Act on Active 
Social Policy, is included in the same cluster as the French RMI and the Portuguese RMG, 
as all of them present the most repressive sanctions regimes. It also explains the existence 
of a cluster of decentralised schemes that display a more restitutive sanction regime.
The indicator that measures the cases’ distance from the cluster centre provides a good 
measure of the internal consistency of the clusters. As can be seen in Table 23, this 
indicator highlights the inadequacy of the inclusion of the SB, before the introduction of 
the Act on Active Social Policy, in the same cluster as the RMI in France and the RMG in 
Portugal. Furthermore, the indicator reflects the level of internal heterogeneity in the 
cluster of decentralised schemes, which had been unveiled with the use of QCA.
Table 24 -  Analysis of variance (A N O V A )
K - 3 K = 4 K = S K = 6 K = 7
F
K = 8
Z score(T N C N E E D ) .443 .420 2.107 2.882 6.628 8.509
Z score(FR E E M P) 7.377 4.467 3.225 2.317 2.009 1.435
Z score (FREEJOB) 7.575 8.688 29.538 20.677
Z score(F R E E D ISC ) 26.769 16.062 14.857 50.225 220.250 210.000
Z score(R E SA N C T ) 52.990 72.882 50.130 35.091 45.917
Some might argue that the discrepancies found between the 3-cluster solution produced by 
the hierarchical cluster analysis and the policy-configurations produced by QCA could be 
resolved by increasing the number of possible clusters in K-means cluster analysis. 
However, as both Tables 23 and 24 show, this is not the case. Even if one assumes a 8 
cluster solution, which would match the number of configurations produced by QCA, there 
are, nonetheless, noticeable discrepancies196. This can be explained by the fact that, as the
196 For instance, the Irish SWA would no longer be in the same cluster with the British JSA. Furthermore, the 
TTK in Finland, prior to the N ew  Social Assistance act, would sit together the Danish SB, after the 
introduction o f  the Act on Active Social Policy.
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number of cluster increases, the level of discretion and the restitutive/repressive character 
of the sanctions regime become ever more important in the process of cluster formation. In 
light of this, it will be argued that the 3-cluster solution, as that which provides the simplest 
outcome, is the most adequate option to examine the relation between the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development.
6.2.3.2. Analysing the employment effectiveness of GMI clusters
This section will look at relation between the schemes’ respect for the Right to Personal 
Development and their employment effectiveness, by cross-tabulating the GMI clusters 
produced earlier with the cases’ marginal employment effectiveness. This can be done by 
analysing the possible discrepancies in the marginal employment effectiveness of the cases 
in light of qualitative aspects of cluster formation, namely the internal consistency of the 
clusters and the relative importance of different variables in cluster formation.
Table 25 -Marginal effectiveness per GMI cluster
Cluster Cases G M I
Marginal
Effectiveness
Cluster 1 D e  - BSHG 97 -6.65
D e  - BSH G 99 -12.05
D k  - SB98 4.15
N L  - ABW 97 -1.29
N L  - ABW 99 -5.75
Fin - TTK 97 6.45
Fin - TTK 99 8.97
Cluster 2 D k - SB97 5.54
Fr - RMI98 -9.58
Pt - RM G98 -1.36
Cluster 3 Irl - SW A98 3.55
U K -J S A 9 7 5.43
U K  - JSA99 2.58
Unfortunately, as it does not expose any discrepancies between the cases in the third 
cluster, Table 25 does not add much to explain the employment effectiveness of centralised 
schemes. This is not, however, the case of the first and second clusters.
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Bearing in mind the importance of the restitutive/repressive character of sanctions in the 
clustering process (see Table 24), the differences in marginal effectiveness among the 
cases that compose the first cluster suggest that the character of the sanctions regime 
cannot explain the differences in the employment effectiveness of decentralised GMI 
schemes. In light of this, one cannot exclude the possibility advanced earlier (section
6.2.2.3.), that the employment effectiveness of decentralised schemes depends on the 
restrictions to recipients’ freedom to choose other activities instead of paid employment.
The discrepancy in the values of the marginal employment effectiveness between the 
Danish SB, prior to the introduction of the Act on Active Social Policy, and the Portuguese 
RMG and the French RMI, seems to confirm the internal inconsistency of the second 
cluster. Bearing in mind the importance of the structure of implementation in the clustering 
process, which would explain the differences in the distance from the cluster centre among 
the cases (see Table 23), one cannot exclude the hypothesis that the specificity of the 
structure of implementation of the French and Portuguese schemes may hamper their 
employment effectiveness.
6.3. REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE
This section evaluates the hypothesis, that GMI schemes that show more respect for the 
Right to Personal Development, once labour market conditions are accounted for, will 
present higher levels of employment effectiveness. As the previous sections show this 
hypothesis is not confirmed by the available empirical evidence. This is not to say that the 
hypothesis has therefore been refuted. The use of correlational measures showed that there 
is no systematic relation between the two variables, which allows for the possibility that 
improving the schemes’ respect for the Right to Personal Development might not 
necessarily have negative consequences on their ability to return recipients back to the 
labour market. The use of Ragin’s QCA showed that some schemes can, with the exception 
of the freedom for recipients to choose other activities instead of paid employment, 
combine a higher level of respect for the Right to Personal Development with higher levels 
of employment effectiveness.
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This reflects the complexity of the processes that condition the employment effectiveness 
of GMI schemes. First, as the previous paragraphs show, this is conditioned by the ability 
of labour markets to create new jobs for unemployed persons. This in turn is influenced by 
the level of investment in ALMP. As a consequence, one can argue that improving the 
recipients’ opportunities to work or participate in training/education courses, even if 
indirectly, may increase the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes.
This complexity is also reflected in the low, and contradictory, pattern of correlation 
between the dimensions of the normative framework and the schemes’ marginal 
employment effectiveness. The exception here is the recipients’ freedom to choose other 
activities besides paid employment, which, as confirmed by QCA, plays a fundamental 
role in explaining the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes.
In this context of causal complexity, one cannot but highlight the usefulness of QCA in 
uncovering how the employment effectiveness of GMI depends on the articulation between 
the schemes’ structure of implementation and the recipients’ freedom to choose the type of 
activity and the type of job they want to perform. This is particularly visible in the case of 
decentralised GMI schemes that can only be more effective by restricting the recipients’ 
freedom of choice.
One can also point that the existing evidence fails to confirm the existence of 
unemployment traps in GMI schemes. In fact, in the cases under analysis there is a positive 
correlation between the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes and the TDNFI of 
recipient households. The existing data also fails to confirm the idea that more repressive 
sanction regimes are more effective at putting recipients back to the labour market. 
However, as the results produced by cluster analysis shows (section 6.2.3.2), there is 
nothing to suggest that restitutive sanctions are necessarily more effective. If anything, this 
study suggests that more research on this topic is required.
Finally, the available evidence does not provide a conclusive account as to the reasons that 
justify the problems of the French RMI and, to a lesser degree of the Portuguese RMG, in 
returning recipients to the labour market. Earlier, three possible explanations were 
advanced: the importance given to the need to find work relative to other aspects of the 
social insertion process; the centrality given to social workers in the delivery of the
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scheme; and the complexity of the structure of implementation. If anything, the results of 
the cluster analysis seem to reinforce the importance of the last option, in explaining the 
low employment effectiveness of social insertion-based schemes.
6.4. CONCLUSION
This chapter sought to test the hypothesis that GMI schemes that show more respect for the 
Right to Personal Development, once labour market conditions are accounted for, present 
higher levels of employment effectiveness. The chapter started by showing that, when 
labour market conditions are taken into account, the TTK in Finland is the most effective 
scheme at returning recipients to the labour market. In contrast, the BSHG in Germany, 
especially after the introduction of the Social Code, and the RMI in France are the schemes 
that are the least effective. The RMG in Portugal and the ABW in the Netherlands, 
especially after the introduction of the Jobseekers Employment Act, also show a negative 
marginal employment effectiveness.
The remaining sections show that, considering the results produced by correlational tools, 
QCA and cluster analysis, the available data does not confirm the research hypothesis 
advanced earlier. However, this does not mean that the hypothesis can therefore be refuted. 
In fact, as Ragin’s QCA shows, some schemes can, with the exception of the level of 
freedom for recipients to choose other activities instead of paid employment, combine a 
higher level of respect for the Right to Personal Development with higher levels of 
employment effectiveness.
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7. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this thesis was to provide a valuable and innovative contribution to the 
debates prompted by the activation of GMI recipients. To the question as to what could 
justify the right to a minimum income, this thesis argues that the latter can only be justified 
in terms of the recipients’ Right to Personal Development. Second, to the question on 
whether one can identify any kind of systematic relation between the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development, in 
the context of different labour market conditions, this thesis showed that with the exception 
of the freedom to choose other activities instead of paid employment, it was possible to 
combine a higher respect for the Right to Personal Development with higher levels of 
employment effectiveness.
However, as the previous chapters highlighted, there are significant restrictions to the 
possibility of generalising the empirical results produced here to non-observed cases. This 
is, first of all, limited number of cases available for analysis. As the previous sections 
show, the available sample of cases limits the ability of extracting more solid results from 
the use of correlational tools (see section 6.2.1.), and only reflects a limited portion of the 
of the internal diversity of the phenomena under analysis (see section 6.2.2.). Furthermore, 
there are also restrictions related with the historical context of the cases under analysis. 
Since then, a number of changes have been introduced in both GMI schemes and in the 
ALMP in various EU member countries, which might of course contradict the results 
produced here.
A final restriction is related with the impossibility, given the limited number of 
observations offered by ECHP, to control for how the relation between the schemes’ 
employment effectiveness and their respect for the Right to Personal Development varies 
per different groups of GMI recipients, such as lone parent families, long-term unemployed 
or members of ethnic minority groups. In light of this, the results here should be 
interpreted with reference to the cases under analysis, and any possible extrapolations 
should carefully contextualised. Despite these limitations, as the following sections will 
show, this study does make some relevant contributions at the theoretical, methodological 
and policy level.
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7.1. CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE THESIS
This section will review the main contributions made by this thesis. The first two sections 
will focus on the thesis contribution to the literature on the right to a minimum income and 
on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. The remaining sections will focus on 
the contributions at the methodological and policy level.
7.1.1. EXPANDING THE LITERATURE ON THE RIGHT TO A MINIMUM 
INCOME
Reflecting on the problems faced by the arguments posed by Lawrence Mead and Philippe 
Van Parijs, which typify the fundamental standpoints in the debate on the right to a 
minimum income, this thesis argues that a more satisfactory justification is possible. This 
alternative must be set in the context of an ontological framework that puts a focus on the 
promotion of the individuals’ personal development, but recognises its social basis, and the 
obligations that it imposes on them; and encompasses a more critical view of the role of the 
market as a mechanism of social regulation.
Chapter 3 demonstrates that that Durkheim’s theory of social justice, as it makes provides 
an ontological framework which is able to establishing a relationship between organic 
solidarity, personal development and social obligation, can provide the basis for a more 
satisfactory justification of the right to a minimum income. Building on Durkheim’s theory 
of social justice, the chapter then argues that individuals have a Right to Personal 
Development.
Consequently, the thesis argues that the Right to Personal Development can provide an 
adequate justification of the right to a minimum income. This can be best illustrated by 
confronting this normative framework with the arguments posed by Mead and Van Parijs. 
As seen earlier, Van Parijs argues for the introduction an unconditional BI as a form of 
achieving a just society (1997, p. 30). However, as Barry, Van Donselaar and White show 
(see section 2.3.2.), this would unfairly favour those who do not want to work. In light of 
this, it can be argued that the Right to Personal Development, which recognises that the 
right to a minimum income should be made conditional on the fulfilment of the
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obligation to exploit one’s talents, provides a more adequate justification of the right to a 
minimum income.
The Right to Personal Development, although it agrees with Mead’s argument that the 
right to a minimum income should be made conditional on the fulfilment of individual 
obligations, provides a more suitable perspective on the conditions under which the latter 
are enforced. Mead suggests that the enforcement of obligations is legitimate regardless of 
the opportunities available to individuals. However, as Gutmann and Thompson (1996) or 
Etzioni (1997) argue, this would be tantamount to unbalanced reciprocity. The Right to 
Personal Development, as it requires that individuals have effective opportunities to exploit 
their talents, provides a more adequate justification of the right to a minimum income.
Finally, Mead argues that paid employment is the main form through which individuals 
can fulfil their obligations to society. However, as Lewis (1998) and Gorz (1992) show, 
this neglects the contributory potential of other activities such as care work, or unpaid 
work for the community. The Right to Personal Development, as it recognises the 
contributory potential of a variety of activities, such as paid employment in the private or 
public sector, paid or unpaid work in social economy organisations, parental care, or care 
of infirm, disabled or old persons, provides a more adequate justification of the right to a 
minimum income.
7.1.2. EXPANDING THE LITERATURE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GMI 
SCHEMES
This thesis provides a relevant contribution to the literature on employment effectiveness 
of GMI schemes. In particular, in proposing a technique to adjust the schemes’ 
employment effectiveness to labour market conditions, this thesis opens new opportunities 
for the comparative study of the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes in Europe. 
Moreover, given the number of cases covered in this study, it fills some of the existing 
gaps in the coverage of the literature on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes.
Thirdly, the thesis contributes to the analysis of the interaction between the functioning of 
labour markets, the impact of ALMP and the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes.
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As the previous chapter shows, the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes is related to 
the ability of labour markets to create new jobs for unemployed persons. However, as the 
model developed by Layard and Nickel (1986) had already suggested, this in turn is 
influenced by the level of investment in ALMP. This also suggests that the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes must be analysed in the context of the overall frameworks 
that regulate the functioning of the labour markets (i.e., employment protection, wage 
policy, human capital development institutions, etc.).
Fourthly, this thesis provides a more comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms that 
condition the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. As Chapter 4 shows, the existing 
literature tends to focus on the independent impact of activation programmes and 
mechanisms on the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. This thesis, by combining 
the analytical potential of traditional quantitative methods and QCA, is able to show how 
different policy variables work both independently and in combination with each other.
7.1.3. CONTRIBUTION TO METHODOLOGY
This thesis made two important methodological contributions. First, when compared with 
other relevant studies in the literature (such as that developed by Nicaise et al. (2003)), this 
thesis provides a more sophisticated methodology to measure transitions to work using 
ECHP data. As seen earlier (section 4.2.4.2. and 4.2.4.3.), this methodology, although it 
might be open to the charge of underestimating the actual number of transitions from 
benefit to work, has two important advantages. First, this methodology eliminates possible 
sources of error in the measurement of the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes, 
namely the presence of individuals who are not available for work and the measurement of 
transitions to subsidised work. Second, it recognises that the employment effectiveness of 
GMI schemes is dependent on the overall ability of labour markets to create jobs for 
unemployed persons, and provides a technique to adjust it.
Second, the thesis provides an additional confirmation of the heuristic potential of the 
combination of traditional quantitative methods with Ragin’s QCA (see also Kangas 1994). 
QCA was of value in mapping the variety of policy-configurations in the sample of cases 
under analysis, and unveiling the complexity of the relation between the schemes’
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employment effectiveness and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. 
Correlational measures were particularly useful in clarifying the interaction between the 
ability of labour markets to create jobs for unemployed persons, the impact of ALMP, and 
the schemes’ employment effectiveness. In fact, as the previous chapter shows, there are 
noticeable advantages in the use of correlational tools in the selection of the variables that 
are to be included in QCA. Cluster analysis was especially useful in highlighting the 
importance of the structure of implementation in explaining the low employment 
effectiveness of the French RMI and the Portuguese RMG.
7.1.4. CONTRIBUTION TO POLICY
At the policy-level, the results produced seem to confirm the suggestions about the low 
employment effectiveness of GMI schemes
197. As seen earlier (see section 6.1.1.), in average, only a quarter of the beneficiaries 
available for work are able to find a non-subsidised job within one year. This of course is a 
matter of concern as it means that a great number of recipients are still locked in 
unemployment or activation programmes that do little to improve their job prospects. At 
the same time, this highlights the need to improve the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes as part of an overall strategy to reduce unemployment in Europe.
But more than just illustrating the low employment effectiveness of GMI schemes this 
thesis provides a new insight on the factors that influence it. In particular, the thesis 
highlights the importance of the way policy-makers define the recipients’ freedom to 
choose other activities instead of paid employment to the schemes’ employment 
effectiveness. The results show that schemes that allow recipients to provide childcare, 
regardless of the existence of alternative form of provision, present lower levels of 
employment effectiveness. Bearing in mind the example of the SB in Denmark, one could 
argue that one way of reconciling the need to provide care to the recipients’ offspring and 
the requirement for higher employment effectiveness, is to combine restrictions on the 
recipients’ freedom of choice with a strong framework of public provision of childcare.
197 This could also make a case for the need for to further research on the cost-effectiveness o f  the increased 
bureaucratic structure needed to activate GMI recipients when compared with non-mandatory programmes 
(Standing 2002, p. 185).
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Notably, this thesis does not corroborate the literature on the unemployment traps of 
income support benefits (see Carone et al. 2004). If anything, QCA suggest that these 
might be a relevant variable in more decentralised schemes (see section 6.2.2.2.) However, 
looking at the SB in Denmark and the SWA in Ireland, one can observe that these schemes 
present some of the highest levels of net income and are still able to present higher levels 
of employment effectiveness. This might be related to the fact that the job-search model 
that underpins the literature on unemployment traps assumes that the individuals’ 
behaviour is purely voluntary. However, the introduction of activation requirements, and 
related sanctions, invalidates this assumption. In light of this, and bearing in mind the 
evidence produced by this thesis, one can make an argument for the need to close the gap 
between the recipients’ net income and the poverty line.
Another relevant contribution is related to the impact of sanctions on the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes. Although it does not include schemes that do not impose 
sanctions on GMI recipients, this study nonetheless provides a first attempt to develop a 
comparative analysis of the impact of sanctions in the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes. Not only that, this study shows that more repressive sanction regimes are not 
more effective in returning recipients back to the labour market. If anything, reflecting on 
the French RMI and the Portuguese RMG, one can argue that sanction regimes should 
have a more progressive character as to enable social workers to make a more effective use 
of them.
Fourthly, this thesis shows how the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes must be 
analysed in the context of the structures that secure their implementation. As mentioned 
earlier, decentralised schemes (hence more discretionary) can only be more effective by 
putting more restrictions on the recipients’ freedom to choose other activities besides paid 
employment or to choose the job they wish to perform. More centralised schemes, on the 
other hand, can be effective, even if they give recipients more freedom to choose the job 
they want. Furthermore, the evidence on the French RMI and the Portuguese RMG seems 
to suggest that schemes that depend on the coordination of different agencies will be less 
effective at returning recipients to the labour market.
Finally, this thesis shows that the requirements of fairness and effectiveness are not 
necessarily contradictory. In what the cases under analysis are concerned, the thesis shows
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that, with the exception of the recipients’ freedom to choose other activities besides paid 
employment, much of the dimensions that measure the respect for the individuals’ Right to 
Personal Development do not harm the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes. 
However, rather than arguing for the possibility of restricting the individuals’ freedom to 
choose, one should instead reflect on the centrality given to paid employment in the 
activation of GMI recipients.
Going back to the analysis of the main standpoints on the basis of the right to a minimum 
income, this thesis shows that the centrality given to paid employment as a form of 
reciprocating the support of society reflects a certain view of society' where the market is 
assumed as the main mechanism of social regulation. The Right to Personal Development 
reflects a more comprehensive view of the functioning of society and a more critical view 
of the role of the market as a mechanism of social regulation. This provides the basis for a 
new understanding of activation policies. Rather than focusing on paid employment alone, 
this should cover a variety of activities that satisfy a social need, i.e., that fulfil a social 
function. Besides opening ways for a broader spectrum for the personal development of 
individuals, this would have a positive impact on the functioning of society, thus 
reinforcing social solidarity.
7.2. REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS
As with every other piece of research, it is necessary to look beyond the immediate results 
that have been produced. This section will discuss, first, the way in which the one can 
expand the knowledge on the relation between the employment effectiveness of GMI 
schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development. Second, it will consider 
ways of improving and expanding the role of this normative framework in the debate over 
the right to a minimum income. Thirdly, it will discuss how this thesis can contribute to the 
debate about the reform of the European welfare states.
7.2.1. POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE STUDY
The results produced by this thesis were limited by the restrictions in the data available to 
measure the transitions from GMI to work (see section 4.2.3). Hence, a data-source that
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would provide a larger number of cases, and for a longer period of analysis, would allow a 
number of improvements198. For instance, it would allow for the inclusion of schemes for 
which there are currently no reliable data, or even the use multiple-regression tools to 
analyse the relation between the schemes’ employment effectiveness and their respect for 
the Right to Personal Development.
Not only that, it would allow to test if the results produced here are confirmed when the 
analysis is focussed on specific groups of GMI recipients, such as heads of lone parent 
families, long-term unemployed or members of ethic minority groups. Furthermore, it 
would allow for a deepening of the analysis of how this relation is dependent on the type of 
activation programme that is offered to recipients. Finally, it would enable for the use of 
longer lags in the measurement of transitions from benefit to work, which, as the study 
developed by Bloom and Michalopolous shows (2001), could provide a more elaborate 
understanding of the impact of education/training programmes on the employment 
effectiveness of GMI schemes.
On a different level, one can also consider how different methodologies could be of use in 
the analysis of the relation between the schemes’ employment effectiveness and their 
respect for the Right to Personal Development. In particular, and bearing in mind the 
difficulties of the study developed by Dahl and Pedersen (2002), one option would be to 
develop a set of methodologically comparable quasi-experimental evaluations which 
would provide a labour market-adjusted measure of the schemes’ employment 
effectiveness.
7.2.2. EXPANDING THE STUDY OF THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN GMI SCHEMES
The Right to Personal Development has other implications in the debate on the right to a 
minimum income that have not been considered here. One aspect that requires further 
investigation concerns the type of minimum income scheme that can best support the 
individuals’ Right to Personal Development. In particular, it is necessary to investigate if
198 One option would be to use the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) introduced by the EU in 
2003 to replace ECHP (see Commission o f  the European Communities, 2003).
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the Right to Personal Development can be best protected by a means-tested guaranteed 
minimum income, or by an universal benefit similar to Atkinson’s ‘participation 
income’199 (Atkinson 1986). Not only that, further research should try to analyse to what 
degree the individuals’ Right to Personal Development can be enhanced by alternative 
redistributive policies, such as ‘stakeholder grants’200 proposed by Ackerman and Alstott 
(2006, p. 45), developmental grants (such as as ‘ACE accounts’201 proposed by Nissan and 
LeGrand (2006, p. 127)) or ‘universal citizen’s accounts’202 as proposed by Stuart White
(2006, p. 82).
Bearing in mind the suggestion made earlier (section 7.1.4.) that the activation of GMI 
recipients should reflect a broader understanding of the functioning of society, and of the 
activities that recipients can be asked to perform, further effort should be put in researching 
how GMI schemes enable individuals to pursue other forms of personal development 
besides paid employment. This entails a new understanding of the effectiveness of GMI 
schemes that captures the individuals’ ability to participate in education or training, to 
provide care or perform unpaid work in social economy organisations.
Furthermore, recognising the connection between the respect for the individuals’ Right to 
Personal Development and the promotion of social solidarity, further research should focus 
on the role of GMI schemes, whilst promoting the individuals’ Right to Personal 
Development, in reducing levels of crime, anti-social behaviour, family breakdown, 
suicide rates, etc., or improving the general level of life satisfaction.
199 Atkinson’s participation income consists o f  a basic income conditional on social participation. Here, all 
individuals working as an employee or self-employed, unable to work, unemployed but available for work, in 
education or training, providing care, undertaking voluntary work and above retirement age would be entitled 
to a minimum income (1996, p. 68-9).
200 Ackerman and Alstott propose that, in order to guarantee equality o f  opportunities, each individual who, 
at the age o f  21, has graduated from secondary education and has not committed any crime, should be 
entitled to a just share o f  the wealth created by previous generations (2006, p. 435).
201 In contrast with capital grants (as those proposed by Ackerman and Alstott (2006)) where individuals are 
completely free to spend their stake in whatever they want, developmental grants can only be spent on 
developmental, asset-building, purposes. Nissan and LeGrand’s Accumulation o f  Capital and Education 
(ACE) accounts consist o f  grants from which individuals’ would be allowed to draw money to pay for asset- 
building purposes, such as, education and training, business start-up costs o f housing down-payments (White 
2006, p. 78-9; LeGrand 2006, p. 127).
202 These accounts combine a generous developmental grant with a citizen’s income subjected to an 
(enlarged) work-test, which can only be enjoyed for a period o f two or three years over the life-course (White 
2006, p. 82).
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7.2.3. THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE REFORM OF 
WELFARE-STATES IN EUROPE
The persistence of structural unemployment that prompted the introduction of activation 
requirements in GMI schemes is one of the most visible symptoms of the difficulties 
experienced by advanced economies. As Ferrera and Rhodes argue (2000, p. 257), these 
difficulties require news ways of reconciling efficiency and equality, growth and 
redistribution, competitiveness and solidarity, fairness and effectiveness. This section will 
discuss the contribution of thesis to the debate about the reform of European welfare states. 
It will do so by confronting some of the most relevant standpoints in this debate (social 
investment, flexicurity and transitional labour markets) with the main findings of this 
thesis.
The notion of social investment, initially proposed by Giddens (1998), and further 
developed by Midgley (2001), has influenced the reform agenda pursued by the UK’ New 
Labour government and, less explicitly, the reform of EU policies (see Perkins, Nelms and 
Smyth 2004, p. 7-11). Underlying this notion is an attempt to reconcile the need for 
economic development with the promotion of social justice (see Midgley 2001, p. 158-9; 
Giddens 1998, p. 104-17). Although some attention is given to the need to preserve the role 
of the state in preventing the growth of inequality, and the exclusion of large groups of the 
population from the productive sphere, the objective is to shift the focus of welfare policies 
from redistribution and consumption, to the investment in peoples’ abilities and the 
enhancement of their capacity to participate in the productive economy.
• 203Despite some significant differences in the arguments posed by Giddens and Midgley , 
one can identify a set of common proposals that embody the notion of social investment. 
At the core of the social investment approach is the promotion of human capital formation, 
as a key lever for participation in the productive economy. This is to be complemented by 
other measures that facilitate economic participation, such as securing child-care, 
eliminating work disincentives in benefit systems, creating public or sheltered employment 
schemes for those with employability problems, or fostering the entrepreneurial spirit of
203 A particular difference concerns the role o f sanctions in the promotion o f  work availability for income 
support recipients. Where Giddens sees the use o f work requirements as eliminating the moral hazard 
associated to income benefits (see 1998, p. 122), Midgley argues that instead policy-makers should put more 
o f an effort into providing the skills needed to become economically active (see 2001, p. 159).
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unemployed persons. In addition, there is a particular emphasis on the role of local 
communities in the personal development of individuals. Finally, the social investment 
approach puts a significant focus on the need to improve the cost-effectiveness of welfare 
expenditure (see Midgley 2001, p. 159-66; Giddens 1998, p. 118-28).
As the previous paragraph showed, most of the strategies mentioned above can be broadly 
seen as enabling the individuals right to exploit their talents. However, as Gooding points 
out, this productivist approach is fundamentally concerned with the smooth supply of 
labour to the productive sectors of the economy (2001, p. 14). Hence, it is the requirement 
for effectiveness that will circumscribe the basis for the definition of fairness. In this 
context, even if it would support some of the strategies promoted by the social investment 
approach, this thesis provides a significant challenge to this standpoint. As the previous 
chapters show, putting a focus on respect for the individuals’ rights, in this case on their 
Right to Personal Development, does not necessarily reduce the supply of labour to the 
economy.
The concept of flexicurity can be seen as an attempt to reconcile the need for further 
flexibilisation of labour markets and work organisations, seen as a condition to improve 
competitiveness and promote economic growth, and the need for socio-economic security, 
seen as a means of preserving social cohesion in European societies (see Wilthagen 2003, 
p. 2-4). Although it can be traced back to the reform of the Dutch labour market in the 
1990s, the concept of flexicurity has become influential across Europe. For instance, the 
European Employment Strategy encourages social partners to negotiate strategies that 
allow companies to achieve an adequate balance between flexibility and security (Council 
of the European Union 2003, p. 18).
As Wilthagen shows (2004), flexicurity policies can be analysed as trade-offs between 
various forms of flexibility204 and security205. Although, it does not set the requirement for
204 The flexibility side o f  this binomium refers to the employers ability to adjust the number o f  employees to 
existing needs (internal numerical flexibility), to adjust the number and distribution o f  working hours 
(external numerical flexibility), to move their employees from one task or department to another, or to 
change the content o f  their work (functional flexibility) and to adjust wages to existing competitive 
conditions (externalisation flexibility) (Tangian 2004, p. 16).
205 Security here, refers to the protection o f  employees against dismissal and significant changes o f  working 
conditions (job security), the ability o f  individuals to remain at work, even if  not the same employer 
(employment/employability security), income protection out o f  work (income security) and the ability to
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economic effectiveness as the main criteria for the definition of social rights, the notion of 
flexicurity still assumes that the two dimensions are fundamentally contradictory. This 
thesis contradicts that idea. For instance, the thesis shows that satisfying the individuals’ 
income needs (income security) does not necessarily reduce their availability to work, nor 
the companies’ external numerical flexibility.
The notion of ‘transitional labour markets’ (TLM) was introduced by Gunther Schmid 
(1998), and has been receiving growing attention in political and academic circles. The 
author sees transitional labour markets, together with increased economic growth as the 
solution to the unemployment problem that have troubled European economies for the past 
two decades (Schmid 1998, p. 1-2). Underlying the notion of TLM is an innovative 
understanding of the meaning of full-employment in modem economies. Schmid sees full- 
employment as a situation where both men and women are expected, throughout their life 
course, to work an average of 30 hours per week. Rather than a mere reduction in the 
working time individuals are expected to perform, this new understanding includes periods 
of ‘transitional unemployment’, and various forms of ‘transitional employment’, such as 
short-term work, part time work, training and retraining, sabbaticals, parental or career 
leaves. Transitional labour markets consist of the institutional arrangements that make 
transitional employment available (Schmid 1998, p. 4-5).
In order to achieve this objective, ‘good’ transitional labour markets should follow the 
following criteria:
• Equipping individuals with the necessary resources to adjust successfully to critical 
events (empowerment);
• Supporting transitions back to the regular labour market by activating income 
benefits and making work pay (sustainable employment and income);
• Provide a new balance between centralised regulations and self-organisation 
(flexible co-ordination);
• Involving civil society in the fight against unemployment, by stimulating local 
networks and promoting public-private-partnerships (co-operation) (Schmid 1998,
p. 10).
combine paid employment with other social responsibilities, namely the provision o f  care (combination 
security) (Tangian 2004, p. 17).
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In contrast with previous standpoints, the TLM approach, in valuing employment both as a 
source of social integration and as a means to promote economic growth, does provide a 
consistent attempt to reconcile the requirements of fairness and effectiveness. However, 
this framework still fails to recognise that individual rights are supposed to protect the 
individuals’ right to develop their abilities, rather than just adjusting to critical events. 
Nonetheless, one can argue that the TLM approach, in providing a more comprehensive 
view of the interaction between labour markets and other social systems, provides an 
interesting background for the integration of this thesis in the debate over the reform of 
European welfare states.
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ANNEXES
ANNEX 1 -  DISPOSABLE INCOME AS A PROPORTION OF
THE POVERTY LINE
Annex 1 -  D isposab le  Incom e a s  a  p ro p o r tio n  o f  the P o verty  Line
1. METHODOLOGY FOR BENEFIT COMPARISON
The purpose here is to evaluate to what degree the schemes under analysis provide the 
necessary income for beneficiaries to satisfy their basic consumption needs. First of all, it 
is necessary to determine the threshold that can be considered as the necessary amount to 
satisfy the needs of a given individual. As the issue here is that of basic consumption 
needs, I would argue that this threshold should be set at the level of the poverty line of the 
country under analysis (quote). In order to avoid going into the debate over the use of 
absolute or relative measures of poverty, I decided to use the Poverty Line currently used 
by the European Union for policy and statistical issues: 60% of the median equivalised 
income of the country they live in (Eurostat 2003: 1). In order to get the values of the 
poverty line for each case, I used ECHP data.
The second step in this analysis will be to define the terms of the comparative exercise. I 
decided to compare the disposable income of different households. In order to reinforce the 
reliability of my comparative exercise I chose to use household models that have been used 
in similar studies (see Eardley et al. 1996). In order to improve the analytical potential of 
my analysis I introduced a number of restrictions on my family models:
I used adult individuals aged 40. On the one side, this will allow me to exclude young 
adults who, in some countries, have lower benefit rates; Furthermore, this will allow me to 
exclude older beneficiaries who might be entitled to non-contributory social pensions;
I opted to include a child in pre-school and a school aged school in order to capture the 
impact of the benefit rates of family allowances in the family disposable income (see 
Eardley etal. 1996)
I chose not to include a large household, as these are not relevant in the population of 
social assistance beneficiaries (Kuivalainen 2003: 133).
Bearing in the previous criteria, this comparative study I will compare four household 
types:
• Single Person, aged 40
• Lone Parent with 2 Children (first child to be 7 and the second child 3 years old)
• Couple (both aged 40) without Children
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• Couple (both aged 40) with 2 Children (first child to be 7 and the second child 3 
years old)
In order to calculate the value of the poverty line for different households, I used the 
‘modified’ OECD equivalence scale, which is also used by the EU for policy and statistical 
issues (Eurostat 2003: 1). This scale gives a weight of 1.0 to the first adult, 0.5 to any other 
household member aged 14 and over and 0.3 to each child.
The next step of this endeavour is to determine what is the amount an individual/household 
Total Net Disposable Family Income (TNDFI). The TNDFI of families on Guaranteed 
Minimum Income will be calculated in the following terms:
TNDFI = (Guaranteed Minimum Income Benefit + Family Allowances) - Taxation (where 
appropriate)
One should point some specificities of my notion of Total Net Disposable Family Income. 
First of all, there is the issue of housing costs. These are important difficulties associated 
with the measuring of housing costs and their implications as these vary with the structure 
of the household, the age and the location of dwellings (Kuivalainen 2003: 133). This is 
further complicated by the way different schemes cover housing costs (see Section 1.4). In 
light of this, and aware of the bias that this will introduce in the comparison of income 
packages in the different countries, I decided to exclude housing costs from the calculation 
of the TNDFI of Guaranteed Minimum Income beneficiaries.
The second issue concerns the inclusion of childcare costs. As mentioned earlier, I decided 
to include pre-school children in my some of my family models. This poses the question of 
whether to include childcare costs in my notion of TNDFI. The problem here is one of lack 
of information. As Bradshaw and Finch demonstrate, there is a lack of comparable 
information on the provision of pre-school childcare. This is related with the high 
percentages of private and informal provision, and with its local character (2002: 80). In 
light of this, I decided not to include childcare costs in my notion of TNDFI.
Finally, it is necessary to specify the economic situation of the families under analysis. 
Here I will use a ‘worst case scenario’ assumption (Ditch et all 1996). Hence, beneficiaries 
will have no income from work or unemployment benefits. Furthermore, they will not
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receive any income from earnings or capital. Their only source of additional income would 
be family benefits .
In order to compare the performance of the different schemes, I will classify the score for 
each case in terms of the difference of the TNDFI for each household in relation to the 
Poverty Line. Hence, the further away the amount of the TNDFI is from the Poverty line 
the more penalised the scheme will be.
Table 2 -  Poverty-line for single person
Poverty Line
BSHG 97 1410.20
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Table 2 -  TNDFI for single person, aged 40
B SH G 97 B SH G 99 SB97 SB98 A B W 9 7 A B W 9 9 RM I98
A. Social A ssistance Benefit
B. H ousing Benefits (where
available) 






















D . A m ount before Taxes 
(A +B +C )
538.00 546.00 6825.00 7104.00 1314.91 1399.50 2429.42
E. Taxation (%) (where 
appropriate) 
















G. (T N D F I)T otal N e t D isposable  
Family Incom e (D-F)
538.00 546.00 5118.75 5328.00 1314.91 1399.50 2429.42
H. Poverty Line 1410.20 1437.75 6726.13 7063.78 1326.00 1418.62 4482.24
I. T N D F I/P L  (G /H ) 0.38 0.38 0.76 0.75 0.99 0.99 0.54
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Table 2 -  TNDFI for single person, aged 40 (cont.)
R M G 98 S W A 9 8 TTK 97 TTK 99 JSA97 JSA 99
A . Social A ssistance Benefit 22100.0 283.40 2021.00 2047.00 229.37 239.87
B. H ousing Benefits (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
available)
C. Family A llow ances 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D . A m ount before Taxes 22100.0 283.40 2021.00 2047.00 229.37 239.87
(A +B +C )
E. Taxation (%) (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate)
F. A m ou nt D educted  (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate) (E*D)
G. (T N D F I)T otal N e t D isposable 22100.0 283.40 2021.00 2047.00 229.37 239.87
Family Incom e (D-F)
H . Poverty Line 56364.88 403.74 3734.60 4037.70 446.03 467.30
I. T N D F I/P L  (G /H ) 0.39 0.70 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.51
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Table 3 -  TNDFI for Lone Parent (aged 40) with 2 children aged 7 and 3
B SH G 97 B SH G 99 SB97 SB98 A B W 9 7 A B W 9 9 R M I98
A. Social A ssistance Benefit 1183.60 1201.20 9100.00 9472.00 1690.58 1799.33 4399.97
B. H ousing Benefits (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
available)
C. Family Allow ances 220.00 250.00 1400.00 1525.00 727.36 727.36 682.00
D . A m ount before Taxes 1403.60 1451.20 10500.00 10997.00 2417.94 2526.69 5081.97
(A +B +C )
E. Taxation (%) (where 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate)
F. A m ount D educted (where 0.00 0.00 2100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate) (E*D)
G. (T N D F I)T otal N e t D isposable 1403.60 1451.20 8400.00 10997.00 2417.94 2526.69 5081.97
Family Incom e (D-F)
H. Poverty Line 1410.20 1437.75 6726.13 7063.78 1326.00 1418.62 4482.24
I. Poverty Line (Lone Parent +  2) 2256.32 2300.40 10761.81 11302.05 2121.60 2269.79 7171.58
J. T N D F I/P L  (G /I) 0.62 0.63 0.78 0.97 1.14 1.11 0.71
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Table 3 -  TNDFI for Lone Parent (aged 40) with 2 children aged 7 and 3
R M G 98 S W A 9 8 T TK 97 TFK99 JSA 97 JSA99
A. Social A ssistance B enefit 42200.00 397.80 4689.00 4524.26 460.83 545.77
B. H ousing Benefits (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
available)
C. Family A llow ances 8400.00 60.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D . A m ount before T axes 50600.00 457.80 4689.00 4524.26 460.83 545.77
(A + B + C )
E. Taxation (%) (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate)
F. A m ount D educted  (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate) (E *D )
G. (T N D F I)T otal N e t D isposab le 50600.00 457.80 4689.00 4524.26 460.83 545.77
Family Incom e (D -F)
H. Poverty Line 56364.88 403.74 3734.60 4037.70 446.03 467.30
I. Poverty Line (Lone Parent +  2) 90183.81 645.98 5975.36 6460.32 713.64 747.68
J. T N D F I/P L  (G /I) 0.56 0.71 0.78 0.70 0.65 0.73
191
Annex 1 -  D isp o sa b le  Incom e as a  p ro p o r tio n  o f  the P o verty  Line
Table 4 -  TNDFI for couple (both aged 40) with no children
B SH G 97 B SH G 99 SB 97 SB98 A B W 9 7 A B W 9 9 R M I98
A . Social A ssistance Benefit 968.40 982.80 13650.00 14208.00 1878.50 1999.25 3671.14
B. H ousing Benefits (where available) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C. Family A llow ances 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D . A m m ount before Taxes (A +B +C ) 968.40 982.80 13650.00 14208.00 1878.50 1999.25 3671.14
E. Taxation (%) (where appropriate) 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00
F. A m ount D educted  (where 0.00 0.00 4368.00 4546.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate) (E*D)
G. (T N D F I)T otal N e t D isposable 968.40 982.80 9282.00 9661.44 1878.50 1999.25 3671.14
Family Incom e (D-F)
H. Poverty Line 1410.20 1437.75 6726.13 7063.78 1326.00 1418.62 4482.24
I. Poverty Line (Couple N o  Children) 2115.30 2156.63 10089.20 10595.67 1989.00 2127.93 6723.36
J. T N D F I /P L  (G /I) 0.46 0.46 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.55
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Table 4 -  TNDFI for couple (both aged 40) with no children (cont.)
R M G 98 SW A98 TTK 97 T TK 99 JSA97 JSA99
A . Social Assistance Benefit 42200.00 456.73 3436.00 3480.00 360.03 376.37
B. H ou sing  Benefits (where available) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C. Family A llow ances 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
D . A m m ount before Taxes (A +B +C ) 42200.00 456.73 3436.00 3480.00 360.03 376.37
E. Taxation (%) (where appropriate) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F. A m ount D educted  (where 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
appropriate) (E*D)
G . (T N D F I)T otal N et D isposable 42200.00 456.73 3436.00 3480.00 360.03 376.37
Family Incom e (D-F)
H. Poverty Line 56364.88 403.74 3734.60 4037.70 446.03 467.30
I. Poverty Line (Couple N o  Children) 84547.33 605.61 5601.90 6056.55 669.04 700.95
J. T N D F I/P L  (G /I) 0.50 0.75 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.54
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Table 5 -  TNDFI for couple (both aged 40) with two children, aged 7 and 3
BSH G P7 B SH G 99 SB97 SB98 A B W 9 7 A B W 9 9 RM I98
A. Social Assistance Benefit
B. H ousing Benefits (where available) 






















D . A m m ount before Taxes (A +B +C ) 1807.10 1860.70 19600.00 20469.00 2605.86 2726.61 5810.80
E. Taxation (%) (where appropriate) 
















G. (T N D F I)T otal N et D isposable  
Family Incom e (D-F)
1807.10 1860.70 13132.00 13714.23 2605.86 2726.61 5810.80
H. Poverty Line 















J. T N D F I/P L  (G /I) 0.61 0.62 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.62
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Table 5 -  TNDFI for couple (both aged 40) with two children, aged 7 and 3 (cont.)
R M G 98 S W A 9 8 T TK 97 T TK 99 J S A 9 7 JS A 99
A. Social A ssistance B enefit
B. H ousing  Benefits (where available) 



















D . A m m ount before Taxes (A + B + C ) 74700.00 631.13 6104.00 5957.26 568.17 557.43
E. Taxation (%) (where appropriate) 







0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
G. (T N D F I)T otal N e t D isposable  
Family Incom e (D-F)
74700.00 631.13 6104.00 5957.26 568.17 557.43
H. Poverty Line 













J. T N D F I/P L  (G /I) 0.63 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.61 0.57
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2. NOTES FOR COUNTRIES
2.1. BSHG97
2.1.1. GMI BENEFIT
The average monthly standard rate for the head-of-household or assistance recipients living 
alone in effect since July 1, 1997 (“basic standard rate”) is DM 538 for the Lander of the 
former territory and DM 519 for the new Lander, including east-Berlin. The standard rates 
for household members are a percentage of the basic standard rate:
• 100 % reference amount ("Eckregelsatz") for the head of the household as well as 
for a person living alone.
• 80 % for adult members of the household..
• 50 % for child aged under 7.
• 55 % for child aged under 7 who lives with one person who is solely responsible
for upbringing.
• 65 % for child aged 7 - 14 .
• 90 % for child aged 14 -  18.(Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 5 and
MISSOC 1998).
Here I will use the values for the Older Lander:
• Single person = 538
• Lone parent + 2 children = 538 + 538 * 55% + 538 * 65% = 538 + 295.9 + 349.7 =
1183.6
• Couple no children = 538 + 538 * 80% = 538 + 430.4 = 968.4
• Couple with 2 children= 538 + 538 * 80% + 538 * 65% + 538 * 50% = 538 + 430.4
+ 349.7 + 269 = 1587.1
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2.1.2. FAMILY BENEFITS
Family allowance is not income-related and is awarded in the form of a monthly tax refund 
(see section 10). In certain instances, parents who are not subject to income tax liability are 
paid their family allowance as a monthly social security benefit. It is staggered by the 
number of children. The rates applying since 1 January 1997 are:
• One or two children - DM 220/month
• Three children- DM 300/month
• Four or more children - DM 350/month (Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 
1997: 7)
2.1.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
Costs for adequate housing and heating are completely covered; housing benefit (including 
flat-rate allowances) is taken into account in the means-test.
2.1.4. TAXATION
Not taxable (Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 7).
2.2. BSHG97
2.2.1. GMI BENEFIT
The average monthly standard rate for the head-of-household or assistance recipients living 
alone in effect since July 1, 1999 ("basic standard rate") is DEM 546 for the Lander the 
former territory and DEM 527 for the new Lander, including east-Berlin. The standard 
rates for household members are a percentage of the basic standard rate. They amount to:
• 100 % reference amount ("Eckregelsatz") for the head of the household as well as 
for a person living alone.
• 80 % for adult members of the household..
• 50 % for child aged under 7.
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• 55 % for child aged under 7 who lives with one person who is solely responsible 
for upbringing.
• 65 % for child aged 7 -14 .
• 90 % for child aged 14 -  18. (Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 5 and
MISSOC 1998).
Here I will use the values for the Older Lander:
• Single person = 546
• Lone parent + 2 children = 546 + 546 * 55% + 546 * 65% = 546 + 300.3 + 354.9 = 
1201.2
• Couple no children = 546 + 546 * 80% = 546 + 436.8 = 982.8
• Couple with 2 children= 546 + 546 * 80% + 546 * 65% + 546 * 50% = 546 + 436.8
+ 354.9 + 273 = 1610.7
2.2.2. FAMILY BENEFITS
Family allowance is not income-related and is awarded in the form of a monthly tax 
refund. In
certain instances, parents who are not subject to income tax liability are paid their family 
allowance as a monthly social security benefit. It is staggered by the number of the 
children. The rates applying since 1 January 1999 are:
• One or two children - DM 250/month
• Three children- DM 300/month
• Four or more children - DM 350/month (Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 
1997: 7)
2.2.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
Costs for adequate housing and heating are completely covered; housing allowance 
(including flat-rate allowances) is taken into account in the means-test.
2.2.4. TAXATION
Not taxable (Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 7).
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2.3. SB97
2.3.1. GMI BENEFIT
The benefits are calculated for the individual. They amount to 80 per cent of the maximum 
unemployment insurance benefit for those with dependent children, and 60 per cent for 
others. Social assistance is reduced to Dkr 4489 per month for those aged under 25 and 
living alone (exemptions for those who have earned a substantial income.) (Benefit 
Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 3-4).
Maximum unemployment benefit in 1997: Dkr 11375 (Dkr 2 625 per week) (Benefit 
Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 2):
• Single person - 60 % of maximum unemployment benefit -  11375 * 60% = 6825
• Lone parent + 2 children -  80% of maximum unemployment benefit = 11375 * 
80% = 9100
• Couple no children - 2 x 60 % of maximum unemployment benefit - 2 x 6825 = 
13650
• Couple with 2 children: 2 x 80 % of maximum unemployment benefit - 2 x 9100 = 
18200
2.3.2. FAMILY ALLOWANCES
Amount of the general family allowances per year is:
• For child 0 - 2 years: DKR 10 500
• For child 3 -6  years: DKR 9 400
• For child 7 - 1 7  years: DKR 7 400 (Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1997:5)
This means that per month families will receive the following amounts:
• For child 0 -2  years: DKR 875
• For child 3 - 6 years: DKR 783.33
• For child 7 - 17 years: DKR 616.67
Final Value = 783.33 + 616.67 = 1400
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2.3.3. HOUSING BENEFIT
Social assistance amounts can be increased to cover rent payments. Rent in excess of an 
individual’s own payment is covered through housing accommodation allowances.
2.3.4. TAXATION
Recipients of social assistance (SA) benefits neither pay the 8 per cent social security, the 
unemployment insurance contribution nor the supplementary pension scheme contributions 
(Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 3).
Yet, Income from social assistance are taxed. The rate of taxation varies according to the 
structure of household (tax rates for 1999):
• Single person -  25%
• Lone parent + 2 children -  20%
• Couple no children -  32%
• Couple with 2 children -  33% SOCASST (report 3) 2001: 14, 44-45)
2.4. SB98
2.4.1. GMI BENEFIT
The starting point of the assessment of the guarantee of resources amount is (for parents) 
80% of the maximum unemployment benefit and 60% of this maximum for persons with 
no children (MISSOC 1998)
Maximum unemployment benefit in 1998: 2690 per week; 11840 per month (MISSOC 
1998):
• Single person - 60 % of maximum unemployment benefit -  11840 * 60% = 7104
• Lone parent + 2 children -  80% of maximum unemployment benefit = 11840 *
80% = 9472
• Couple no children - 2 x 60 % of maximum unemployment benefit - 2 x 7104 = 
14208
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• Couple with 2 children: 2 x 80 % of maximum unemployment benefit - 2 x 9472 = 
18944
2.4.2. FAMILY ALLOWANCE
Amount of the general family allowances per year is:
• For child 0 -2  years: DKR 11 300
• For child 3 - 6 years: DKR 10 200
• For child 7 - 17  years: DKR 8 100 (Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1999: 51)
This means that per month families will receive the following amounts:
• For child 0 - 2 years: DKR 941.66
• For child 3 -6  years: DKR 850
• For child 7 - 17  years: DKR 675
Final Value = 850 + 675 = 1525
2.4.3. HOUSING
Social assistance amounts can be increased to cover rent payments. Rent in excess of an 
individual’s own payment is covered through housing accommodation allowances.
2.4.4. TAXATION
Recipients of social assistance (SA) benefits neither pay the 8 per cent social security, the 
unemployment insurance contribution nor the supplementary pension scheme contributions 
(Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1997: 3).
Yet, Income from social assistance are taxed. The rate of taxation varies according to the 
structure of household (tax rates for 1999):
• Single person -  25%
1 As there where discrepancies with the values o f MISSOC 1998, it was decided to used the Benefit Systems and Work Incentives 1999 
data.
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• Lone parent + 2 children -  20%
• Couple no children -  32%
• Couple with 2 children -  33% SOCASST (report 3) 2001: 14, 44-45)
2.5. ABW97
2.5.1. GMI BENEFIT
The Dutch national government specifies three minimum basic benefit payment rates. 
There are three basic rates related to family composition:
Table 6 - Guaranteed Minimum Income basic benefit payment rates in Netherlands
Family situation Proportion of the 
subsistence minimum
Corresponding net yearly Corresponding net monthly
benefit (excl. holiday 
allowance)
benefit (excl. holiday 
allowance)
C ouples 100% 22 542 1878.50
L one parent 90% 20 287 1690.58
families
Single 23 or older 70% 15 779 1314.91
Based on Benefits and Wages, 1997, p. 4
Young people between 18 and 21 years of age are deemed to be in work, education or in 
the Youth Work Guarantee programme (JWG). Furthermore, until the age of 21 parents are 
supposed to provide financial support to young people. Therefore, municipalities are only 
obliged to provide benefits to applicants in this age group in exceptional circumstances.
Table 7 - Guaranteed Minimum Income basic benefit payment rates according to age
and household type in Netherlands
Family type Monthly allowance
<21 years w ith children single parent N ig  744.64
one is >21 years and one is married N ig  1743.42
<21
b oth  >21 years old married N ig  1089.77
<21 years and n o  children single N ig  345.13
married b oth  <21 years N ig  690.26
married on e> 21  one<21 N ig  1343.91
(Benefits and Wages 1997: 4)
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Here I will use values for individuals aged above 21. In light of this the benefit rates will 
be:
• Single person - 1314.91
• Lone parent + 2 children -  1690.58
• Couple no children - 1878.50
• Couple with 2 children - 1878.50
2.5.2. FAMILY ALLOWANCE
Children bom on or after 1 January 1995 (monthly values):
• up to 5 years: HFL 299.50
• from 6- 11 years: HFL 363.68
• from 12-17 years: HFL 427.86
Table 8 - Family allowances basic benefit payment rates according to age and 
household type in Netherlands (for children born before 2 October 1994)
Families with Age Groups
0-5 6-11 and 18-24 12-17
1 child 299.50 427.86 556.22
2 children 346.47 494.96 643.45
(Benefits and Wages 1997: 4)
Final value = 299.50 + 427.86 = 727.36
2.5.3. HOUSING BENEFIT
In principle: no; social assistance is an 'all-in'-amount, therefore housing cost should be 
covered by the granted amount. However, beneficiaries paying rent between HFL 335.42 
(ECU 151) and HFL 963.75 (ECU 433) per month are usually entitled to rent subsidy. This 
is a separate statutory arrangement which applies to tenants in general. Beneficiaries in 
private houses with accommodation expenses between HFL 335.42 (ECU 151) and HFL 
963.75 (ECU 433) per month, may receive a housing cost allowance at the same level as
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the rent subsidy. For accommodation expenses above HFL 963.75 (ECU 433) per month a 
temporary supplement may be awarded on condition that a cheaper dwelling is sought.
2.5.4. TAXATION
The level of general assistance is defined on its net value; a net income level is guaranteed. 
The income taxes on the social assistance benefit are not paid by the recipient, who thus 
receives a net benefit, but are transfered to the tax inspector by the municipality that is 
administering the benefit (benefits and Wages 1997: 5).
Hence the imputed value will be 0.
2.6. ABW99
2.6.1. GMI BENEFIT
The Dutch national government specifies three minimum basic benefit payment rates. 
There are three basic rates related to family composition:
Table 9 - Guaranteed Minimum Income basic benefit payment rates in Netherlands
Family situation Proportion of the 
subsistence minimum
Corresponding net yearly 
benefit (excl. holiday 
allowance)
Corresponding net monthly 
benefit (excl. holiday 
allowance)
C ouples 100% 23 991 1999.25
L one parent 90% 21 592 1799.33
families
Single 23 or older 70% 16 794 1399.50
Based on Benefits and Wages, 1999, p. 5
Young people between 18 and 21 years of age are deemed to be in work, education or in 
the Youth Work Guarantee programme (JWG). Furthermore, until the age of 21 parents are 
supposed to provide financial support to young people. Therefore, municipalities are only 
obliged to provide benefits to applicants in this age group in exceptional circumstances.
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Table 10 - Guaranteed Minimum Income basic benefit payment rates according to 
age and household type in Netherlands
Family type Monthly allowance
<21 years w ith children single parent N ig  745.28
one is >21 years and one is married N ig  1744.89
<21
both  >21 years old married N ig  1090.71
<21 years and no children single N ig  345.43
married both <21 years N ig  690.86
married one>21 one<21 N ig  1345.04
(Benefits and Wages 1999: 6)
Here I will use values for individuals aged above 21. In light of this the benefit rates will 
be:
• Single person - 1399.50
• Lone parent + 2 children -  1799.33
• Couple no children - 1999.25
• Couple with 2 children - 1999.25
2.6.2. FAMILY ALLOWANCE
Children bom on or after 1 January 1995:
• up to 5 years: HFL 321.92
• from 6-11 years: HFL 390.91
• from 12-17 years: HFL 459.89
Table 11 - Family allowances basic benefit payment rates according to age and 
household type in Netherlands (for children born before 2 October 1994)
Families with A.ye Groups
0-5 6-11 and 18-24 12-17
1 child 321.92 459.89 597.86
2 children 367.91 525.58 683.25
(Benefits and Wages 1999: 8)
Final value = 321.92 + 459.89= 727.36
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2.6.3. HOUSING BENEFIT
In principle, no. Social assistance is an 'all-in'-amount, therefore housing cost should be 
covered by the granted amount. However, in certain cases a person may be eligible for rent 
subsidy. Whether a person is eligible for rent subsidies depends, among other things, on his 
income, his rent, his assets and his age. A person can only apply for rent subsidy if his rent 
is between NLG 349 (EUR 158) and NLG 1,107 (EUR 502) per month. If a person 
chooses to live in an expensive dwelling when a less expensive dwelling is available, the 
government does not have to give him any rent subsidy.
2.6.4. TAXATION
The level of general assistance is defined on its net value; a net income level is guaranteed. 
The income taxes on the social assistance benefit are not paid by the recipient, who thus 
receives a net benefit, but are transferred to the tax inspector by the municipality that is 
administering the benefit (benefits and Wages 1999: 6).
Hence the imputed value will be 0.
2.7. RMI98
2.7.1. CALCULATION OF BENEFIT
Single person: basis amount.
This basis amount is increased by:
• 50% for the first additional person in the household;
• 30% for each person in addition to the first;
• 40% for each further person after the third person without taking into account the
partner or cohabitant (MISSOC 1998)
Single person -  2 429.42
Lone parent + 2 children -  2 429.42 + (2 429.42*0.5) + (2 429.42*0.3) = 2 429.42 + 1 
241.71 +728.83 = 4399.97
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Couple no children - 2 429.42 + (2 429.42*0.5) = 2 429.42 + 1 241.71 = 3671.14 
Couple with 2 children -  2 429.42 + (2 429.42*0.5) + (2 429.42*0.3) + (2 429.42*0.3) = 2 
429.42 + 1 241.71 + 728.83 + 728.83= 5128.8
2.7.2. FAMILY ALLOWANCE
Family benefits are only payable to families with at the least two children (Wages and 
benefits, 1999: 11): 2 children: FF 6822
2.7.3. HOUSING BENEFIT
Extension of entitlement to social housing allowance (allocation logement) to all RMI 
recipients; the differential allowance of the RMI is not taken into account when 
determining resources in housing allowance matters
2.7.4. TAXATION




• 100% of the amount of the old-age social pension is awarded for each adult up to 
the second;
• 70% of the amount of the old-age social pension is awarded for each adult from the 
third;
• 50% of the amount of the old-age social pension is awarded for each minor.
2 The information in MISSOC 1998 and Wages and Benefits 1999 is not consistent. Hence I am using the value mentioned by MISSOC 
1998, as it is the only source o f  information for the year under o f  analysis.
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Old Age social pension in 1998 was PTE 22,100 (MISSOC 1998):
• Single person -  22 100
• Lone parent + 2 children -  22 100 + (22 100*0.5) + (22 100*0.5) = 22 100 + 11050 
+ 11050 =42 200
• Couple no children - 42 200
• Couple with 2 children -  66 300
2.8.2. FAMILY BENEFITS
The monthly family allowance amounts for children and young people correspond to those 
established for the first and second descendant within the first level category under the 
contributory social security schemes. The values, per child, refer to the 1st of January 
1998, (MISSOC 1998 Benefits and Wages 1997, 5).
Children over 12 months old:
• up to the second child: ESC 4,200
• from third child on: ESC 6,300
Family benefit= 4200 + 4200 = 8400
2.8.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
There is no associated right for payment of housing costs. Beneficiaries can nonetheless 
apply to a means-tested housing benefit scheme.
2.8.4. TAXATION
Benefits are not subject to taxation (MISSOC 200).
2.9. SWA98
2.9.1. GMI CALCULATION
• Single person: IR£ 283.40
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• Single parent family with two children: IR£ 397.80
• Couple without children: IR£ 456.73
• Couple with 2 children: IR£ 571.13
All child dependants are treated the same (IR£ 13.20 (ECU 17) per week), regardless of 
age (MISSOC 1998).
2.9.2. FAMILY BENEFITS
Amount for each child:
• 1st and 2nd child: IR£ 30.
• 3rd and subsequent children: IR£ 39 (MISSOC 1998)
2.9.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
No direct rights. But recipients may also qualify for rent supplements under the 
Supplementary Welfare Allowance scheme, Mortgage Interest relief under the taxation 
system or local authority differential rent schemes, where the rent payable depends on the 
income of the tenant(s) and the household circumstances.
2.9.4. TAXATION
Not taxable. (Wages and benefits, 1999: 5).
2.10. TTK97
2.10.1. GMI BENEFIT
• Single Person = 2 021
• Lone Parent family with (2) Children= 2021 + 1334 + 1334= 4689
• Couple without Children= 1718 + 1718= 3436
• Couple with (2) Children= 1718 + 1718 + 1334 + 1334 = 6104 (Benefits and
systems 1997: 5)
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2.10.2. FAMILY BENEFITS
Family benefits are taken into account in the means-test (Guibentif and Bouget 1997 
country questionnaire). Hence the imputed value will be 0.
2.10.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
The rates presented here are basic amounts for “every day living costs.” Additional 
socialassistance is granted to cover reasonable housing costs or other costs (such as health 
care, work-related expenses).
2.10.4.TAXATION
Not taxable (Benefits and Wages 1997: 5).
2.11. TTK99
2.11.1. GMI BENEFIT
• Single Person = 2 047
• Lone Parent family with (2) Children= 2 047 + 1 290 + 1187.26* = 4524.26
• Couple without Children= 1 740 + 1 740 = 3480
• Couple with (2) Children= 1 740 + 1 740 + 1 290 + 1187.26* = 5957.26
*If there are more than one child (0 -  17) in families the rates will be reduced. The rate of 
the second child will be 5 percentage points lower (e.g. 70 % -> 65 % or 63 % to 58 %of 
single rate) the rate of the third and subsequent child will be 10 percentage points lower 
(e.g. 70 ->  60 or 63 -> 53) (Benefits and Wages 1999: 5). Notice that this is not made 
explicit in 1997.
Notice that the value of the benefit rate for children has decreased in relation to 1997 
(Benefits and Wages 1999: 5)
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2.11.2. FAMILY BENEFITS
Family benefits are taken into account in the means-test (MISSOC 1999). Hence the 
imputed value will be 0.
2.11.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
The rates presented here are basic amounts for “every day living costs.” Additional 
socialassistance is granted to cover reasonable housing costs or other costs (such as health 
care, work-related expenses).
2.11.4. TAXATION
Not taxable (Benefits and Wages 1999: 6).
2.12. JSA97
2.12.1. GMI BENEFIT
There is a Personal Allowance and a Family premium of Lib 10.80 for couples and Lib 
15.80 for Lone Parent Families. (Benefits and Wages 1999: 3). The benefit is determined 
in the same terms of Income Support. The original values are refer to weekly benefit. The 
final values will be multiplied by 56 and then divided by 12.
Week values:
• Single Person (+25) = 49.15
• Couple without Children = 77.15
• Couple with (2) Children= 77.15+ 16.90 +16.90 = 110.95 + Family premium of Lib 
10.80 + 121.75
• Lone Parent family with (2) Children= 49.15 + 16.90 + 16.90 = 82.95 + Family 
premium of Lib 15.80 = 98.75
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Table 12 - GMI benefit payment rates in the UK
Week * 5 6 /  12
Single Person (+25) 49.15 2752.40 229.37
C ouple w ithout Children 77.15 4320.40 360.03
Couple with (2) Children 121.75 6818.00 568.17
L one Parent family with (2) Children^ 98.75 5530.00 460.83
2.12.2. FAMILY BENEFIT
Most income resources, most social security benefits and pension are taken fully into 
account. Benefits generally ignored include: Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit and 
non-contributory disability benefit. The main family allowance (i.e. Child Benefit) is taken 
into account as family income when determining the amount of Income Support/JSA 
(MISSOC 1998). The resources consist of the net income of the claimant and partner 
(including family benefits), subject to some disregards. Resources for income testing 
purposes are defined as gross earned income after tax and social security taxes, local taxes 
not included, plus unemployment benefits, Child Benefits, Lone Parent Benefits and 
Family Credit (Benefits and Wages 1997: 4-5). Hence, the value imputed will be 0.
2.12.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
There is no associated right for payment of housing costs. Income Support can provide 
help with certain housing costs, including mortgage interest payments and with some 
residential care and nursing home charges that are not met by Housing Benefit. However, 
Income Support/JSA beneficiaries are entitled to the maximum rate of Council Tax Benefit 
and Housing Benefit.
2.12.4. TAXATION
Only the personal allowance is taxable. Tax is not deducted from the personal allowance, 
but when the recipient moves into paid employment the benefit they received is taken into 
account when assessing tax liabilities (Benefits Systems 1997: 3).
The tax system is structure so that a year-long beneficiary will pay no tax (Benefit Systems 
and Work Incentives 1998: 27). Hence the imputed value will be 0
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2.13. JSA99
2.13.1. GMI BENEFIT
There is a Personal Allowance and a Family premium of 13.90 for couples, and 15.75 for 
Lone Parent Families. (Benefits Systems 2001: 3). The benefit is determined in the same 
terms of Income Support. The original values are refer to weekly benefit. The final values 
will be multiplied by 56 and then divided by 12.
Week values:
• Single Person (+25) = 51.40
• Couple without Children = 80.65
• Couple with (2) Children= 80.65 + 24.90 + 24.90 + 13.90 (Family premium) =
• Lone Parent family with (2) Children= 51.40 + 24.90 + 24.90 + 15.75 (Family 
premium and Lone Parent premium)
Table 13 - GMI benefit payment rates in the UK
Week * 5 6 /  12
Single Person (+25) 51.4 2878.40 239.87
C ouple w ithout Children 80.65 4516.40 376.37
C ouple with (2) Children 119.45 6689.20 557.43
L one Parent family with (2) Children^ 116.95 6549.20 545.77
2.13.2. FAMILY BENEFIT
The main family allowance (i.e. Child Benefit) is taken into account as family income 
when determining the amount of Income Support/JSA (MISSOC 1999). The resources 
consist of the net income of the claimant and partner (including family benefits), subject to 
some disregards. Income other than earnings, including most other social security benefits 
and tax credits, are normally taken fully into account and reduce benefit penny for penny 
(Benefits and Wages 1999: 5). Hence the value imputed is 0.
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2.13.3. HOUSING BENEFITS
There is no associated right for payment of housing costs. Income Support can provide 
help with certain housing costs, including mortgage interest payments and with some 
residential care and nursing home charges that are not met by Housing Benefit. However, 
Income Support/JSA beneficiaries are entitled to the maximum rate of Council Tax Benefit 
and Housing Benefit.
2.13.4. TAXATION
Income Support is not taxable. (Benefits and Wages 1999: 6).
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E m ploym ent
(N ot available)
N ew  D eal for  





unem ployed people  
and other socially 
excluded groups
U nem ployed, Y oun g  
U nem ployed
Public sector and voluntary organisations receive grants to support projects that respond to a clearly 
identified com m unity need, to do w orthw hile w ork w hich  otherw ise could n ot be undertaken, and 
w hich also develop the work skills o f  participants. T he programm e covers tw o different options. 
T he part-time Integration O ption is targeted at long-term  unem ployed w ith reasonable prospects o f  
em ploym ent. Participation will normally be for one year and an enhanced training elem ent w ill be 
phased in for participants. T he part-time Job O ption  is targeted at older, very long-term  
unem ployed w ith poor em ploym ent prospects. Participants on  this option  will have an annual 
contract o f  em ploym ent, renewable for up to three years subject to availability o f  a place (Collins
2000, p. 16).
This is intended to provide work experience to N D Y P  recipients by allowing them to participate in  
projects/activities organised by organisations o f  the voluntary sector (which includes voluntary  
organisations, small com m unity based groups and ethnic minority organisations). Projects should  
increase the ability o f  organisations to  im prove their services, im prove com m unity relations, 
com m unity safety and avoid the risk o f  re-offending or drug use by young people. In certain cases 
this work placem ent can take place w ith an em ployer in  the labour market. T he later cases should  
n ot extend 8 weeks; T hese projects also involve a job search and training com ponents (D itch and
Roberts 2000, p. 29-33).
1 Under the Employment and Training Act 1973 (section 2), the Secretary o f State (for employment) has discretionary powers to set up, fund and administer employment and training programmes without the need for further secondary 
legislation.
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N ew  D eal for 
Y oung P eo p le / 
N ew  D eal + 25 , 
- Subsidised  
Jobs O ption
(N ot available)2
E m ploym ent 
Subsidy to  
municipalities
E m ploym ent 
D ecree  
(1363/1997), 
E m ploym ent 
A ct (275/1987).
U nem ployed, Y oung  
U nem ployed
Long-term  
unem ployed, youth, 
disabled and older.
In addition, there is an ‘option. H ere, em ployers receive a subsidy o f  £15  per w eek to  support the 
cost o f  hiring N D Y P  recipients. Em ployers are expected to provide training and, in the case the 
participants show  the necessary qualities, to  o ffer a job at the end o f  the internship stage. There is 
an additional £ 7 5 0  subsidy to support training costs. They are n ot allowed to  displace existing  
em ployees or to make cash-gains w ith the job subsidy they receive. The salary they receive m ust be 
at the least equal to the subsidy given  to the em ployers. T he training com pon en t m ust be at the
least on e day a w eek (D itch and Roberts 2000, p. 29-33).
T he labour office can also support for up to 10 m onths to municipalities, other non-profit 
organisations w ho take on  a registered unem ployed person. T he subsidy is payable in respect o f  
em ploym ent w hich is full-time or at least 85% o f  normal full-time hours in the sector and for a
m aximum o f  5 days per week.
D uring the job, the new  em ployee may take part in additional actions such as training, 
rehabilitation or other measures to prom ote employability that w ill have been  agreed previously in  
their individual action plan. T he em ploym ent subsidy w ill n o t be paid during these other activities. 
In total, the actions may last up to 24 m onths but the subsidy is payable only for a m axim um  o f  10 
_______________________________________ m onths (European E m ploym ent Observatory 2002a, p. 75).
2 Under the Employment and Training Act 1973 (section 2), the Secretary o f State (for employment) has discretionary powers to set up, fund and administer employment and training programmes without the need for further secondary 
legislation.
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Em ploym ent 
schem e for 
unem ployed  
persons in need
D ecree 1 9 2 /9 6  
o f  30.5.96
Solidarity 
E m ploym ent 
Contract 
(Contract 
E m ploi 
Solidarite - 
CES)
D ecree n°90- 
105 o f  30  
January 1990; 
D ecree n°98- 
1108 o f  9 
D ecem ber  
1998
U nem ployed
Hard to em ploy groups, 
especially RM I recipients 
w h o have been out o f  
w ork for m ore than a 
year.
This programme allows public or private charitable institutions, to hire unem ployed persons to o  
jobs that serve com m unity needs (existing jobs may n ot be filled under this schem e). T he  
remuneration is co-financed by the em ployer and the IE FP, w hich contributes betw een 80 and 
100% for the first six m onths and betw een 60 and 80% for the follow ing six m onths. T he  
em ploym ent runs for up to one year, w hich  may be extended by an additional year under certain
circum stances (European E m ploym ent Observatory 2002b, p. 133).
The purpose is to create em ploym ent opportunities for unem ployed individuals, w hilst satisfying  
unm et needs in local com m unities. T his measure allows public entities (with the exception  o f  local 
authorities) and non-profit organisations to hire individuals on  a part-time basis (m aximum 20 
hours p /w eek ) for a period betw een three m onths and tw o years (three years In exceptional cases).
The recipient will receive a salary equal to  half the m inim um  wage for the non-profit sector. A s 
these schem es are targeted at the hard to  em ploy, they m ight include a training com ponent. H ence, 
recipients m ight receive supplementary training to obtain som e qualifications during the tim e they  
are not at work. T he State w ill cover up to 200 hours o f  training per CES em ployee. T he state w ill 
bears 90% o f  wage costs associated w ith this jobs . Em ployers w ill also be exem pted from  all 
welfare contributions other than unem ploym ent insurance prem ium s (Gautrat, Fraisse and B ucollo
2000, p. 24-5, Enjolras et al. 2000, p. 59-60, Fraisse 1999, p. 7).
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C onsolidated  
E m ploym ent 
Contacts 
(Contract 
E m p loi 
C onsolide — 
CEC)
Law n° 92-722  
o f  29 July 1992; 
D ecree n°92- 
1076 o f  2 
O ctober 1992; 
D ecree n°94- 
265 o f  5 A pril 
1994; D ecree  
n°98-1109 o f  9 
D ecem ber  
1998.
P eople leaving a CES 
contract (Contrat 
em ploi solidarite - 
measure F-39) w ithout 
any option  in terms o f  
em ploym ent or 
training., som e young  
people w ith particular 
problem s o f  
integration, persons 
on  basic social
U p until 1998, it allowed that individuals w h o  had concluded their CES contract and w ere still facing 
difficulties to find a job or training to  be hired by public bodies (including local authorities) and n on­
profit organisations. A fter 1998, the target group was extended to include unem ployed individuals 
registered w ith the A N P E  for at the least 12 o f  the preceding 18 m onths, unem ployed individuals aged 
over 50 w ho are unem ployed for m ore than a year, disabled individuals, individuals betw een 18 and 25 
w ho are n ot able to get a job and RMI recipients w ho have been out o f  w ork for m ore than a year. In the 
case o f  individuals betw een 18 and 25, only local authorities are entitled to  make use o f  this measure. 
Em ployers w ill be exem pted from  the paym ent o f  social security contributions. T he state w ill also fund 
part o f  the recipients salary, for a period no  longer than five years. Recipients can be em ployed under full 
or part-time contracts. T hese can also be open-ended or fixed-term. (Gautrat, Fraisse and B ucollo 2000,
p. 25-6).
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E m ploi - CIE)
D ecree n°95- 
925 o f  19 
A ugust 1995; 
D ecree n°96- 
435 o f  22 May 
1996; D ecree  




A ct on  an 
active labour 
market policy, 
no. 1199 o f  27 
D ecem b er 1993
L ong term  
unem ployed and 
other priority groups.
Em ployers are exem pted from  the paym ent o f  social security contributions. T hese are limited to  the 
am ount o f  salary that is equal (or lower) to  the m inim um  w age for a m axim um  period o f  24 m onths. 
In certain situations the employer m ight also receive a m onetary prize. They will also receive further 
funding for training (which can am ount to a m axim um  400 hours) and for tutoring expenses. 
Recipients receive a fixed-term contract lasting 12 or 24 m onths or an open-end contract. This can be  
either a part-time (16 hours/w eek) or a full-time contract. T hey m ight also receive com plem entary
training (Gautrat, Fraisse and B ucollo  2000, p. 26-7).
Registered T his programme provides wage subsidies (approximately m inim um  wage) to public or private
unem ployed entering employers. Placem ents should have a minimal duration o f  6 m onths and a maximal duration o f  2
the activation period. years. T he duration o f  the Job Training schem e can be extended i f  the em ployer provides training to
the recipient, or i f  he em ploys the recipient under norm al conditions for a period equal to  the Job  
Training period. T he recipient continues to receive the social assistance benefit that is com plem ented
by a work subsidy (per hour) (Rosdahl and W eise 2000, p. 172).
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Table 2 -  Employment Incentives (cont.)





Individual Job U nem ployed persons
T rain ing w h o  have difficulties
in finding a job or job
training on  ordinary
T he pay and working
(Consolidation) conditions (e.g. long­
A ct on an active term unem ployed and
labour market low  qualified
policy, no. 199 youngsters).
o f  27 D ecem ber
1993
A dditional Jobs long-term
Schem e for the unem ployed, social
Long-Term assistance recipients
U nem ployed’
(EW LW  -
Melkert-I)
(not available)
I / D  Jobs long-term
unem ployed, social
D ecree o f assistance recipients
17.12.1998,
Stcrt. 1998 /2 4 6
Recipients are also entitled to apply to  ‘placem ents, w hich is targeted at hard to em ploy recipients 
with. Private employers or voluntary organisations can initiate these projects, although these are 
often  led by municipalities them selves. There is a net job creation clause to these kind o f  projects. 
T he recipient continues to receive the social assistance benefit w hich is com plem ented  by a work
subsidy (per hour) (Rosdahl and W eise 200, p. 172-3).
T he programme aims at providing long-term  unem ployed social assistance recipients w ith  
permanent additional jobs in the public sector (namely w ith municipalities). Jobs w ould  cover  
needs in the childcare, sports, health care, security and heritage conservation. Recipients w ere 
expected to receive a salary that w ould  n ot exceed  120% o f  the statutory m inim um  wage. This 
programme was replaced by the I / D  Jobs programm e in 1999 (O E C D  1998, p. 123; van
O orschot and E ngelfriet 2000, p. 28-9).
This schem e tied to expand access to  m ore qualified jobs in the public sector (O E C D  1998, p.
123, van O orschot and Engelfriet 2000, p. 28-9).
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Name /Legislation Target Group
Subsidies for U nem ployed
perm anent youngsters or young
em ploym ent jobseekers in search
contracts for a first job and long
term -unem ployed
D ecree Law
3 4 /9 6  o f  18.4.96
E xem ption  from Long-Term







3 4 /9 6  o f  1996
18.4.96; Law
4 7 /9 6  o f  1996
Description
Enterprises with up to 50 em ployees w hich create new  jobs, for w hich  they recruit on  open-ended  
contracts long term unem ployed (or young unem ployed), may receive financial aid in  the form  o f  a non- 
refundable subsidy equal up to 12 tim es the m onthly m inim um  wage. T he subsidy may also be granted 
to enterprises w ith  over 50 em ployees w hen  they recruit unem ployed persons aged over 45 years w ho  
have been registered at the em ploym ent office for m ore than 18 m onths. T he subsidised enterprises 
enter into an obligation n ot to shed any jobs for a period o f  at least four years (European E m ploym ent
Observatory 2002b, p. 139).
Enterprises that recruit long-term  unem ployed jobseekers on  an open-ended contract o f  em ploym ent 
are exem pted from  payment o f  social security contributions for 36 m onths. T he qualifying condition  for 
this benefit is that the number o f  em ployees in the firm m ust have increased in com parison to the final 
m onth o f  the previous year (European E m ploym ent O bservatory 2002b, p. 138)..
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Table 3 -  Start-Up Incentives
Scheme
(country)







Support for entry U nem ployed,
into self- young unem ployed
em ploym ent and long-term
(A poio a Criacao unem ployed
do Proprio persons
Em prego)
D ecree 2 4 7 /9 5  o f
29.3.95
Back to  w ork Long-term




Area A llow ance U nem ployed
(not available)
Support for entry Y oung
into self- unem ployed
em ploym ent persons and long­
term unem ployed
D ecree 2 4 7 /9 5 persons.
T his is a non-refundable installation grant corresponding to  12 tim es the national m inim um  wage. T he  
grant may be increased by 20%  if  the recipients are at least 45 years o f  age and have been unem ployed  
for longer than 12 m onths. In certain circumstances, a loan am ounting to  12 tim es the national m inim um  
wage per job created may be granted. T hey can also receive technical support and training (E U R O STA T
2001b, p. 55)
Participants w ill receive support as follow s (including increases for a qualified adult and child dependant 
allowances): - 100% o f  their weekly social welfare paym ent for the first year; - 75% for the second year; -
50% for the third year; - 25% for the fourth year. (E U R O ST A T  2001a, p. 55)
U nem ployed persons can create a job initiative by applying to their local Area Partnership (local 
developm ent body). Recipients w ill receive the equivalent to  the unem ploym ent benefit (Departm ent o f
Enterprise Trade & E m ploym ent 19983).
T his includes a non-refundable installation grant corresponding to 12 tim es the national m inim um  wage 
and assistance in drawing up the enterprise proposal at the end o f  a six-w eek training course in 
organisation and managem ent. T he grant may be increased by 20% i f  the recipients are at least 45 years 
o f  age and have been unem ployed for longer than 12 m onths. In certain circum stances, a loan am ounting  
 to 12 times the national m inim um  wage per job created may be. granted (E U R O ST A T  2001b, p. 55).
3 http://www.entemp.ie/book/rcepOO.htm
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Table 3 -  Start-Up Incentives (cont.)
Scheme
(country)




E m ploym ent 
Initiative (ILE)
D ecree Law  
1 8 9 /9 6  o f  
8.10.96
Long-term  
unem ployed (and 
other vulnerable 
groups)
T he ‘Local E m ploym ent Initiative’ (ILE) provides technical and financial assistance in the creation 
o f  small enterprises (less than 5 people) that can prom ote local developm ent. Financial aid is then  
given up to an am ount equal to 36 times the statutory m inim um  w age, two-thirds o f  w hich  are a 
subsidy and one-third a interest-free loan. T he loans m ust be repaid w ithin a period o f  n o  m ore than 
seven years. T he subsidies are increased by 20%  w hen  young people, recipients o f  the guaranteed 
m inim um  incom e or long-term  unem ployed persons are hired. Entrepreneurs have to attend 
m anagem ent training courses in order to have access to  the start-up incentive (E U R O ST A T  2001b,
p. 33).
Table 4 -  Job Sharing/Job rotation schemes
Scheme
(country)
Name / legislation Target Group Description
T T K
(Finland)
Job-R otation  
(not available)
U nem ployed This schem e allows employers to hire unem ployed persons to  replace em ployees (working at the least 75% o f  
norm al w orking-tim e and w ho has been w orking for at least one year) to engage in training/education or to  
take on  caring responsibilities (European E m ploym ent Observatory 2002a, p. 70-1).
Part-time pay 
supplem ent
Em ploym ent D ecree  
(1330 /1996) and new  
E m ploym ent D ecree  
(1363 /1997) as 
amended.
U nem ployed T his schem e allows employers to take on  a registered unem ployed person to replace an em ployee w h o  has 
voluntarily changed h is /h er  full time job to a part-time job for up to a year. T he em ployee in turn, w ill receive  
a part-time incom e supplem ent as com pensation for dim inished earnings (European E m ploym ent
Observatory 2002a, p. 72).
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N ew  D eal for 
Y oung P eo p le / 











U nem ployed, Y ou ng  
U nem ployed
This option is mainly for those w ho lack qualifications at S /N V Q  Level 2 or equivalent. Y oung people  
on  this option receive an allowance equivalent to  their JSA and retain their entidem ent to any passported
benefits (European E m ploym ent O bservatory 19994)
The A ct on  Municipal A ctivation allows m unicipal authorities to buy training courses from  the local 
PES. These courses are primarily intended to  prepare individuals for other training programm es or to 
participate in m ore vocational schem es, such as Job Training. W ithin this option  individuals can chose  
from: further training in day h igh-schools, extraordinary education in youth schools, courses in  
com m unity D anish language courses for immigrants and refugees (Rosdahl and W eise 2001, p. 173).
4 http://www.eu-employment-observatory.net/ersep/uk_uk/00805340.asp
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T hese courses are intended to im prove the skills o f  unem ployed individuals in accordance w ith the needs 
o f  the local/regional labour markets. Individuals receive a form al qualification that is recognised at the 
national level. T he overall offer o f  training courses is determ ined in cooperation w ith the social partners
at the national level (European E m ploym ent Observatory 19975).
This measure provides training courses for young individuals w ho are deem ed in need o f  them , or m ight 
require them  to access further education. T hese courses can be organised by enterprises, com m ercial and
technical schools (European E m ploym ent O bservatory 19976).
PES can organise specific training courses targeted at particular groups such as em ployed persons, 
jobseekers, young persons or refugees/m igrant workers. T hese courses have a m inim al duration o f  6 
weeks. Ordinary training courses can last up to 36 w eeks, whereas special training courses may last for 18
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Table 5 -  Training Programmes (cont.)
Scheme
(country)
Name / Legislation Target Group
V ocational Y oung people and
training for young adults, either
and adults em ployed or
unem ployed, aged 18
O rdinances n° and over, w ith no
8 9 7 /9 8  o f  22 qualifications or
N ovem b er and inadequate
n °1 2 3 /9 7  o f  17 qualifications and w h o
June did n o t com plete the
four, six or nine years
o f  basic education.
Special training Long-term
for disadvantaged unem ployed, young at
groups risk and other
vulnerable groups
D ecree Law
2 4 7 /8 5  o f
12.7.85;
Ordinance




T he vocational training courses include three com ponents: general training, socio-cultural training and 
technical training. A  traineeship in a w orking environm ent is also planned. Courses have a minimum  
duration o f  1,020 hours or 1,500 hours depending on  the level o f  education o f  participants (E U R O STA T
2001b, p. 14).
Participants can benefit from training and counselling actions to avoid social exclusion and allow their 
professional integration. T hese actions consist in developing inform ation sessions and specialised training 
provided by technical assistants. C ost o f  the training is subsidised by public authorities. Participants can 
benefit from  an allowance and from  reim bursem ent o f  participants (E U R O ST A T  2001b, p. 12).
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D ecree Law  
2 4 7 /8 5  o f
12.7.85
Initial training
D ecree Law  




em ploym ent 
and integration 
courses (SIFE)
U nem ployed Instrument: State co-finances training actions for eligible participants in public or private training
centres (E U R O ST A T  2001b, p. 11).
Y oung and adult 
unem ployed w ith  a 
qualification level II or 
III
U nem ployed w ith  
low  levels o f  
qualifications or out­
dated specialist skills.
Instrument: Eligible participants can fo llow  training courses (1500 hrs) in public or private training 
centres. Trainees receive an allowance, whereas training structures benefit from  the aid o f  the State
(E U R O ST A T  2001, p. 10).
T hese courses offer jobseekers w ith som e experience o f  w ork the chance to update or extend their 
skills. T he training is o f  short duration (1 to 3 m onths) and is organised as far as possible according  
to individual training needs. T he courses are organised and managed by A N P E  (E U R O ST A T
20 0 Id, p. 25).
Articles L.322- 
4-1 o f  the 
Labour C ode  
and Circular o f  
1st A ugust 
1994.
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(JSA) M odern Y oun g U nem ployed,
U nited A pprenticeships individuals w ithout
K ingdom N /S V Q  2 or
Administrative equivalent
regulation8 qualification
RM G Apprenticeship Y ou n g  people
(Portugal) training for w ithout qualification
young people w h o  are beyond the 
com pulsory school
D ecree Law  









M odem  A pprenticeships are aimed primarily at 16-17 year-olds to enable them  to train for jobs at craft, 
technician and trainee-managem ent level, although LEC s have discretion to fund training for young people  
aged 18-24. T he training m ust lead to SV Q  L evel III or above and include core skills. N ational Training 
Organisations (N T O s) develop M A frameworks for their sector (European E m ploym ent Observatory
19999).
Participants can benefit from  vocational training as w ell as general education. T he first is carried out in 
enterprises or inter-com pany training centres or in recognised professional training centres; the general 
training is provided in vocational training centres. T he young people are bound to an enterprise by an 
apprenticeship contract. They receive social assistance and an allowance for practical, work-related training.
O n com pletion o f  the training  they are entided to a training certificate attesting a certain level o f  
qualification and schooling. Three levels o f  courses are available and can be com plem ented w ith  further
vocational courses (E U R O ST A T  2001b, p. 23).
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RMI
(France)
Table 6 -  Apprenticeship Programmes
E xem ptions 
and subsidies 
for recruitment 
o f  apprentices
Articles L.115- 
1, L .116-1, 
L. 117-1 o f  the 
Labour C ode  
(C ode Law  
n°96-376 o f  6 
 May 1996.
Y oung people w ho  
are unem ployed or 
inactive and with low  
qualifications.
T he apprenticeship contract is an alternance training contract lasting at least as long as the term o f  the 
training w hich  is the object the contract (between 1 and 3 years). It allows the recipient to o b tain a 
recognised vocational qualification with a diploma o f  vocational or technological education o f  secondary  
level or above. T he state covers all social contributions due in respect o f  the remuneration o f  an apprentice 
throughout an apprenticeship contract (typically 2 years) (E U R O ST A T  2001 d, p. 29).
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Annex 3 -  S en sitiv ity  a n a lys is  o f  the d istribu tion  o f  w eigh ts in URP Indicator
Table 1 -  URP based on a 0.8/0.2 weight distribution
Inflow Into 
Employment % of max
Relevance of Flow 
From Unemployment to 
Employment % of max
URP  
(0 .8 /0 .2 )
SZ H 97 16.60 1.00 18.10 0.37 0.87
SZ H 99 15.60 0.94 16.30 0.33 0.82
SB97 12.40 0.75 18.90 0.39 0.68
SB98 11.50 0.69 20.70 0.42 0.64
A BW 97 8.30 0.50 25.70 0.53 0.51
A BW 99 7.90 0.48 22.30 0.46 0.47
RM I98 9.50 0.57 48.80 1.00 0.66
R M G 98 8.00 0.48 36.20 0.74 0.53
SW A98 11.60 0.70 29.70 0.61 0.68
TTK 97 13.30 0.80 35.30 0.72 0.79
T TK 99 12.20 0.73 32.30 0.66 0.72
JSA97 14.00 0.84 17.90 0.37 0.75
JSA99 15.10 0.91 12.80 0.26 0.78
Table 2 -  URP based on a 0.7/0.3 weight distribution
Inflow Into 
Employment % of max
Relevance o f Flow 
From Unemployment to 
Employment % of max
URP  
(0 .7 /0 .3)
SZ H 97 16.60 1.00 18.10 0.37 0.81
SZ H 99 15.60 0.94 16.30 0.33 0.76
SB97 12.40 0.75 18.90 0.39 0.64
SB98 11.50 0.69 20.70 0.42 0.61
A BW 97 8.30 0.50 25.70 0.53 0.51
A BW 99 7.90 0.48 22.30 0.46 0.47
RM I98 9.50 0.57 48.80 1.00 0.70
RM G 98 8.00 0.48 36.20 0.74 0.56
SW A98 11.60 0.70 29.70 0.61 0.67
T TK 97 13.30 0.80 35.30 0.72 0.78
T TK 99 12.20 0.73 32.30 0.66 0.71
JSA97 14.00 0.84 17.90 0.37 0.70
JSA99 15.10 0.91 12.80 0.26 0.72
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Table 3 -  URP based on a 0.6/0.4 weight distribution
Inflow Into 
Employment % of max
Relevance o f ¥  low 
From Unemployment to 
Employment % of max
URP  
(0 .6 /0 .4)
SZH 97 16.60 1.00 18.10 0.37 0.75
SZH 99 15.60 0.94 16.30 0.33 0.70
SB97 12.40 0.75 18.90 0.39 0.60
SB98 11.50 0.69 20.70 0.42 0.59
ABW 97 8.30 0.50 25.70 0.53 0.51
ABW 99 7.90 0.48 22.30 0.46 0.47
RMI98 9.50 0.57 48.80 1.00 0.74
RJV1G98 8.00 0.48 36.20 0.74 0.59
SW A98 11.60 0.70 29.70 0.61 0.66
TTK 97 13.30 0.80 35.30 0.72 0.77
T TK 99 12.20 0.73 32.30 0.66 0.71
JSA97 14.00 0.84 17.90 0.37 0.65
JSA99 15.10 0.91 12.80 0.26 0.65
Table 4 -  URP based on a 0.5/0.5 weight distribution
Inflow Into 
Employment % of max
Relevance o f Flow 
From Unemployment to 
Employment % o f max
URP
(0.5 /0 .5)
SZH 97 16.60 1.00 18.10 0.37 0.69
SZH 99 15.60 0.94 16.30 0.33 0.64
SB97 12.40 0.75 18.90 0.39 0.57
SB98 11.50 0.69 20.70 0.42 0.56
ABW 97 8.30 0.50 25.70 0.53 0.51
ABW 99 7.90 0.48 22.30 0.46 0.47
RMI98 9.50 0.57 48.80 1.00 0.79
RM G98 8.00 0.48 36.20 0.74 0.61
SW A98 11.60 0.70 29.70 0.61 0.65
TTK 97 13.30 0.80 35.30 0.72 0.76
T TK 99 12.20 0.73 32.30 0.66 0.70
JSA97 14.00 0.84 17.90 0.37 0.61
JSA99 15.10 0.91 12.80 0.26 0.59
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Table 5 -  Correlation between employment effectiveness and URP (based on a 0.8/0.2 
weight distribution)
y U RP (0.810.2)
SZ H 97 21.43 0.87
SZ H 99 14.71 0.82
SB97 29.85 0.68
SB98 28 0.64
A BW 97 20.62 0.51
A BW 99 15.07 0.47
RM I98 18.37 0.66
RM G 98 22.5 0.53
SW A98 29.41 0.68
TTK 97 35.09 0.79
T TK 99 35.94 0.72
JSA97 31.03 0.75
JSA99 28.13 0.78
r =  0.31
Table 6 -  Correlation between employment effectiveness and URP (based on a 0.7/0.3
weight distribution)
y U R P (0 .7 /0 .3 )
SZ H 97 21.43 0.81
SZ H 99 14.71 0.76
SB97 29.85 0.64
SB98 28 0.61
A BW 97 20.62 0.51
A BW 99 15.07 0.47
RM I98 18.37 0.70
RM G 98 22.5 0.56
SW A98 29.41 0.67
T TK 97 35.09 0.78
T T K 99 35.94 0.71
JSA97 31.03 0.70
JSA99 28.13 0.72
r  =  0.34
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Table 7 -  Correlation between employment effectiveness and URP (based on a 0.6/0.4 
weight distribution)
Y U R P  (0 .6 /0 .4 )
SZH 97 21.43 0.75
SZH 99 14.71 0.70
SB97 29.85 0.60
SB98 28 0.59
ABW 97 20.62 0.51
ABW 99 15.07 0.47
RMI98 18.37 0.74
RM G98 22.5 0.59
SW A98 29.41 0.66
TTK 97 35.09 0.77
TTK 99 35.94 0.71
JSA97 31.03 0.65
JSA99 28.13 0.65
r =  0.34
Table 7 -  Correlation between employment effectiveness and URP (based on a 0.6/0.4
weight distribution)
y U R P  (0 .5 /0 .5 )
SZH 97 21.43 0.69
SZH 99 14.71 0.64
SB97 29.85 0.57
SB98 28 0.56
ABW 97 20.62 0.51
ABW 99 15.07 0.47
RMI98 18.37 0.79
RM G98 22.5 0.61
SWA98 29.41 0.65
TTK 97 35.09 0.76
TTK 99 35.94 0.70
JSA97 31.03 0.61
JSA99 28.13 0.59
r  =  0.29
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Annex 4 -  C orrela tion a l analysis
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(Z =  Y -Y ’)
SZ H 97 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.62 0.94 0.64 21.43 0.75 -6.65
SZ H 99 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.68 0.94 0.64 14.71 0.70 -12.05
SB97 0.85 0.50 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.00 0.51 29.85 0.60 5.54
SB98 0.89 0.50 0.00 0.30 1.00 0.75 0.77 28.00 0.59 4.15
A BW 97 0.97 0.60 0.25 0.40 0.33 1.00 0.78 20.62 0.51 -1.29
A BW 99 0.96 0.60 0.25 0.40 0.36 1.00 0.77 15.07 0.47 -5.75
RMI98 0.61 0.30 0.00 0.75 0.67 0.00 0.36 18.37 0.74 -9.58
RM G 98 0.52 0.60 0.00 0.75 0.27 0.00 0.33 22.50 0.59 -1.36
SW A98 0.73 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.75 0.63 29.41 0.66 3.55
T TK 97 0.68 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.67 0.75 0.62 35.09 0.77 6.45
T TK 99 0.62 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.62 1.00 0.69 35.94 0.71 8.97
JSA97 0.58 0.12 0.50 1.00 0.10 0.38 0.39 31.03 0.65 5.43
JSA99 0.59 0.42 0.50 1.00 0.13 0.38 0.41 28.13 0.65 2.58
r / Y -0.06 -0.39 -0.11 0.12 0.13 -0.09 -0.08 - - -
r !  Z 0.19 -0.31 -0.14 0.17 0.05 -0.06 0.02 - - -
r j  URP - - - - 0.24 - - 0.34 - -
Notes:
1 - Values in this column represent the product of the sum of the investment in ALMP as a percentage of GDP for each country, as a proportion of the best performing case.
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Table 2 - Correlation between the employment effectiveness of GMI schemes and their respect for the Right to Personal Development, when the
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(Z =  Y -Y ’)
SZ H 97 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.94 0.61 21.43 0.75 -6.65
SZ H 99 0.52 0.60 0.50 0.10 0.94 0.61 14.71 0.70 -12.05
SB97 0.85 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.42 29.85 0.60 5.54
SB98 0.89 0.50 0.00 0.30 0.75 0.66 28.00 0.59 4.15
A BW 97 0.97 0.60 0.25 0.40 1.00 0.81 20.62 0.51 -1.29
A B W 99 0.96 0.60 0.25 0.40 1.00 0.81 15.07 0.47 -5.75
RM I98 0.61 0.30 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.35 18.37 0.74 -9.58
R M G 98 0.52 0.60 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.34 22.50 0.59 -1.36
SW A98 0.73 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75 29.41 0.66 3.55
T T K 97 0.68 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.75 0.57 35.09 0.77 6.45
T T K 99 0.62 0.50 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.62 35.94 0.71 8.97
JSA97 0.58 0.12 0.50 1.00 0.38 0.51 31.03 0.65 5.43
JSA99 0.59 0.42 0.50 1.00 0.38 0.54 28.13 0.65 2.58
r / Y -0.06 -0.39 -0.11 0.12 -0.09 -0.13 - - -
r / 7 . 0.19 -0.31 -0.14 0.17 -0.06 0.01 - - -
r !  URP - - - - - 0.34 - -
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Annex 5  -  F undam entals o f  Q u alita tive  C om parative  A nalysis
1. BASICS OF QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
1.1. USE OF BINARY DATA
Comparative analysis using Boolean Algebra consists in analysing how a given outcome 
emerges as the result of the presence or absence of certain conditions. Hence, both the 
dependent and the independent variables are represented using a binary nominal scale, 
where 1 means presence of a certain condition/outcome, and 0 means the absence of that 
condition/outcome. This conditions how more complex variables are represented. Hence, 
nominal-scale measures with more than two categories should be represented with several 
binary variables. Interval-scale measures are transformed into multicategory (binary) 
nominal-scale variables (Ragin 1987, p. 86).
1.2. USE OF THE TRUTH TABLE TO REPRESENT THE DATA
Once the raw data has been recoded in binary variables, this will be presented in a Truth 
Table. Each row represents a logical combination of independent variables associated with 
a given output value of the dependent variable. Besides the logical combination of 
dependent and independent variables, the Truth Table includes a column representing the 
frequency of a given combination. Yet, one must be aware that this is not as important in 
Boolean analysis as it is in traditional statistical analysis. Nonetheless, there are ways of 
incorporating the frequency of a given combination as part of the comparative analysis. For 
instance, one can set a minimal number of observations for a given combination to be 
considered relevant in the analysis (Ragin 1987, p. 87-9).
1.3. COMBINATORIAL LOGIC: BOOLEAN ADDITION AND BOOLEAN 
MULTIPLICATION
In Boolean algebra *+’ is the equivalent to the logical operator ‘OR’. The meaning of this 
logical operator must be related with the differentiation between necessary and sufficient 
conditions. If one considers the following logical combination:
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This means that Y can occur as long as one of the three conditions (A, B or C) is present. 
Here lies a significant advantage in regards to statistical analysis, which in order to achieve 
this result would require a higher number of cases (and the application of discriminant 
analysis or log-linear analysis).
In Boolean algebra ‘x’ is the equivalent to the logical operator ‘AND’. If one considers the 
following logical combination:
Abe2 + ABC = Y
This means that Y can occur when one of these two combinations (AbC, ABC) occur. The 
important thing here is that a combination Abe means that a given outcome refers to the 
presence of A, ‘AND’ the absence of B, ‘AND’ the absence of C. More than that, it means 
that can A only produce Y if B and C are absence. This is a necessary condition (Ragin 
1987, p. 89-92).
1.4. BOOLEAN MINIMISATION AND PRIME IMPLICANTS3
As mentioned earlier, the Table of Truth presents a number of logical combinations 
(Primitive Expressions) of dependent variables that are expected to produce a given 
outcome. Boolean minimisation is the process by which one can simplify the diversity of 
Primitive Expressions and provide a more succinct formula to explain Y. Underlying the 
minimisation procedures in Boolean analysis is the concept of implication: “A Boolean 
expression is said to imply another if the membership of the second term is a subset of the 
membership of the first” (Ragin 1987, p. 95). Hence, the process of minimisation intends 
to determine which is the simplest way to explain a larger subset of configurations.
The first step of this minimisation process consists in reducing the number of expressions 
that cause a given outcome. This minimisation operation consists of an experiment-like
<f
As a convention, when a variable is represented with an uppercase, this means that the variable is present 
^1). When a variable is represented with a lowercase, this means that the variable is absent (0).
One must remember that, in order to simplify algebraic functions, the multiplication sign can be collapsed.
3 One should first try to analyse there are no contradictory combinations in our analysis.
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process where pairs of configurations, differing in just one cause are compared in order to 
find a simpler expression. The basic minimisation rule is the following:
“If two Boolean expressions differ only in one causal condition yet produce the same 
outcome, then the causal conditions that distinguishes the two expressions can be 
considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression” 
(Ragin 1987, p. 93).
Take the following function:
Y = ABC + AbC + ABc + aBc
Applying the minimisation rule mentioned earlier we get:
Y = AC + AB + Be
The terms of this function are called ‘primary implicants’, in the sense that they imply a 
larger number of primitive expressions. Yet, it might happen that not all primary 
implicants are logically essential, i.e, there are more primary implicants than those really 
needed to explain the totality of primitive expressions. The second stage of this 
minimisation process consists in the construction of a prime implicant chart, which maps 
the links between prime implicants and the primitive expressions. (If the prime implicant 
charts are very complicated it might be necessary to use sophisticate computer algorithms). 
This second minimisation stage will lead to a ‘logically minimal equation’, which uses the 
essential prime implicants to explain a given output. One should nonetheless be aware that 
this second stage of of the minimisation process is optional. It is necessary to determine if 
the logical minimal equation is the most suitable form to explain a given output (Ragin 
1987, p. 95-98).
Finally, one should mention a further method of simplifying the functions that explain how 
a given outcome is produced. This can be done through Boolean factoring. Take the 
following function:
Y = AB + AC + AD
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This can be represented in the following way 
Y = A(B + C + D)
There are significant advantages to factoring a given Boolena function. First of all, it 
allows us to better differentiate necessary and sufficient conditions. Furthermore, it 
identifies the conditions that are causally equivalent.
Factoring can also be used to simplify an expression that could not be simplified through 
the use of prime implicants or in order to adjust the findings of the comparative analysis to 
the theoretical framework used (‘theoretical factoring’) (Ragin 1987, p. 110-11).
1.5. EXPLAINING ABSENT OUTCOMES -  THE USE OF MORGAN’S LAW
In some cases it might necessary to explain the absence of a given output. Instead of 
building a new truth table and reapply the minimisation algorithms, one can apply 
Morgan’s Law to the equation that explains how that output has been produced. This 
means that the terms of the equation will be inverted. Hence:
- The presence of a given condition (A) will be recoded as absence (a);
- Logical AND is recoded as logical OR
- Logical OR is recoded as logical AND
For instance, if one takes the following equation 
S = AC + Be
will be transformed in the following equation:
s = (a + c) (b + C)
this can be further simplified
s = ab + aC + be
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1.6. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CAUSES
The dichotomy necessity/sufficiency is of especial interest in comparative analysis as 
clarifies the causal relations between conditions and outcomes. This is especially useful in 
studies that aim to test theoretical arguments, or that analyse a set of cases with very 
similar outcomes, When a cause deemed as necessary when is always present when a 
certain outcome occurs. When a cause can produce an outcome by itself it is defined as 
sufficient.
Necessity and sufficiency should be always taken in consideration jointly:
- In certain cases there is only one explanatory condition to a given outcome -  then 
the cause is both sufficient and necessary;
- In other cases there is more than one cause can, by itself, produce a given outcome 
-  these are sufficient, but not necessary causes;
- In some cases a given cause is present in all combinations, but cannot, by itself, 
produce a given outcome -  this is a necessary, but not sufficient cause;
- In other cases, a cause appears only appears in a subset of combinations that 
produce a given outcome - this cause is neither necessary nor sufficient (Ragin 
1987, p. 99-101);
2. OTHER ISSUES IN QCA
2.1. LIMITED DIVERSITY
In traditional statistical analysis the issue of diversity is deal by the setting of a number of 
assumptions on populations, variables and how these relate (the use of ceteris paribus 
conditions and linear models is the best example of this approach. In qualitative 
comparative research, the analysis of causal relationships is done by maximising diversity 
and complexity. The problem of limited diversity is specially significant for (qualitative) 
comparative analysis, as it limits the possibility to extract causal relations. These are 
limited by the range of causally relevant conditions that actually exist (Ragin 1987, p. 104- 
6).
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Boolean analysis allows us to deal with the issue of limited diversity. There are two 
options to this.
Option 1 -  Limiting causal inference to existing combinations
The first option would consist in accessing the diversity of causal combinations for a given 
phenomenon. This can be done by introducing an output column in the truth table. This 
column (P) will identify if a particular combination actually exists (1) or not (0). Then one 
can use the traditional minimisation algorithms to identify an equation which shows the 
basic types of combinations that actually exist. For instance:
P = ac + aD + BD + Abd
This means that in the sample of cases under analysis one can find these typical 
combinations. One must remember thought, that these are typical combination. There are 
other type of combinations.
Using Morgan’s law, one can determine the type of combinations that are not present in the 
sample:
p = ABd + aCd + AbD + BCd
These two equations determine the limits of the analysis, i.e., the causal inferences can 
only be applied to existing combinations (P). In the same line of thought, one can also 
assume that these non-existing combinations would not produce the output (R) under 
analysis. In fact, the author suggest that these combinations should be recorded as non­
presence of outputs (r)** (Ragin 1987, p. 107-9).
Once we have recoded the truth table, we can then apply the minimisation algorithms in 
order to determine which causal conditions produce output R. Assuming that the equation 
would be
R = ABD + aCD
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One can derive R only occurred in two typical types of combinations, from the existing 
four. In subsequent phases the researcher use these two combinations to classify the cases 
where the output was present (Ragin 1987, p. 109-10).
Option 2 -  Extending causal inference to non-existing combinations
As mentioned earlier, there is a second (optional) step to deal with the issue of limited 
diversity. Traditionally comparative researchers tend to either restrict their causal 
inferences to the cases under analysis. In order cases, some try to expand those inferences 
to nonexistent cases, neglecting or obscuring the assumptions that underlie such an 
exercise. In order to enable qualitative comparative analysis to extend causal inferences to 
non-existent combinations.
In order to do this the author suggests that non-existent combinations are recoded to 
produce output R4. Prime implicants are derived using existent and non-existent 
conditions. Yet, when constructing the prime implicant chart to simplify the explanatory 
equation, the non-existing combinations should not be included5 (Ragin 1987, p. 109-10).
One should nonetheless be careful in the use of this second option. Actually, the author 
suggest that using the first option is more adequate, especially when the number of cases is 
small. First of all, because this does not imply any assumptions on non-existent 
combinations. Second, especially if the analysis involves a small number of cases, the 
analysis of complexity might be more important than parsimony (Ragin 1987, p. 13).
2.2. CONTRADICTORY COMBINATIONS
As the number of cases under analysis grows, the probability of finding contradictory rows 
increases. This might produce combinations with no clear outcome. This is a problem that 
must be cleared in the construction of the truth table. The author suggests two main
4 Note that this is the opposite o f  Option 1, where non-existing combinations . There is a point o f  criticism 
here. The underlying logic o f  Option 1 is that R is a logical consequence o f  P, i.e., r would not be present if  
the combinations in P were not there. Yet, this does not apply to option two. This option would only allow us 
to speculate o f  the possibility that all non-existing combinations would produce the same output.
5 There is a second criticism to this. Earlier the author suggests that the prime implicant chart is optional. Yet, 
here he does not make it clear if  in order to extend causal inferences to non-existent combinations the prime 
implicant chart is mandatory or not.
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approaches to deal with this issue. The (traditional) ‘case-oriented approach’ consists in 
reanalysing more thoroughly the troublesome cases in order to find omitted or uncovered 
variables, and if necessary to reconstruct the truth table in order to include those variables 
(Ragin 1987, p. 13). The truth table can be used to help in the task of identifying omitted or 
variables or refine existing variables. The process consists of creating a new column (X) 
which differentiates between combinations that produce a clear outcome (0)6 and 
contradictory combinations (1). The truth table is simplified by using the traditional 
minimisation algorithms. Assuming that the final equation would be
X = ABD + Abd
In order to simplify this equation the author suggests that non-existent combinations are 
recoded to produce output X7. Prime implicants are derived using existent and non­
existent conditions (which are recoded as 1). Yet, when constructing the prime implicant 
chart to simplify the explanatory equation, the non-existing combinations should not be 
included8. The author suggests that the result of this equation would be
X’ = A
What both equations tell us is that contradictory causal combinations can occur when A is 
present. This might lead the researcher to clarify the content of A, or alternatively, to try to 
look for an omitted variable that might condition the influence of A (Ragin 1987, p. 113- 
15).
Despite the preference given to this option by the author, in some cases, it is not possible to 
go back to the data. In other cases, when the purpose is to test a given theory, it might not 
adequate to include explanatory variables that are not covered by that theoretical 
framework9. The second approach would then consist in the elimination of contradictory
6 Hence all combinations in R that are coded as 1 or 0, will be recoded as 0.
7 Note that this is the opposite o f  Option 1, where non-existing combinations . There is a point o f  criticism 
here. The underlying logic o f  Option 1 is that R is a logical consequence o f  P, i.e., r would not be present if 
the combinations in P were not there. Yet, this does not apply to option two. This option would only allow us 
to speculate o f  the possibility that all non-existing combinations would produce the same output.
8 There is a second criticism to this. Earlier the author suggests that the prime implicant chart is optional. Yet, 
here he does not make it clear if  in order to extend causal inferences to non-existent combinations the prime 
implicant chart is mandatory or not.
9 Curiously, the author does not recognise this type o f situation.
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combinations by Boolean or statistical techniques. The author suggest three Boolean 
alternatives:
- Recode the outcome of contradictory combinations as 0 -  The assumption that 
given the fact that there are contradictory evidence, it might be best to assume that 
they will not produce the outcome in question;
- Recode the outcome of contradictory combinations as 1 -  the assumption here is 
that in order to capture the full complexity of a given phenomenon, contradictory 
combinations should be considered to produce the outcome in question;
Recode the outcome of contradictory combinations as Non-Existent -  By using the
minimisation operations used to extend causal inferences to non-existing 
1 ncombinations , it might be possible to determine which outcome value the 
contradictory combination should receive. If they produce a minimal solution, they
A A
receive a coding of 1. If not they receive a coding of 0 (Ragin 1987, p. 116-17).
If the number of cases allows it is possible to use statistical techniques to recode the 
contradictory combinations. One option is to set a standard for the probability of a positive 
outcome for the whole sample of cases and them to compare the probability of a positive 
outcome in the set of contradictory conditions. When the probability for the contradictory 
combinations is significantly higher than the standard probability (say, at the least, 0.33) 
then these combinations will be recoded as producing a positive outcome (1). In the 
opposite case, then these combinations will be recoded as producing a absent outcome (0). 
This option might, however not eliminate all the ambiguous combinations (Ragin 1987, p. 
117).
One more complex option would consist in using a logit model to compute the expected 
outcome values for each combination. The observed deviations from the expected values 
could them be used as the basis for the recoding the ambiguous combinations. Hence, large 
positive deviations would be coded 1 and large negative deviations would be coded 0 
(Ragin 1987, p. 117-18)12.
10 In order to do this the author suggests that non-existent combinations are recoded to produce output R . 
Prime implicants are derived using existent and non-existent conditions. Yet, when constructing the prime 
implicant chart to simplify the explanatory equation, the non-existing combinations should not be included 
JRagin 1987, p. 109-10).
The option is not clear.
12 The author mentions, in very superficial terms, a third option o f  conducting a Boolean analysis and a log- 
linear analysis.
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2.3. EVALUATING THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
Boolean analysis allows various options in the testing competing theoretical frameworks.
2.3.1. Determining which causal combinations that were hypothesized by different 
theoretical frameworks are found in the empirical analysis.
Theories do not specify causal variables alone. They point to causal combinations. Lets 
assume that there are two contradicting theories on R. T1 argues that R = B, and T2 argues 
that T = aCd. Boolean analysis can be used to test their empirical validity. This can be 
done by mapping the areas of agreement or disagreement between the theoretical derived 
model (T) and the results of the analysis of the truth table (R’13). Lets assume that
T = B + aCd
R’ = AB + CD
If we intercept the two, we have:
(T) (R’) = (B + aCd) (AB + CD)
Applying the Distributive Law of Boolean Algebra14, this can be transformed in the 
following way
(T) (R’) = BAB15 + BCD + aCdAB16 + aCdCD17
13 Here the author uses R \  which includes non-existent observations. Yet, as the author it se lf mentions, the 
inclusion o f  this type o f  combinations is not mandatory (Ragin 1987, p. 117-18). Given that these equations 
are supposed to be more parsimonious, hence simpler to use, I will assume that the author uses R’ for 
demonstration purposes.
14 See Laws o f Boolean Algebra in Annex I.
15 Applying the Absortion Law, B is part o f  AB.
16 This is an inconsistent term, as ‘A ’ is both present and absent. Hence, this expression is not valid.
17 This is an inconsistent term, as ‘D ’ is both present and absent. Hence, this expression is not valid.
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(T) (R’) = AB + BCD
This would show that the hypothesis posed by T1 can only be partially confirmed, as B is
not a sufficient condition to produce R. B can only produce R in the presence of A or
instead in the presence of CD.
2.3.2. Determining causal combinations that were not hypothesized by different 
theoretical frameworks
Boolean analysis also allows us to identify the shortcomings of the competing theories. 
The first step here is to determine the causal conditions that were not hypothesised by the 
existing theories. This can be done by applying De Morgan’s Law to T:
T = B + aCd
t = b (A + c + D)
t = Ab + be + bD
The next step is to intercept t with R’ :
(t) (R’) = (Ab + be + bD) (AB + CD)
(t) (R’) = AbAB + AbCD + beAB + beGD-+ ABbB + bDCD 
(t) (R’) = AbCD + bCD 
(t) (R’) = bCD
If one looks at T1 and T2, one can observe that neither considers that the absence of ‘B’ can 
produce R. What the previous operation shows is that in situations where ‘C’ and ‘D’ is 
present, the absence o f ‘B’ does not impede R.
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2.3.3. Modeling causal combinations that were hypothesized by different theoretical 
frameworks, but did not produce the outcome under analysis
Boolean analysis adds to the analysis of competing frameworks by allowing the researcher 
to model causal combinations that were hypothesised but that empirical evidence has 
shown not to produce the outcome. This is done by intercepting T and r \  r’ refers to all 
instances of the absence of the outcome (this is achieved by applying De Morgan’s law to 
R).
R’ = AB + CD 
r' = (a + b) (c + d) 
r' = ac + ad + be + bd
T = B + aCd
(T)(r’) = (B + aCd) (ac + ad + be + bd)
(T)(r’) = aBc + aBd + aCd
This operation shows that the second theory (aCd) is not in anyway confirmed by the 
theory. In addition, the first theory (B) appears to overemphasise the role of B in order to 
produce the outcome. In fact, this can only produce the outcome in the presence of ‘a’ and 
‘c’ or, alternatively, in the presence o f ‘a’ and ‘d’.
3. LAWS OF BOOLEAN ALGEBRA18
Commutative Law
(a ) A + B  = B + A 
(b ) A B  = BA
18 http://www.ee.surrey.ac.Uk/Projects/Labview/boolalgebra/#identitylaw
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Associate Law
(a ) (A + B )  + C = A + (B + C) 
(b) (A B) C = A (B C)
Distributive Law
(a )A ( B  + C ) = A B + A C  
(b) A + (B C) = (A+B) (A + C)
Identity Law
(a) A + A = A 
(b ) A A  = A
Redundance Law
(a) A + A B = A
(b)A  (A+B) =A
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Annex 6  - V alidation o f  the research  hypothesis using QCA
1. EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATION OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
One can test the research hypothesis that guides this study by mapping the areas of agreement or disagreement between the research hypothesis 
(T’GMIEFF), and the empirically derived model (GMIEFF).
Assuming that:
T’GMIEFF = INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT 
and
GMIEFF = INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT +
incneed* freeemp* FREE JOB *FREEDISC*resanct + INCNEED* freeemp* FREE JOB * FREEDISC* RES ANCT
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Then:
(T’GMIEFF)(GMIEFF) = (INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT) (INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT)
(T’GMIEFF)(GMIEFF) = (INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT* INCNEED1(!&eeefflp*freejob*freedisc) +
(INCNEED* FREEEMP* FREE JOB* FREEDI SC* RESANCT * *eeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT) +
(INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT* incneed* R«eet»p* FREE JOB* FREEDISC* resanct) +
(INCNEED* FREEEMP* FREE JOB * FREEDISC* RESANCT* INCNEED*lfeeeffip*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT)
(T’GMIEFF)(GMIEFF) = 0 
Note:
INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT -  Redundant condition/combination 
INCNEED*FREEEMP!|1FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT -  Inconsistent combination
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2. REBUTTAL OF NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
(T’GMIEFF) (gmieff) = (INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT) (incneed*freeemp*freejob*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*FREEEMP*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*freedisc*RESANCT)
(T’GMIEFF) (gmieff) = INCNEED* FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT*ift6fteed*freeemp*freejc>b*FRE)EDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJGB*FREEDISC*RESANCT*INCNEED*FREEEMP*ffee)eb*freedisc*RESANCT + 
IN € NEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT*ffl6fieed*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*freedisc*RESANCT
(T’GMIEFF) (gmieff) = 0
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3. IDENTIFYING THE INSUFFICIENCIES OF THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
t’GMIEFF = incneed + freeemp + freejob + freedisc + resanct
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = (incneed + freeemp + freejob + freedisc + resanct) (INCNEED* freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed* freeemp* FREEJOB * FREEDISC*resanct + INCNEED* freeemp*FREE JOB *FREEDISC* RESANCT)
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = incneed*IN CNEEB*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
incneed*INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT + freeemp* INCNEED*freeemp*freeiob*freedisc + freeemp*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
freeemp* incneed* freeemp* FREE JOB* FREEDISC* resanct + Ifreeemp*INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT + freeiob*INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + 
freejob* freeemp*freeiob*freedisc*RESANCT +
freejob* incneed* freeemp* FREEJOB* FREEDISC*resanct + freejob*INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT + freedisc*INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + 
freedi sc * freeemp * free i ob * freedi sc * RE S ANCT + freedisc* incneed* freeemp* FREE JOB * FREEDISC* resanct + freedisc*INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT + 
resanct*INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + resanet* freeemp* freejob* freedisc*RESANGT + resanct* incneed* freeemp* FREEJOB * FREEDISC*resanct + 
resanet* INCNEED* freeemp* FREEJOB * FREEDI SC * RES ANCT
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(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) -  incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct +  INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + 
freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + INCNEED * freeemp* FREE JOB * FREEDISC * RE S ANCT + 
INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + INCNEED* freeemp* freejob* freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
resanct*INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*freeiob*freedisc + 
freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + INCNEED * freeemp * FREEJOB * FREEDISC * RE S ANCT + 
INCNEED*freeemp*freeiob*freedisc + freeemp*freeiob*freedisc*RESANCT + INCNEED* freeemp*freeiob*freedisc + freeemp*freeiob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
resanct*INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + incneed* freeemp * FREEJOB * FREEDISC *resanct
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + freeemp*freeiob*freedisc*RESANCT + 
incneed* freeemp* FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED* freeemp* FREE JOB* FREEDISC*RES ANCT
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = INCNEED*freeemp*freejob*freedisc + freeemp*freejob*freedisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*freeemp*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT
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Annex  7 -  S ensitivity  analysis o f  resu lts p ro d u c e d  by  QCA
1. MAPPING DIVERSITY IN GMI SCHEMES
This Annex will evaluate the impact of eliminating cases where the increase in investment in ALMP could have an impact in the percentage of recipients 
who find a job (SZH99, SB98, ABW99 and JSA99), and where marginal effectiveness is close to 0 (RMG98, ABW97).
Table 1 -  Crisp-Set representation of the remaining cases
Income needs are better 
satisfied a
More freedom to chose other 
activities instead of paid 
employmentb
More freedom to choose the 
job one wants'







SZH97 0 1 1 0 1 0
SB97 1 0 0 0 0 1
RMI98 0 0 0 1 0 0
SWA98 1 0 1 1 1 1
TTK97 0 0 0 0 1 1
TTK99 0 0 0 0 1 1
ISA97 0 0 1 1 0 1
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2. ANALYSING THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVENESS OF GMI SCHEMES
Note:
INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT -  Redundant condition/combination
INCNEEE) * FREEEMP * FREE JOB * FREEDI SC * RESANCT -  Inconsistent combination
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2.1. ANALYSING POSITIVE CASES
GMIEFF = INCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT
GMIEFF = freeemp*frejob*fredisc (INCNEED*resanct + incneed*RESANCT) + freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC (incneed*resanct + INCNEED*RESANCT)
2.2. ANALYSING NEGATIVE CASES
gm ieff = incneed*freeemp*frejob*FREDISC*resanct+ incneed* FREEEMP* FREJOB*fredisc* RESANCT
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3. VALIDATION OF THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
3.1. EMPIRICAL CONFIRMATION OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
GMIEFF = INCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT
T’GMIEFF = INCNEED* FREEEMP * FREE JOB * FREEDI SC * RES AN CT
(T’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = (INCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*RESANCT +
incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT) (INCNEED* FREEEMP* FREE JOB*FREEDISC * RES ANCT)
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(T’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = (INCNEED*freeefflp*frejob*fredisc*resanct*INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT) + 
(mefteed* freeemp* frejob* fredisc* RES ANCT*IN€NEED* FREEEMP* FREE JOB* FREEDISC* RES ANCT) +
( incneed* freeemp* FREJOB * FREDISC*resanct*INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB * FREEDISC* RES ANCT) +  
(INCNEED*freeefflp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT*INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT)
(TGM IEFF) (GMIEFF) = 0
3.2. EMPIRICAL REBUTTAL OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
(T’GMIEFF) (gmieff) = (INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT) (incneed*freeemp*frejob*FREDISC*resanct+ (incneed*FREEEMP*FREJOB*fredisc*RESANCT)
(T’GMIEFF) (gm ieff) = INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT*iftefteed*freeemp*frejob*FREDISC*resanct + 
INCNEED*FREEEMP*FREEJOB*FREEDISC*RESANCT*ineneed*FREEEMP*FREJOB*fredisc*RESANCT
(T’GMIEFF) (gmieff) = 0
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3.3. IDENTIFYING THE INSUFFICIENCIES OF THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
t’GMIEFF = incneed + freeemp + freejob + freedisc + resanct
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = (incneed + freeemp + freejob + freedisc + resanct) (INCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*RESANCT + 
incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT)
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = incneed*INCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*incneed*freeemp*freiob*fredisc*RESANCT +
incneed*incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + incneed*INCNEED*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT +
ffeeemp*INCNEED*freeemp*freiob*fredisc*resanct + freeemp* incneed*ffeeemp*frejob*fredisc*RESANCT +
freeemp* incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + freeemp* INCNEED* freeemp* FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT +
freei ob * INCNEED * freeemp* frej ob * fredisc * resanct + freejob* incneed* freeemp* frejob* fredisc* RESANCT +
freejeb*incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + freejob* INCNEED* freeemp * FREJOB* FREDISC * RES AN CT +
freedi sc * IN CNEED * freeem p * fre i ob* fred isc * resanct +  freedisc*incneed*freeemp*ffejob*fredisc*RESANCT +
freedisc* incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + freedisc*INCNEED*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT +
resanct * IN CNEED * freeem p * frei ob * fredi sc * r esanct + resanet* incneed* freeemp* frejob* fredisc* RESANCT +
resanct*incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + resanet*INCNEED*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*RESANCT
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = incneed*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct + 
incneed* freeemp*freiob*fredisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + INCNEED* freeemp* FREJOB* FREDISC*RESANCT +
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INCNEED*freeemp*freiob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*freiob*fredisc* RESANCT + INCNEED*freeemp*freiob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*freiob*fredisc*RESANCT + 
rNCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct + incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct
(t’GMIEFF) (GMIEFF) = incneed*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*RESANCT + incneed*freeemp*FREJOB*FREDISC*resanct + INCNEED*freeemp*frejob*fredisc*resanct +
INCNEED* freeemp* FREJOB * FREDISC* RES ANCT
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